Sacrifices – Plato on Diotima and the Plague of Athens

A reminder for the equinox.

“Alright, then, I'll let you go, and I'll try to describe to you the speech about Eros, which I once heard from a Mantinean woman, Diotima. She was wise about these and many other things. In fact, ten years before the plague, she held off that sickness by telling the Athenians what they needed to sacrifice. And she even taught me the art of love.”

καὶ σὲ μέν γε ἤδη ἐάσω: τὸν δὲ λόγον τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἔρωτος, ὅν ποτ᾽ ἤκουσα γυναικὸς Μαντινικῆς Διοτίμας, ἣ ταῦτά τε σοφὴ ἦν καὶ ἄλλα πολλά—καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ποτὲ θυσαμένοις πρὸ τοῦ λοιμοῦ δέκα ἔτη ἀναβολὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νόσου, ἣ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἐδίδαξεν—ὃν οὖν ἐκείνη ἔλεγε λόγον, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διελθεῖν...

Plato, Symposium 201D

More on Providential Ecology from Herodotus and Plato

Yes, more providential ecology. Herodotus and Plato explain why some animals have many babies, others do not. Also, flying snakes.

Wise Gods

“And, it’s reasonable to suppose that divine providence, since it is wise, set things up so that all the timid and edible animals produce many offspring in order that they would not go extinct by all being eaten up; while all the savage and violent animals are able to produce only a few offspring.”

καί κως τοῦ θείου ἡ προνοίη, ὥσπερ καὶ οἰκός ἐστι, ἐοῦσα σοφή, ὅσα μὲν ψυχήν τε δειλὰ καὶ ἐδώδιμα, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα πολύγονα πεποίηκε, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιλίπῃ κατεσθιόμενα, ὅσα δὲ σχέτλια καὶ ἀνιηρά, ὀλιγόγονα.

Herodotus, Histories, 3.108.2

“[Epimetheus] devised these things, taking care that no animal species goes extinct: when he had provided them a way to avoid destroying each other, he devised protection from the seasonal weather sent by Zeus, by clothing them in thick hair and solid hides, which are enough to keep off the winter cold, and also able to ward off burning heat; and, when they go home to their lairs, these same clothes serve as a proper and natural bed-cushion for them all. And to some he gave hooves, to others claws and thick, bloodless hides. Then, he provided them with various foods: to some, grass from the earth; others, fruits from trees; others, roots. There are also those to whom he gave other animals to eat as food, and to them he bestowed few offspring, while to those consumed by them, many offspring, ensuring the survival of the species.”

ταῦτα δὲ ἐμηχανᾶτο εὐλάβειαν ἔχων μή τι γένος ἀϊστωθείη· ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀλληλοφθοριῶν διαφυγὰς ἐπήρκεσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Διὸς ὥρας εὐμάρειαν ἐμηχανᾶτο ἀμφιεννὺς αὐτὰ πυκναῖς τε θριξὶν καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμασιν, ἱκανοῖς μὲν ἀμῦναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα, καὶ εἰς εὐνὰς ἰοῦσιν ὅπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα στρωμνὴ οἰκεία τε καὶ αὐτοφυὴς ἑκάστῳ· καὶ ὑποδῶν τὰ μὲν ὁπλαῖς, τὰ δὲ <ὄνυξι> καὶ δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις. τοὐντεῦθεν τροφὰς ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἐξεπόριζεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς βοτάνην, ἄλλοις δὲ δένδρων καρπούς, τοῖς δὲ ῥίζας· ἔστι δ᾽ οἷς ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφὴν ζῴων ἄλλων βοράν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀλιγογονίαν προσῆψε, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀναλισκομένοις ὑπὸ τούτων πολυγονίαν, σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων.

Plato, Protagoras, 321A–B

The Mating Habits of Vipers and the Winged Snakes of Arabia*

“As for vipers and the winged snakes of Arabia, if they came about as their nature would have it, living would be impossible for human beings; in fact, however, when the vipers mate, at the very moment when the male ejaculates, once he emits the seed, the female grabs his throat, bites down, and does not let go until she has eaten through. And while the male dies in the way we just described, the female gets paid back for it by the male. Seeking revenge for their father, the offspring, while they are still in the belly, chew through their mother and eat through her womb, thus making their escape. The other snakes, however, since they are not harmful to people, lay eggs and hatch a great clutch of offspring.”

