A Neoplatonist’s Hymn

“I once heard someone singing

Two souls were passing on, and one said to the other, where must we go?* 

Some time later, I heard another person singing the tune and the rhythm to which Two souls were passing on was sung, but the words and the meaning were not the ones from before. Instead they were

The First Reason leads me and again downward brings me.**

Like I said, both this song and the earlier song were sung to the same rhythm. When [my soul] had been moved here and there by [this] rhythm, I remembered the place I had first heard it, then [I remembered] the man who sang it, and then the [lyrics] ‘Two souls were passing on’ and the rest. There are, then, certain traces in the soul which follow one another by necessity, in which it is impossible that [the memories] that come next will not follow once [the soul] is set in motion.”

πάλιν ἤκουσά του ᾄδοντος “δύο ψυχαὶ ἐξήρχοντο, καὶ μία πρὸς ἄλλην ἔλεγε, ποῖ πορευτέον”.* μετὰ δέ τινας χρόνους ἤκουσα ἄλλου ᾄδοντος τὸ μὲν μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν ἐκεῖνον, καθ' ὃν ᾔδετο τὸ “δύο ψυχαὶ ἐξήρχοντο”, ἡ δὲ λέξις καὶ ἡ ἔννοια οὐκ ἐκείνη, ἀλλ' ἦν ὅτι “ὁ νοῦς ὁ πρῶτος ἄγει με καὶ πάλιν κάτω φέρει”. ᾔδετο οὖν, ὥσπερ εἶπον, τῷ αὐτῷ ῥυθμῷ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκεῖνα· ἀφ' οὗ ῥυθμοῦ πρῶτον ἀνεμνήσθην κινηθεὶς ὧδε κἀκεῖσε τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ ἤκουσα τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ, εἶτα τὸν ᾄδοντα ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τότε τὸ “δύο ψυχαὶ ἐξήρχοντο” καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν τύποι τινὲς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθοῦντες ἀλλήλοις, ἐν οἷς ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τούτου κινηθέντος μὴ ἕπεσθαι καὶ τὸν ἑξῆς.

Michael of Ephesus, In parva naturalia commentaria, CAG 22.1, 24,23-25,3 Wendland

*This song does not come up with a TLG search, except for the paraphrase in “Themistius” (Sophonias?), in Parva Naturalia, CAG 5.6 8,25.

**I haven’t found this song in a TLG search either, except for the “Themistius” paraphrase: in PN CAG 5.6 8,27-8.

Byzantine Silk

In this passage from his commentary on Aristotle’s Generation of Animals, Michael of Ephesus tries to explain a reference to insects generated in wool. Michael thinks Aristotle cannot mean wool, as in the material made from sheep’s hair; rather, he believes Aristotle was talking about silk, specifically the raw silk of a silkworm's cocoon.

Now, Michael is almost certainly wrong about this. The method of producing silk was unknown in the west in Aristotle’s time and would remain so until the reign of Justinian (6th century CE). But in trying to explain what Aristotle meant, Michael ends up giving an amazing description of the process of silk-making during the Byzantine middle-ages.

“[Generation] happens in the same way as [it does among caterpillars] in the case of the other [insects] that are generated in wool and not from copulation.” (Aristotle, De generatione animalium III 9, 758b21)

“By ‘wool’ he means what is now in fact called ‘silk’* by many people. For a certain kind of worm produces this silk. There is really nothing to stop [someone from] observing their generation. Certain winged animals copulate with one another (the males obviously with the females), and from their copulation something worm-like is produced, something which nevertheless does not have the ability to sense [i.e., is not yet really alive].** The women whose job is to produce the silk collect [these worm-like things] and place [them] in the folds of their robes, warming them, until the worm acquires sensation and becomes an animal. Once they become animals, the women place them into a sieve and give them leaves of mulberry to eat.*** By feeding on these leaves, the worms grow and so produce a cocoon around each of them, and it is the cocoon which the women unwind into silk. Then the worm dies. And after a time, out of the cocoons that have broken open, a certain winged creature emerges, resembling those that generated the worms. And it goes on in this way forever. For from this winged creature in turn a worm is produced; and from this worm, a woolen cocoon and a winged [creature]; and again from this winged creature a worm, and so on forever.”

758b21 «Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν μὴ ἐξ ὀχείας γινομένων ἐν ἐρίοις.»