ὣς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἔχιδναί τε καὶ οἱ ἐν Ἀραβίοισι ὑπόπτεροι ὄφιες εἰ ἐγίνοντο ὡς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῖσι ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἂν ἦν βιώσιμα ἀνθρώποισι: νῦν δ᾽ ἐπεὰν θορνύωνται κατὰ ζεύγεα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ᾖ ὁ ἔρσην τῇ ἐκποιήσι, ἀπιεμένου αὐτοῦ τὴν γονὴν ἡ θήλεα ἅπτεται τῆς δειρῆς, καὶ ἐμφῦσα οὐκ ἀνιεῖ πρὶν ἂν διαφάγῃ. ὁ μὲν δὴ ἔρσην ἀποθνήσκει τρόπῳ τῷ εἰρημένῳ, ἡ δὲ θήλεα τίσιν τοιήνδε ἀποτίνει τῷ ἔρσενι: τῷ γονέι τιμωρέοντα ἔτι ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ ἐόντα τὰ τέκνα διεσθίει τὴν μητέρα, διαφαγόντα δὲ τὴν νηδὺν αὐτῆς οὕτω τὴν ἔκδυσιν ποιέεται. οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ὄφιες ἐόντες ἀνθρώπων οὐ δηλήμονες τίκτουσί τε ᾠὰ καὶ ἐκλέπουσι πολλόν τι χρῆμα τῶν τέκνων.

Herodotus, Histories, 3.108.2–3

“Megasthenes says that in India there are winged scorpions of immense size, and that their sting is similar to that of European ones. And that in the same place, there are also snakes with wings, and that they come around not during the day but at night, and they emit from themselves a urine, which, immediately produces decay when it falls on someone’s body.”

Μεγασθένης φησὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἰνδικὴν σκορπίους γίνεσθαι πτερωτοὺς μεγέθει μεγίστους, τὸ κέντρον δὲ ἐγχρίμπτειν τοῖς Εὐρωπαίοις παραπλησίως. γίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ ὄφεις αὐτόθι καὶ τούτους πτηνούς· ἐπιφοιτᾶν δὲ οὐ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἀλλὰ νύκτωρ, καὶ ἀφιέναι ἐξ αὑτῶν οὖρον, ὅπερ οὖν ἐὰν κατά τινος ἐπιστάξῃ σώματος, σῆψιν ἐργάζεται παραχρῆμα.

Aelian, Nature of Animals, 16.41

*So, I guess winged serpents are more like cobras, less like flying snakes? More curious is the contrast Herodotus implies between what an animal does by its own nature, and what it does because of divine providence. Is the idea that the divine intervenes in how animals act and interact, but doesn’t make them what they are?

Via getty images

Plato on Providence in Laws X

More on providence: the theodicy from Plato’s Laws. Plato doesn’t say the divine punishes or spites people for failing to be as virtuous as they could be. Instead, he says the cosmic ruler figures out where people with less-than-perfect characters in this life are most likely to succeed in the next one, and makes sure that’s where they end up. Didn’t make it as a good human? No problem—in the next round, maybe you can make it as a good bird or fish. The idea is that the cosmos has been set up so that we’re always given a chance to excel, not just for our own sake, but for the sake of being a part of a process of making everything as good as possible.

“Athenian: This. When the ruler of the cosmos saw that all our actions are ensouled, and that in them there is much virtue and much vice, and that soul and body, once they came into existence, were indestructible—for, had either of them been destroyed, there would never have been a generation of animals—, but they were not eternal like the customary gods, and when he saw by how much the good of the soul is always by nature beneficial, and the evil harmful—when he saw all these things, he determined where, if placed, each individual would make virtue victorious and vice defeated in the universe. And he made it so that, depending on what we are like, we must make our home always in a certain abode and ever in certain places. The causes of becoming the way we are, however, he left to our individual choices. For how we desire and what our soul is like—in just about every case, all of us for the most part come to be the way we are by this.”

ΑΘ. Ὧδε. ἐπειδὴ κατεῖδεν ἡμῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐμψύχους οὔσας τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας καὶ πολλὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν ἐν αὐταῖς οὖσαν, πολλὴν δὲ κακίαν, ἀνώλεθρον δὲ ὂν γενόμενον, ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰώνιον, ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί – γένεσις γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἦν ζῴων ἀπολομένου τούτοιν θατέρου – καὶ τὸ μὲν ὠφελεῖν ἀεὶ πεφυκός, ὅσον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς, διενοήθη, τὸ δὲ κακὸν βλάπτειν· ταῦτα πάντα συνιδών, ἐμηχανήσατο ποῦ κείμενον ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν νικῶσαν ἀρετήν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν, ἐν τῷ παντὶ παρέχοι μάλιστ' ἂν καὶ ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστα. μεμηχάνηται δὴ πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ ποῖόν τι γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ ποίαν ἕδραν δεῖ μεταλαμβάνον οἰκίζεσθαι καὶ τίνας ποτὲ τόπους· τῆς δὲ γενέσεως τοῦ ποίου τινὸς ἀφῆκε ταῖς βουλήσεσιν ἑκάστων ἡμῶν τὰς αἰτίας. ὅπῃ γὰρ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ ὁποῖός τις ὢν τὴν ψυχήν, ταύτῃ σχεδὸν ἑκάστοτε καὶ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται ἅπας ἡμῶν ὡς τὸ πολύ.

Plato, Laws 904A6–C4

Spontaneous Generation: Galen and Alexander against the Platonists on why the world soul doesn’t make mosquitos

Stranger: Take animals and all mortal things, and even plants, those which grow from seeds on the earth or those which grow from roots, and those bodies without soul which form in the earth, both the ones that can be melted and the ones that can’t. Surely we are not going to say anything other than divine craftsmanship makes them come to be after previously not being? Or do we consult the saying and opinion of the masses that…

Theaetetus: That what?

Stranger: That nature produces them from some spontaneous cause and without an engendering thought, rather than with reason and divine knowledge that comes from a god?

Ξένος: ζῷα δὴ πάντα θνητά, καὶ δὴ καὶ φυτὰ ὅσα τ᾽ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ῥιζῶν φύεται, καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ συνίσταται σώματα τηκτὰ καὶ ἄτηκτα, μῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι—

Θεαίτητος: ποίῳ τῳ;

Ξένος: τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾶν ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης, ἢ μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης; [265δ]

Plato, Sophist 265 C-D

“When one of my Platonists teachers told me that the soul-that-is-extended-through-the-whole-cosmos formed the (human) embryo, I thought that the technical skill and power is worthy of it; but, I could not abide thinking that the world-soul formed scorpions, poisonous spiders, flies, conopses, vipers, grubs, worms and ascarides. I take it this kind of opinion comes near impiety. ”

εἰπόντος δέ τινος τῶν διδασκάλων μοι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν, τὴν δι' ὅλου κόσμου ψυχὴν ἐκτεταμένην διαπλάττειν τὰ κυούμενα, τὴν μὲν τέχνην καὶ δύναμιν ἀξίαν ἐκείνης ἐνόμισα, σκορπίους δὲ καὶ φαλάγγια, καὶ μυῖαν καὶ κώνωπας, ἐχίδνας τε καὶ σκώληκας, ἕλμινθάς τε καὶ ἀσκαρίδας ὑπ' ἐκείνης διαπλάττεσθαι νομίζειν οὐχ ὑπέμεινα, πλησίον ἀσεβείας ἥκειν ὑπολαβὼν τὴν τοιαύτην δόξαν.

Galen, On the Formation of the Foetus, 4.700—701 K

“Again, it is possible to discover the existence of a regular order even among evil things and things that come to be contrary to nature, like abscesses, wounds, inflammations, and periodic illnesses. But also the generation of some living things is in fact orderly, without being relative to an Idea, like the generation of grubs, gnats, and grubs.”