Ἔρια λέγει νῦν καὶ τὴν καλουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέταξαν· σκώληκες [154] γάρ τινες ταύτην τὴν μέταξαν γεννῶσιν. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν κωλύει τὴν τούτων γένεσιν ἱστορῆσαι. ζῷά τινα πτηνὰ ὀχεύουσιν ἄλληλα, τὰ ἄρρενα δηλαδὴ τὰ θήλεα, ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὀχείας γεννᾶται σκωληκώδη τινά, ἀναίσθητα μέντοι, ἃ δὴ συλλέξασαι αἱ περὶ τὴν μέταξαν πονοῦσαι γυναῖκες καὶ ὑπὸ τὸν κόλπον ἐμβιβάσασαι θερμαίνουσιν, ἕως ἂν αἴσθησιν λάβῃ καὶ ζῷα γένηται. ζῴων δὲ γεγονότων, τίθενται αὐτὰ εἰς κόσκινα καὶ διδόασιν ἐσθίειν φύλλα συκαμίνων, ἐξ ὧν φύλλων τρεφόμενα αὔξονται καὶ οὕτως ἐργάζονται τὸ κέλυφος κύκλῳ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, καὶ ἔστι τὸ κέλυφος ὃ ἀναλύουσιν εἰς μέταξαν· εἶτα ἀποθνήσκει. καὶ μετὰ χρόνον τινὰ τοῦ κελύφους ῥαγέντος ἐξέρχεται ζῷον πτηνὸν ὅμοιον τῷ γεννήσαντι τὸν σκώληκα, καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ οὕτω γίνεται. πάλιν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πτηνοῦ τούτου γεννᾶται σκώληξ, ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἔριον κέλυφος καὶ πτηνόν, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ πτηνοῦ τούτου σκώληξ, καὶ οὕτως ἀεί.

Michael of Ephesus, In de generatione animalium commentaria, 153,29-154,13 Hayduck

*Silk had been produced in the Eastern Roman Empire since the time of Justinian (483-565 CE). In his History of the Wars, Procopius reports that Justinian wanted to solve the “silk question”: how to acquire silk without having to buy it from their Persian enemies (VIII.vi.1-8). Some monks who had recently returned from India came to Justinian with an answer. They had visited a land north of India called Serinda (Σηρίνδα, China), and discoverd the secret of silk production and how it might be produced by the Romans. Silk, they said, was produced by grubs. And while it was impossible to bring the grubs back from China alive, they could (and eventually did) bring back their eggs, hatched them in Byzantium, and began an industry that would last almost a thousand years.

**Michael is no doubt talking about the eggs laid by the silk moth (bombyx mori). Michael refuses to call them eggs, considering them instead imperfect worms. This is why the women who produce silk need to warm them: to finish the process of bringing the worm to life. He refuses to call them eggs, because, at least according to Aristotle, the immediate offspring of metamorphosizing insects are worms, a stage of life that precedes the egg. The egg itself for Aristotle (and Michael when he is interpreting him) is what we call a pupae or cocoon. Procopius in the passage cited above, does not hesitate to call the things laid by silk moth ‘eggs’, and it is remarkable to me that Michael would think they are anything else. But he seems to endorse Aristotle’s view that what the silk moth produces are tiny non-animals that need to be warmed into life, only to die when they become the egg of a different kind of animal.

***In researching this, I had no idea how silk was actually produced, so I went to youtube. I found this video from the “High Fashion Silk Company” in China which claims that “in ancient times, farmers tucked the [silkworm] eggs into their clothes so the larvae would grow up healthy”. And this video of a traditional silk-farm in Cambodia shows the silk-growers feeding the silkworms mulberry leaves in something that resembles a sieve, like Michael describes. I think the resemblance of these techniques and those described by Michael is just brilliant.

Galen and Palladius on Mental Exercise and the Boundaries between Medicine and Philosophy

In a fragment on diet for women, Athenaeus quotes an aphorism from the sixth book of the Epidemics. He writes:

“One must encourage exercises (gymnasia) that are suitable for women: of the soul by means of the studies proper for women and concerns about the household because ‘a soul's walk is concern for people’, as the venerable Hippocrates said; while, of the body [exercise] by means of spinning wool and the other work around the house.”

γυμνάσια δ’ ἐπιτρεπτέον τὰ γυναιξὶν ἁρμόζοντα, ψυχῆς μὲν τὰ διὰ τῶν οἰκείων αὐταῖς μαθημάτων καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν φροντίδων («ψυχῆς γὰρ περίπατος φροντὶς ἀνθρώποισι», ὡς εἶπεν ὁ παλαιὸς Ἱπποκράτης), σώματος δὲ διὰ τῆς ταλασιουργίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν πόνων.

Athenaeus of Attalia apud Oribasius, Libri Incerti 23, CMG VI 2,2 112,19-24 Raeder

The aphorism Athenaeus quotes from is found at Epidemics 6.5.5. He seems to think it is about exercise, but the aphorism itself is pretty ambiguous. I’ll translate it literally to try to emphasize just how ambiguous it is:

“Exertion for the joints and for flesh, food, sleep for the viscera. A soul's walk is concern for people.”

Πόνος τοῖσιν ἄρθροισι καὶ σαρκὶ σῖτος ὕπνος σπλάγχνοισιν. Ψυχῆς περίπατος φροντὶς ἀνθρώποισιν.

‘Hippocrates’, Epidemics 6.5.5, V 316,9-10 Littré

The term I translate as “concern” (phrontis) usually means something more like “apprehension” or “worry”. Athenaeus, however, takes it to be a word for any kind of serious thinking, i.e., sustained intellectual activity. The term peripatos, “walk”, can just as easily mean “wandering about”. So the aphorism could be describing apprehensiveness as a kind of wandering thought.