ἔτι τὸ εὔτακτον ἔστιν εὑρεῖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς καὶ παρὰ φύσιν γιγνομένοις, οἷον ἀποστήματα, τραύματα, φλεγμοναί, νόσων περίοδοι. ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῴων τινῶν γενέσεις τεταγμέναι μέν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς ἰδέαν, οἷον σκωλήκων, ἐμπίδων, τερηδόνων.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle’s Metaphysics Α, 103,35-104-19 Hayduck

Plato on Providential Ecology

Disobedient Stomachs

“What comes next needs to be pursued along the same lines, and that is: how has the rest of our body come to be? It would be more fitting than anything else if it had been composed following a rationale like the following: those who were putting our kind together were aware of the intemperance for food and drink that would exist within us, and that we would want much more than what is moderate or necessary because of our gluttony. Therefore, to prevent wasting away swiftly through disease and the immediate and complete coming to an end of the incomplete race of mortals, the gods, foreseeing these problems, set up a receptacle, called the “lower belly,” to serve as a container for surplus food and drink; and they coiled the entrails around as they made them, in order to prevent food from passing through too quickly, a situation which would quickly compel the body to need even more food and produce insatiable desire, a gastric-gluttony on account of which the whole race would be rendered unphilosophical, uncultured and disobedient to what is most divine in us.”

τὸ δ᾽ ἑξῆς δὴ τούτοισιν κατὰ ταὐτὰ μεταδιωκτέον: ἦν δὲ τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐπίλοιπον ᾗ γέγονεν. ἐκ δὴ λογισμοῦ τοιοῦδε συνίστασθαι μάλιστ᾽ ἂν αὐτὸ πάντων πρέποι. τὴν ἐσομένην ἐν ἡμῖν ποτῶν καὶ ἐδεστῶν ἀκολασίαν ᾔδεσαν οἱ συντιθέντες ἡμῶν τὸ γένος, καὶ ὅτι τοῦ μετρίου καὶ ἀναγκαίου διὰ μαργότητα πολλῷ χρησοίμεθα πλέονι: ἵν᾽ οὖν μὴ φθορὰ διὰ νόσους ὀξεῖα γίγνοιτο καὶ ἀτελὲς τὸ γένος εὐθὺς τὸ θνητὸν τελευτῷ, ταῦτα προορώμενοι τῇ τοῦ περιγενησομένου πώματος ἐδέσματός τε ἕξει τὴν ὀνομαζομένην κάτω κοιλίαν ὑποδοχὴν ἔθεσαν, εἵλιξάν τε πέριξ τὴν τῶν ἐντέρων γένεσιν, ὅπως μὴ ταχὺ διεκπερῶσα ἡ τροφὴ ταχὺ πάλιν τροφῆς ἑτέρας δεῖσθαι τὸ σῶμα ἀναγκάζοι, καὶ παρέχουσα ἀπληστίαν, διὰ γαστριμαργίαν ἀφιλόσοφον καὶ ἄμουσον πᾶν ἀποτελοῖ τὸ γένος, ἀνυπήκοον τοῦ θειοτάτου τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν.

Plato, Timaeus 72E-73A

Endings

“Zeus, god of the gods, who rules with force of law, was able to see these things clearly. When he realized that good people were reduced to struggling, he wanted to grant them justice so that they might take control of themselves and return to harmony. He assembled all the gods together into their most honoured home, which, set at the centre of the entire cosmos, looks down upon all who share in creation, and once he had assembled them, he said:”*

θεὸς δὲ ὁ θεῶν Ζεὺς ἐν νόμοις βασιλεύων, ἅτε δυνάμενος καθορᾶν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐννοήσας γένος ἐπιεικὲς ἀθλίως διατιθέμενον, δίκην αὐτοῖς ἐπιθεῖναι βουληθείς, ἵνα γένοιντο ἐμμελέστεροι σωφρονισθέντες, συνήγειρεν θεοὺς πάντας εἰς τὴν τιμιωτάτην αὐτῶν οἴκησιν, ἣ δὴ κατὰ μέσον παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου βεβηκυῖα καθορᾷ πάντα ὅσα γενέσεως μετείληφεν, καὶ συναγείρας εἶπεν:

Plato, Critias, 121B7-C5

*To the right is the last column of the Critias, written on parchment in one of the oldest manuscripts of Plato we have, Parisinus gr. 187 f. 151r. This manuscript is at the Bibliothèque nationale de France, and it’s been been dated to around 850-875 CE.