But Athenaeus takes Hippocrates to be claiming that concerns, thoughts, studies, etc., are quite literally forms of exercise—activities that will “nourish” a woman’s (or anyone else’s) soul, just as physical exercise, ponos, nourishes the body. 

His interpretation also likely implies a kind of corporeal dualism like what we find in the Stoics and the Pneumatic physicians. It was this kind of interpretation that two later readers took issue with. They are Galen and Palladius.

The commentaries of Galen and Palladius on the Epidemics are pretty great, if for no other reason than that they give us a glimpse into the game of Hippocratic exegesis playing out in Greek-speaking parts of the Roman empire. But they also give us a sense of how doctors tried to navigate disputes between medicine and philosophy—disputes about disciplinary boundaries, and about whose responsibility it was to treat the ailing soul or mind.

Although this is something of a simplification, it is not too much of a distortion to say that around Galen’s time medicine was usually thought of as restricted to the care of the body; philosophy, on the other hand, was a discipline whose aim was the care of the soul or mind. Some doctors, however, considering that our bodies and our health are affected by our psychological states, started to think it was also important that doctors treat the soul as well. But when these considerations were discussed, they were often accompanied by discussion of the legitimacy of medical intervention in the treatment of the soul. Doctors in other words felt they had to justify the encroachment on philosophy.

Interestingly, their justification was not usually aimed at appeasing philosophers, but other doctors who felt it was not their place to treat the soul. The two passages which follow are clearly aimed at doctors, and are examples of the kind of justification one might give, if not for the medicalization of the mind, then at least for its importance in physiology and therapeutics.

1. Galen, In Hipp. Epid. 6, 17B.263.1-264.6 Kühn = CMG V 10,2,2 280,6-281,6 Wenkenbach

“All the book’s interpreters take ‘walk’ [peripatos] to mean ‘exercise’, so that the sentence would be:

‘for humankind, concerns are an exercise.’

They think [Hippocrates] used the familiar term, ‘walk’ [peripatos], because the word means a kind of exercise. Dioscorides, however, reasonably avoided this interpretation because it is affectatious [kakozêlos]*; he did not write peripatos [in his edition], but added the letter ‘n’, [so that it reads] ‘peri pantos’: 

‘concern for the soul above all belongs to humankind’.

So that what is meant by it is:

‘above all, for humankind what is to be practiced is reasoning.’ 

For after all acts of thinking [dianoêseis] are called ‘concerns’ [phrontides], which is why Socrates, too, was called ‘concerned’ and the man’s wise counsels were called ‘concerns’, as one can even find in the Clouds of Aristophanes, where he makes fun of Socrates and mocks him as an idle-talker.

But if it should seem to anyone that the phrase belongs to philosophical speculation, not medicine—first, let them consider that it applies to all the rational arts in which one needs to exercise reasoning, as it has been said by many other physicians, and not a few times by Erasistratus.** And furthermore, certain affections occur, some, for instance, which numb the soul’s rational faculty and the faculty of memory, others which are stuporific [karôdê] and soporific [kataphorika]. In these cases, one must consider thinking to be beneficial, just as in other places he [sc. Hippocrates] taught that anger is useful for good humour and regaining a state in accordance with nature.”

Τὸν περίπατον ἀντὶ τοῦ γυμνασίου πάντες ἤκουσαν οἱ ἐξηγησάμενοι τὸ βιβλίον, ἵν' ὁ λόγος ᾖ τοιόσδε· “τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἱ φροντίδες γυμνάσιον”, <νομίσαντες αὐτὸν τῇ> προσηγορίᾳ κεχρῆσθαι τῇ τοῦ περιπάτου, δηλούσης τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης εἶδός τι γυμνασίου. κακοζήλου δὲ τῆς ἑρμηνείας οὔσης, εἰκότως αὐτὴν ὁ Διοσκουρίδης φυλαττόμενος, οὐ περίπατος ἔγραψεν, ἀλλὰ προσθεὶς τὸ ν γράμμα “περὶ παντὸς”, ὥστε γενέσθαι τὴν λέξιν τοιάνδε· ψυχῆς περὶ παντὸς φροντὶς ἀνθρώποις, ἵν' ᾖ δηλούμενον ἐξ αὐτῆς· “περὶ παντὸς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀσκητέον ἐστὶ τὸν λογισμόν.” αἱ γάρ τοι διανοήσεις ὀνομάζονται φροντίδες, ὅθεν καὶ τὸν Σωκράτην φροντιστὴν ἐκάλουν καὶ φροντίδας τὰ σοφὰ βουλεύματα τἀνδρὸς ὠνό- μαζον, ὡς κἀν ταῖς Ἀριστοφάνους Νεφέλαις <ἔστιν> εὑρεῖν, ἔνθα κωμῳδεῖ καὶ σκώπτει τὸν Σωκράτην ὡς ἀδολέσχην. εἰ δέ τῳ δόξει φιλοσόφου θεωρίας, οὐκ ἰατρικῆς ὁ λόγος ἔχεσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐνθυμείτω κοινὸν ἁπασῶν εἶναι τῶν λογικῶν αὐτὸν τεχνῶν, ἐν αἷς τὸν λογισμὸν χρὴ γυμνάζειν, ὡς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς εἴρηται τῶν ἰατρῶν Ἐρασιστράτῳ τ' οὐκ ὀλιγάκις. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ πάθη τινὰ γίνεται τὰ μὲν οἷον ναρκοῦντα τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ τὸ μνημονευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ δὲ καρώδη καὶ καταφορικά. τούτοις οὖν ἡγητέον ὠφελίμους εἶναι τὰς φροντίδας, ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις ἐδίδαξε τὰς ὀξυθυμίας εἶναι χρησίμους εἰς εὐχυμίαν τε καὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως ἀνάκτησιν.