The Critias ends mid-sentence. The Atlantans’ story is never resolved. Maybe Plato died before he finished it, maybe he couldn’t think of what Zeus was supposed to say. To mark this the copyist writes the εἶπεν (“he said”) with a colon in the centre of the last line—two dots bordering on universes of possibilities.

Soda and onions

Continuing with Aetius of Amida's pharmacy and its parallels: onions.

Philumenus on onions as a cure for bites of all kinds.

"For dog bites or people bites, apply a poultice of fine salt mixed with honey until the bite is filled. Some also add onion and vinegar and then use it."

πρὸς οὖν κυνόδηκτα καὶ ἀνθρωπόδηκτα ἅλας λεῖον σὺν μέλιτι κατάπλασσε, ἄχρις οὗ πλήρη ᾖ. τινὲς δὲ καὶ κρόμμυον προσμίσγουσιν καὶ ὄξους καὶ οὕτως χρῶνται.

Philumenus, On poisonous animals and their remedies [De venenatis animalibus eorumque remediis], 5.6 (10,7-9 Wellman)

Galen on onions.

"The onion belongs to the fourth degree of things that heat. Its substance is composed of rather large particles, which is why it also opens up hemorrhoids when it is applied; when used full strength with vinegar in the sun, it washes away skin lesions; and when rubbed on bald spots, it stimulates the hair faster than alcuonium. If one separates off its juice, whatever remains is a considerably earthy, hot substance, but the juice itself is a watery and airy hot substance. Thus, when it is used as a salve against thick humours, it benefits cataract sufferers and those who are short-sighted. Due to its mixture, the onion generally causes flatulence when eaten, and for this reason, those which are drier in their mixture cause less flatulence."

Κρόμμυον ἐκ τῆς τετάρτης ἐστὶ τάξεως τῶν θερμαινόντων. ἡ δ' οὐσία παχυμερής ἐστιν αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον, ὅθεν καὶ τὰς αἱμοῤῥοΐδας ἀναστομοῖ προστιθέμενον καὶ σὺν ὄξει καταχριόμενον ἐν ἡλίῳ τοὺς ἀλφοὺς ἀποῤῥύπτει καὶ παρατριβόμενον ἀλωπεκίαις θᾶττον ἀλκυονίου παρορμᾷ τὰς τρίχας. εἰ δ' ἀποχωρίσειεν αὐτοῦ τις τὸν χυλὸν, ὅσον μὲν ὑπόλοιπον ἱκανῶς ἐστι γεώδους οὐσίας θερμῆς, αὐτὸς δ' ὁ χυλὸς ὑδατώδους τε καὶ ἀερώδους θερμότητος. οὕτω οὖν καὶ τοὺς ὑποχεομένους καὶ ἀμβλυώττοντας ἐπὶ πάχει χυμῶν ὀνίνησιν ὑπαλειφόμενος. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτου κράσεως ὅλον τὸ κρόμμυον φυσῶδές ἐστιν ἐσθιόμενον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὅσα ξηρότερα τὴν κρᾶσιν ἀφυσότερα.

Galen, On the mixtures and capacities of simple drugs, 7.58 (XII 48-49 Kühn)

Oribasius' concise summary.

"Onion belongs to the fourth rank of things that heat. Its substance is composed of thick particles."

Κρόμμυον ἐκ τῆς τετάρτης ἐστὶ τάξεως τῶν θερμαινόντων· ἡ δὲ οὐσία παχυμερής ἐστιν.

Oribasius, Collectiones medicae, 15.1.10.79 (260,26-28 Raeder)

Aetius' entry based on Galen.