Galen, In Hipp. Epid. 6, 17B.263.1-264.6 Kühn

2. Palladius, Commentarii in Hippocratis librum sextum de morbis popularibus, Scholia in Hippocratem et Galenum vol. 2 Dietz, 136,11-137,5

“Having put aside medical matters, Hippocrates comes again to the soul. ‘Soul’—not as in the warmth we were speaking about earlier, but the really immaterial and immortal [soul]. There are two ways it is possible to interpret this statement: for either [it says] ‘walk’ [peripatos] or ‘above all’ [peri pantos]. And ‘above all’ in this sense:

‘that for humankind there is a concern to consider the soul above all [peri pantos]’

since a person ought to honour nothing above this. For Hippocrates says just as the body is exercised, so too the soul ought to be exercised. But the soul is exercised through more [activities], since a walk is one form of exercise. Concern is any exercise [of the soul]. ‘Concern’—not in order to seek after a profit or after a woman, but to seek the comprehension of the truth, the differentiation of true things from false things. For these are exercises. And concern, especially, is [an exercise] of the rational soul. This is why we speak about the ‘Thinkery’ (phrontistêrion) of Socrates and Plato, not because they were generally concerned, but because they dwelled on the truth.

And he [sc. Hippocrates] added, ‘for humankind’ for a reason. He knows that by nature humans are distinguished in this: the spirited [part of the soul] is [a part] in a person’s real nature, but to rule belongs to reason.*** That is why, as much as it concerns philosophers, we are also able to refer the statement to what belongs to us. For if having come to a sick person, you found him tired and drowsy at the wrong time, know that it is a great evil. For whenever the material in the head is excessive, brings heavy sleep, [and] threatens apoplexia, then you ought to command spirit with concern, in order that the boiling [caused by rousing the spirit] will make this humour thin and disperse it. And thus this statement is fitting for both physicians and philosophers.”

Ἐάσας τὰ ἰατρικὰ ὁ Ἱπποκράτης ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πάλιν ἔρχεται. ψυχὴν δὲ, οὐχ ὡς ἄνω ἐλέγομεν τὴν θερμασίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὄντως ἄϋλον καὶ ἀθάνατον. διττῶς δέ ἐστιν ἐξηγήσασθαι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. ἢ γὰρ <περίπατος>, ἢ <περὶ παντός>. καὶ περὶ παντὸς οὕτως· ὅτι φροντίς ἐστι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοῦ περὶ παντὸς ποιήσασθαι τὴν ψυχήν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ταύτης ὀφείλει προτιμῆσαι ὁ ἄνθρωπος. λέγει γὰρ Ἱπποκράτης, ὥσπερ γυμνάζεται τὸ σῶμα, οὕτως ὀφείλει καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ γυμνάζεσθαι. γυμνάζεται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ διὰ πλειόνων, ἐπειδὴ ἓν εἶδος γυμνασίου ἐστὶν ὁ περίπατος. πᾶν γυμνάσιον ἡ φροντίς. φροντὶς δὲ, οὐχ ἵνα ζητῇ ἢ περὶ κέρδους, ἢ περὶ γυναικὸς, ἀλλὰ ζητεῖν τὴν κατάληψιν τῆς ἀληθείας, τὴν διάκρισιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ ψευδοῦς. ταῦτα γὰρ γυμνάσιά εἰσιν. καὶ μάλιστα τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φροντίς. ἔνθεν λέγομεν Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος φροντιστήριον, ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἐφρόντιζεν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὴν ἀλήθειαν κατεγένετο. οὐ μάτην δὲ προσέθηκε τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν ἄνθρωπος ἐν τούτῳ κρίνεται, ἐν τῷ ὑπόστασιν μὲν τὸ θυμοειδὲς, ἄρχειν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ. ταῦτα οὖν ὅσα κατὰ φιλοσόφους, δυνάμεθα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα ἀγαγεῖν τὸν λόγον. εἰσελθὼν γὰρ πρὸς τὸν κάμνοντα, εὗρες αὐτὸν καταφερόμενον ἀκαίρως καὶ ὑπνώττοντα, γίνωσκε ὅτι μέγα κακόν. ὕλη γὰρ πλεονάζουσα ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ, ὠδίνει κάρον, ἀπειλεῖ ἀποπληξίαν, τότε ὀφείλεις φροντίδι θυμὸν ἐπιτάξαι, ἵνα τοῦτον ἡ ζέσις ἐκλεπτύνῃ καὶ διαφορήσῃ τὸν χυμὸν, ὥστε καὶ ἰατροῖς καὶ φιλοσόφοις πρέπει οὗτος ὁ λόγος.

Palladius, Commentarii in Hippocratis librum sextum de morbis popularibus, Scholia in Hippocratem et Galenum vol. 2 Dietz, 136,11-137,5

Notes

*Galen does not tell us why he and Dioscorides thought this interpretation is affectatious—why it is kakozêlos. The great stylist Hermogenes of Tarsus (roughly contemporary with Galen) says that kakozêlos describes a figure of speech that is implausible or unconvincing, either for reasons of impossibility, inconsistency, ugliness, impiety, injustice, or contrariness to nature—something that makes us think, “that does not seem do-able [οὐκ εἰκὸς τόδε πραχθῆναι]” (Herm. Inv. 4.12 Rabe). One example he uses is Od. 9.481 where Odysseus says the Cyclops, Polyphemus, “lobbed the peak of a great mountain after having snapped it off [ἧκε δ᾽ ἀπορρήξας κορυφὴν ὄρεος μεγάλοιο].” When Galen uses kakozêlos, he tends to use it in this sense (he does not use it often). The majority of Galenic examples are in the Hippocratic commentaries, where he uses it in two ways:

• (i) Sometimes he uses it to describe Hippocrates’ bad style. For example, in Aph. 7.66, Hippocrates calls food “strong for the healthy” and “disease for the sick”, a claim Galen thinks is kakozêlos since food is not itself literally either strong or disease. The sense, however, is clear enough: food is either productive of strength or disease (Hipp. Aph. XVIIIA 179 K). The problem is merely a matter of style.
• (ii) More often, he uses it as a reason for rejecting an interpretation of Hippocrates. For example, there is an aphorism in Epid. 6, which states: “weaker foods have shorter life [βιοτὴν]” (Epid. 6.5.14, V 318,20 L.). Galen thinks the natural reading is that weaker foods are used up and expelled rapidly; and he goes on to say it is kakozêlon to think Hippocrates’ meant that weaker food “continues to live” [μονὴν ζωὴν] in our body for a short time (Hipp. Epid. VI 5.21 (CMG V 10,2,2 299,20-21 Wenkebach = XVIIB 282 K).

In either case, Galen and Dioscorides think “walk” [περίπατος] is kakozêlos enough to warrant an emendation to the text. This may be because it implies thinking is literally a kind of exercise that heats you up; but this would be odd, since Galen himself admits that rational activity is important for maintaining the soul’s heat, e.g., San. Tu. 1.8 (VI 40K).

**On Erasistratus, Wenkebach gives a parallel in his edition: PHP VII 5, 602 Kühn. This is almost certainly wrong. In PHP VII 5, Galen mentions Erasistratus’ views on the anatomy of the nerves and brain. The only thing he says remotely related to the Epidemics 6.5.5 passage is that Erasistratus had time to make precise dissections ‘when he was old and had leisure to focus on the study of the art’ (440,24-25 Wenkebach). What Galen must have in mind is Erasistratus’ belief that practice of the rational arts improves their performance, a view which Galen attributes to Erasistratus at De Consuetudinibus 1, Scripta Minora II 17,1-22 Helmreich.

*** ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν ἄνθρωπος ἐν τούτῳ κρίνεται, ἐν τῷ ὑπόστασιν μὲν τὸ θυμοειδὲς, ἄρχειν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ.  This sentence is difficult. I’ve translated “but he knows that by nature humans are distinguished in this: that the spirited part of the soul is in the hypostasis, but to rule belongs to reason.” Palladius may be reluctant to say that reason is a part of a the hupostasis, the real nature, of a person; but I’m not sure I understand the point he is making and I’ve found no parallels anywhere else.

Michael of Ephesus talks about his dreams

Michael of Ephesus uses Aristotle’s (somewhat skeptical) remarks about visions in dreams to talk about the kinds of things he and his friends dream about: the dead coming to life, finding books, white roses and scorpion-tailed melons.

“When my friend saw our most honoured ruler rise from the dead, since he was still sleeping, he thought he had had a vision that our master had risen up.”

ἰδὼν γὰρ ὁ ἐμὸς ἑταῖρος τὸν πάνσεπτον ἡμῶν καθηγεμόνα, ὅτι ἀνέστη ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, ἔτι κοιμώμενος ἐνενόει, ὅτι ὄναρ ὁρᾷ τὸν διδάσκαλον ἐγερθέντα.

Michael of Ephesus, In parva naturalia commentaria, CAG II.1 62,3-5 Wendland

“I often have visions, and when I do I will bear in mind that what I am seeing is a vision. And my friend, when he saw that he discovered a book, he thought to say ‘it is a vision, but what I am seeing is not real.’”

πολλάκις γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶδον ὄναρ, καὶ ὁρῶν διενοούμην ὅτι τοῦθ' ὅπερ ὁρῶ ὄναρ ἐστίν. καὶ ὁ ἐμὸς ἑταῖρος ἰδὼν ὅτι εὗρε βιβλίον, ἐδόκει λέγειν ὅτι ὄναρ ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀληθὲς τὸ ὁρώμενον.