"Onion belongs to the fourth degree of things that heat. Its substance is composed of very large particles, whence it also opens up hemorrhoids when it is applied; when used full strength with vinegar in the sun, it washes away skin lesions; and when rubbed on bald spots, it stimulates the hair faster than alcuonium. When eaten, it heats the body with its acridity and thins thick and sticky humours in it. It fills the abdomen with air because its substance is composed of very thick particles."

Κρόμυον ἐκ τῆς τετάρτης ἐστὶ τάξεως τῶν θερμαινόντων· ἡ δὲ οὐσία αὐτοῦ παχυμερὴς μᾶλλον, ὅθεν καὶ τὰς αἱμορροίδας ἀναστομοῖ προστιθέμενον καὶ σὺν ὄξει καταχριόμενον ἐν ἡλίῳ τοὺς ἀλφοὺς ἀπορρύπτει καὶ παρατριβόμενον ἀλωπεκίαις θᾶττον ἀλκυονίου παρορμᾷ τὰς τρίχας. ἐσθιόμενον δὲ θερμαίνει μὲν τὸ σῶμα τῇ δριμύτητι καὶ λεπτύνει τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ παχεῖς καὶ γλίσχρους χυμούς· ἐμπνευματοῖ δὲ τὴν γαστέρα διὰ τὸ παχυμερὲς τῆς οὐσίας.

Aetius of Amida, Libri medicinales, I 232 (97,14-20 Olivieri)

Cf. Dioscorides, De materia medica, 2.151 (p.155 in Beck), which mentions many of the other uses of onions as well, adding to what is said above that it's useful for blisters on the feet (when it is mixed with chicken fat, hardness of hearing, sore throats, and stuffy noses, but that it causes headaches. He leaves out the part about people bites. Oddly, none of these passages mention the fact that onions make your cry, a fact that Aristotle's school was rather interested in:

(pseudo-)Aristotle on why onions cause tears, while garlic does not.

"Why is it that only onions cause the eyes to sting so excessively? People even say it got its name because of this, since [κρόμμυον] makes the pupil close [τὴν κόρην συμμύειν]. Marjoram doesn't, nor do other things which are acrid. Thus, watercress [lit. "up the nose"], because it is hotter, causes more drying than the colliquescence that it produces, since it produces tears in those who eat it; it does not, however, [produce tears] when it is brought close by, because it does not give off any thin vapour, for it is too dry and hot. Marjoram and similar hot things are dry and mild, but what is going to produce tears needs to be stinging, moist and sticky. For this reason, olive oil produces tears, although its stinging is weak. For because of its stickiness and fineness, it produces pain when it penetrates [the flesh], and produces liquefaction because of the pain. The onion has a similar capacity, hence the moisture and vapour from it is hot, fine and sticky. Thus, when it is brought close by, because of the kind of vapour that it is and because it carries with it a fine moisture, it produces tears; when it is eaten, the exhalation passes through […there is a lacuna here…]. Garlic is hot and acrid and has moisture, but it is not sticky, so it does not produce tears.