Michael of Ephesus, In parva naturalia commentaria, 64,10-12

“Once I had a dream that I travelled through some filthy and stinky place, and a few days later I got sick.”

ἐγὼ γὰρ ἰδὼν ἐν ὕπνῳ ὤν, ὅτι διηρχόμην ἔν τινι τόπῳ βορβορώδει καὶ δυσώδει, μετ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας νενόσηκα·

Michael of Ephesus, In parva naturalia commentaria, 79,18

“Often when I see white roses in a dream, the next day I receive gifts from people.”

καὶ ἐγὼ δὲ πολλάκις ἐν ὕπνῳ ῥόδα λευκὰ ἰδὼν μεθ' ἡμέραν ἔλαβον παρά τινων δῶρα.

Michael of Ephesus, In parva naturalia commentaria, 80,23

“Either I happen to have dreams that are extremely clear, e.g. that a war is coming in Persia, and it turns out to be true; or [I have dreams] that are enigmatic. By ‘enigmatic’, I mean when from [having a dream about] one thing, something else turns out to be true. For example, my friend had a dream that a certain woman sent him slender, round melons that had scorpions’ tails. One day a little while later, he was hurt by this woman.”

ἀλλ' ὅμως συμβαίνει ἢ καθαρώτατα ἰδεῖν με, ὅτι γίνεται ἐν Περσίδι πόλεμος, καὶ ἀποβῆναι τοῦτο καὶ γενέσθαι, ἢ καὶ αἰνιγματωδῶς· λέγω δὲ αἰνιγματωδῶς, ὅταν ἀπ' ἄλλου ἄλλο ἀποβῇ, οἷόν τί φημι· ἐθεάσατο ὁ ἐμὸς ἑταῖρος ἐν ὕπνῳ, ὡς ἀπέστειλεν αὐτῷ γυνή τις μηλοπέπονας λεπτοὺς καὶ ἐπιμήκεις, ἔχοντας οὐρὰς σκορπίων· μετὰ δὲ ὀλίγας τινὰς ἡμέρας ἐλυπήθη ὑπ' ἐκείνης τῆς γυναικός.

Michael of Ephesus, In parva naturalia commentaria, 81,4-9

Michael of Ephesus on death and the decisions of Providence

Michael of Ephesus  (11/12 c. CE) was a Byzantine commentator and teacher of Aristotelian philosophy. He was probably one of the intellectuals who gathered around Anna Komnene after she gave up her attempt to claim her father’s throne. Komnene had asked this group to write commentaries on Aristotle’s works which had not been commented on before (see Browning, “An Unpublished Funeral Oration on Anna Comnena”, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, 8, pp 1-12). Michael took up the request, and he covered a pretty amazing range of topics: the never-before-commented-on animal works (PA, IA, MA, GA), the Parva Naturalia, Metaphysics Ζ-Ν, and Colours (In PN 148.21-149.15). We also have commentaries attributed to him on the Nicomachean Ethics (books 5 & 9-10) and the Sophistical Refutations.

In this passage from his De respiratione commentary (part of the Parva Naturalia commentary), Michael interrupts a discussion about the difference between natural and violent death to talk about Providence’s decision to take away his favourite teacher and his feelings about the people he was left to work with :

[Death is] natural whenever [the origin is] internal and the condition of the part is like what it was originally. (Aristotle, De respiratione 17, 478b27-8) 

“In other words, death is also natural if the condition of the lungs [leading to death] arises from a natural origin. For when the lungs have become dry due to old age, they cannot do their work. And since this kind of  condition—i.e., a dry one—has a natural origin and cause (for it is ‘from’ old age, i.e., due to old age), then death from it is natural. But whenever the condition comes from ‘some acquired affliction’, like when there is an inflammation of the lungs [sc. peripneumonia] (in these cases, because the lungs are filled with ichor and other such things, they cannot do their work), then this kind of death is violent.

Speaking of inflammation of the lungs, even my renowned and most revered teacher—what a brilliant mind—when he had been ruined by an inflammation of the lungs, he died. He left us lamenting and mourning and totally deprived of the ability to speak to and take care of those eager to learn. I don’t mean to sound divisive and contentious, and I don’t say this with any jealousy towards my colleagues—I swear on my teacher’s soul, which I esteem and worship second only to God. But honestly, speaking from my experience with the other teachers, some of them are completely dumb. They don’t understand at all the actual words written on the page, never mind their deeper meaning. Sure, some of them are slightly more clever and have sporadic thoughts, but they are a ways off from establishing the text correctly, and others just wander at random. I don’t need to get into these things, and besides, I respect them and I am fond of them. Anyway, since Providence thought it was a good idea, my teacher flew away to heaven, while we, with Providence as our guide and helper, ought to get back to the work that lies before us.”

«Κατὰ φύσιν δ' ὅταν [ἡ ἀρχὴ] ἐν αὐτῷ [ᾖ] καὶ ἡ τοῦ μορίου σύστασις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοιαύτη»

Τουτέστι καὶ ὅταν ἡ τοῦ πνεύμονος σύστασις γένηται ἐκ φυσικῆς ἀρχῆς· ὅταν γὰρ ξηρανθεὶς διὰ γῆρας ὁ πνεύμων οὐ δύνηται τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ποιεῖν, ἡ τοιαύτη σύστασις καὶ ξηρότης ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ αἰτίας οὖσα φυσικῆς (ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ γήρως καὶ διὰ τοῦ γήρως), τότε ὁ ἐκ τούτου θάνατος φύσει ἐστίν. ὅταν δὲ «ἐπίκτητόν τι πάθος» γένηται, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς περιπνευμονίαις (ἐν ταύταις γὰρ πληρούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἰχώρων καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων ὁ πνεύμων οὐ δύναται τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ποιεῖν), ὁ τοιοῦτος θάνατος βίαιος.

περιπνευμονίᾳ καὶ ὁ ἐμὸς κλεινότατος καὶ πανσέβαστος διδάσκαλος, αἲ αἴ, ὁ νοῦς ἐκεῖνος, νοῦς ὁ ἐνεργήσας, περιπνευμονίᾳ δὴ ἁλοὺς τὴν ζωὴν κατέλυσεν, καταλιπὼν ἡμᾶς στένοντας καὶ ὀλοφυρομένους καὶ ἐν ἐρημίᾳ παντελεῖ τῶν δυναμένων λέγειν καὶ ὠφελεῖν τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας. ταῦτα δὲ λέγω οὐ διαφορᾷ ἢ φιλονεικίᾳ ἢ φθόνῳ τῷ πρὸς τοὺς καθ' ἡμᾶς, οὐ μὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ψυχήν, ἣν ἐγὼ μετὰ θεὸν σέβομαί τε καὶ προσκυνῶ, ἀλλ' ἀληθείᾳ καὶ πείρᾳ τῇ πρὸς τούτους μοι γεγονυίᾳ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν παντελῶς εἰσιν ἄφωνοι μηδὲν ὅλως ἐννοοῦντες, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ὅλως τὰ ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις γεγραμμένα καὶ τίς ὁ τούτων νοῦς, τινὲς δὲ τῶν χαριεστέρων τῆς μὲν διανοίας ἐφάπτονται σποράδην, τοῦ δὲ τὴν λέξιν καθιστάνειν πόρρω ποι ἀποπλανῶνται, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλως· περὶ ὧν οὐ δεῖ με λέγειν. πλὴν καὶ τούτους τιμῶ καὶ ἀσπάζομαι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος μέν, ὡς ἔδοξε τῇ προνοίᾳ, ἡμῶν ἀπέπτη, ἡμεῖς δ' ὑπὸ ταύτης χειραγωγούμενοι καὶ βοηθούμενοι ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἐπανέλθωμεν.

Michael of Ephesus, In Parva Naturalia commentaria, CAG 22.1, 141,31-142,18 Wendland

(Plato on) Democritus and Aristotle (on Plato) on Art and Nature

“We know how to say many lies like the truth,
And we know how to sing the truth when we want to.”

ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
ἴδμεν δ᾽, εὖτ᾽ ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.

Hesiod, Theogony, 26-7

I

“We are pupils [μαθητὰς] of the animals in the most important things: the spider in spinning and mending, the swallow in building, and the songsters, swan and nightingale, in singing, by way of imitation [κατὰ μίμησιν].”

μαθητὰς ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις γεγονότας ἡμᾶς· ἀράχνης ἐν ὑφαντικῆι καὶ ἀκεστικῆι, χελιδόνος ἐν οἰκοδομίαι, καὶ τῶν λιγυρῶν, κύκνου καὶ ἀηδόνος, ἐν ὠιδῆι κατὰ μίμησιν.

Democritus, DK 68 B154

II

“I'll put it more clearly. They say fire and water and earth and air, all exist by nature and chance [φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ], and none of them by art [τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων]; and the bodies which come next—those, namely, of the earth, sun, moon and stars—have been brought into existence through those [former ones] which are entirely without soul. By chance, they are moved by each other’s forces, through which they crash into each other, somehow fitting together: hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with hard, and all such things that are blended together from necessity through the mixture of opposites by chance. In this way and by those means they have brought into being the whole heaven and all that is in the heaven, and again all animals and plants when all the seasons came to be from these things. [All this], they claim, is not due to reason, or because of some god or some art [οὐ δὲ διὰ νοῦν, φασίν, οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην], but, as I said, by nature and by chance. And art comes from them later, after [everything else]; itself a mortal from mortals, it begets later playthings [παιδιάς τινας] which do not share much in truth [ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας], but are instead images [εἴδωλ’] closely related to [arts] themselves, like [the images] painting makes, and music, and whichever arts are their helpers. Those arts which in fact engender something serious [σπουδαῖον] are whichever ones share their capacity with nature—like medicine, agriculture, and gymnastic.”

Ὧδ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασίν, τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων, καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα, γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἄστρων τε πέρι, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων· τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ᾗ συμπέπτωκεν ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως, θερμὰ ψυχροῖς ἢ ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρὰ καὶ μαλακὰ πρὸς σκληρά, καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη, ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτως γεγεννηκέναι τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα κατ' οὐρανόν, καὶ ζῷα αὖ καὶ φυτὰ σύμπαντα, ὡρῶν πασῶν ἐκ τούτων γενομένων, οὐ δὲ διὰ νοῦν, φασίν, οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην ἀλλά, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ. τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, αὐτὴν θνητὴν ἐκ θνητῶν ὕστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδιάς τινας, ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλὰ εἴδωλ' ἄττα συγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν, οἷ' ἡ γραφικὴ γεννᾷ καὶ μουσικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις εἰσὶν συνέριθοι τέχναι· αἳ δέ τι καὶ σπουδαῖον ἄρα γεννῶσι τῶν τεχνῶν, εἶναι ταύτας ὁπόσαι τῇ φύσει ἐκοίνωσαν τὴν αὑτῶν δύναμιν, οἷον αὖ ἰατρικὴ καὶ γεωργικὴ καὶ γυμναστική.

Plato, Laws X 889B1-D6

III

“Of things that come to be, some come to be from some kind of thought and art [ἀπό τινος διανοίας καὶ τέχνης], for example a house or a ship (for one cause of each of these is a kind of art and thought), while others come to be from no art at all, but from nature [διὰ φύσιν]. For the cause of animals and plants is nature and all such things come to be in accordance with nature. But then some things come to be from chance [διὰ τύχην] as well, for we say most things that come to be neither from art nor from nature nor of necessity come to be from chance. So then, nothing of what comes to be from chance comes to be for the sake of anything, nor do they have any end; however, in what comes to be from art there exists both the end and the for the sake of which (for one who possesses the art always will give you a reason [λόγον] because of which and for the sake of which he wrote), and this [because it] is better than what comes to be because of it. I mean the things of which art is a cause naturally in itself and not accidentally. For we should assume medicine is properly [a cause] of health rather than disease, while housebuilding is [a cause] of the house and not of its demolition. Therefore, everything that comes to be in accordance with art comes to be for the sake of something and this end is its best; yet, what is from chance does not come to be for the sake of something, for even should something good occur from chance, nevertheless surely it is not good in accordance with chance and insofar as it is from chance; instead what comes to be in accordance with it is always indeterminate. What is in accordance with nature [τὸ κατά γε φύσιν], however, comes to be for the sake of something and is always composed for the sake of a better thing than that [which comes to be] from art. For it is not the case that nature imitates art, but art nature [μιμεῖται γὰρ οὐ τὴν τέχνην ἡ φύσις ἀλλ' αὐτὴ τὴν φύσιν], and it exists to help and compensate for nature’s deficiencies.”

Τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ μὲν ἀπό τινος διανοίας καὶ τέχνης γίγνεται, οἷον οἰκία καὶ πλοῖον (ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ τούτων αἰτία τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ διάνοια), τὰ δὲ διὰ τέχνης μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς, ἀλλὰ διὰ φύσιν· ζῴων γὰρ καὶ φυτῶν αἰτία φύσις, καὶ κατὰ φύσιν γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διὰ τύχην ἔνια γίγνεται τῶν πραγμάτων· ὅσα γὰρ μήτε διὰ τέχνην μήτε διὰ φύσιν μήτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται, τὰ πολλὰ τούτων διὰ τύχην γίγνεσθαί φαμεν. Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνομένων οὐδὲν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, οὐδ' ἔστι τι τέλος αὐτοῖς· τοῖς δ' ἀπὸ τέχνης γιγνομένοις ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα (ἀεὶ γὰρ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων ἀποδώσει σοι λόγον δι' ὃν ἔγραψε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα), καὶ τοῦτο [ὅτι] βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ διὰ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. λέγω δ' ὅσων καθ' αὑτὴν ἡ τέχνη πέφυκεν αἰτία καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὑγιείας μὲν γὰρ ἰατρικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ νόσου κυρίως ἂν θείημεν, οἰκοδομικὴν δ' οἰκίας, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ καταβάλλειν. πᾶν ἄρα ἕνεκά του γίγνεται τὸ κατὰ τέχνην, καὶ τοῦτο τέλος αὐτῆς τὸ βέλτιστον, τὸ μέντοι διὰ τύχην οὐ γίγνεται ἕνεκά του· συμβαίη μὲν γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ἀγαθόν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλά γε κατὰ τὴν τύχην καὶ καθόσον ἀπὸ τύχης οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ἀόριστον δ' ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνόμενόν ἐστι κατ' αὐτήν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ κατά γε φύσιν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, καὶ βελτίονος ἕνεκεν ἀεὶ συνίσταται ἢ καθάπερ τὸ διὰ τέχνης· μιμεῖται γὰρ οὐ τὴν τέχνην ἡ φύσις ἀλλ' αὐτὴ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῷ βοηθεῖν καὶ τὰ παραλειπόμενα τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν.

Aristotle, Protrepticus 9, 49.3-50.2