Διὰ τί τὸ κρόμμυον μόνον οὕτως περιττῶς δάκνει τὼ ὀφθαλμώ (διὸ καὶ τοὔνομά φασι τοῦτ' ἔχειν αὐτό, ὡς τὴν κόρην ποιεῖν συμμύειν), ἡ δὲ ὀρίγανος οὔ, οὐδ' ἄλλα δριμέα ὄντα; καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀνάρρινον μᾶλλον δάκνον οὐ ποιεῖ ὁμοίως δακρύειν προσφερόμενον, τὸ δὲ προσφερόμενον καὶ κατατρωγόμενον. ἢ ὅτι διαφοραὶ πολλαὶ ἀκολουθοῦσιν ἑκάστοις τῶν δριμέων, ἃ ποιεῖ τὴν ἰδίαν ἑκάστου δύναμιν; τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀνάρρινον διὰ τὸ θερμότερον εἶναι ξηραντικώτερόν ἐστι τῆς γινομένης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συντήξεως, ἐπεὶ ποιεῖ γε δάκρυον ἐσθίοντι· προσφερόμενον δὲ οὔ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπατμίζει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ λεπτόν τι· ξηρότερον γάρ ἐστι καὶ θερμότερον. ἡ δὲ ὀρίγανος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα θερμὰ ξηρά ἐστιν ἠρέμα. δεῖ δὲ τὸ μέλλον δάκρυον ποιήσειν δηκτικὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν εἶναι καὶ γλίσχρον. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον ποιεῖ δακρύειν, ἀσθενῆ ἔχον δῆξιν· διὰ γλισχρότητα γὰρ καὶ λεπτότητα παραδῦνον ποιεῖ τὸν πόνον, καὶ τὴν σύντηξιν διὰ τὸν πόνον. τὸ δὲ κρόμμυον τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὴν ἀτμίδα αὐτοῦ θερμὴν καὶ λεπτὴν καὶ γλίσχραν εἶναι. ὥστε προσφερόμενον μέν, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀτμίδα τοιαύτην εἶναι καὶ συναφιέναι ὑγρότητα λεπτήν, ποιεῖ δακρύειν, ἐσθιομένου δὲ ἡ ἀναθυμίασις διιοῦσα ... τὸ δὲ σκόροδον θερμὸν μὲν καὶ δριμύ ἐστι καὶ ὑγρότητα ἔχει, ἀλλ' οὐ γλίσχρον· διὸ οὐ ποιεῖ δακρύειν.

Pseudo-Aristotle, Problemata, 21.22, 925a27-925b12

Alexis on knowing frivolous things.

"You don’t know what you're talking about. Run over and have a conversation with Plato and become enlightened about soda and onions."

λέγεις περὶ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα· συγγενοῦ τρέχων
Πλάτωνι καὶ γνώσῃ λίτρον καὶ κρόμμυον.

Alexis, Ancylion ap. Diogenes Laertius, Vita philosophorum, 3.37

"When the soul is inflamed", part II

... Galen discusses the opinions of Aristotle, Plato and the Stoics on the relationship between nature, soul, vital breath and innate heat. Some physicians, perhaps the Pneumatists, were interested in finding the Stoic view already articulated by Hippocrates, particularly in a work called On Sevens, and in Epidemics 6, which is being discussed here. I've added paragraph breaks to make the text easier to read. This is a continuation from part i...

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In fact, some of those who wrote commentaries on the book under discussion say the word 'born' was written in the sense of 'becomes better'. They suppose it [sc. the soul] becomes better over time for those who are concerned about science and wisdom. This discussion, however, is neither medical nor is it consistent with what comes next, for it is clear from the following quotation that 'produced' is said about the substance of [the soul]: "when it is inflamed together with disease, the soul also consumes the body." The word 'inflamed' would seem to indicate Hippocrates thinks the substance of the soul is the innate heat, which he uses as a cause of natural activities in many other places.

On this point, there is also a great difference of opinion among philosophers. Some believe the substance of the soul and of nature are identical, some of these ones positing its existence in pneuma, others in a specific quality of the body. Certain people think it is not one substance, but claim each of them is distinct and differ not just in a small way in species, but wholly in kind. In this case, they think that the substance of nature is perishable, while that of the soul is imperishable.

Now, Aristotle and Plato introduce both capacities using one word, not only calling that by which we think and remember 'soul', but also the capacity in plants by which they are nourished, increased and preserved until they dry out over time. For the Stoics, on the other hand, it is customary to refer 'nature' to that by which plants are governed, 'soul' that by which animals are. They posit that the substance of both is the co-natural pneuma, and they think these differ from each other by quality: the pneuma of the soul is drier, that of nature more moist, but both require not only food in order to persist, but also air.

Whoever thinks the person who introduced this opinion is Hippocrates, according to what was mentioned in On Sevens, say the word 'born' is mentioned concerning the production in them of additional stuff from both substances, of food and air, since it is clearly observable and we know the usefulness of each of them. For it has been proven that respiration preserves the balance of the innate heat, while ingestion of food replenishes the flowing-out of bodily substance. Moreover, if the soul is a kind of form of the body, it would be appropriate to say that 'it is born until death.'  

Now, if there is some other substance, then concerning the one called 'nature', which Aristotle calls 'threptic', Plato 'epithumetic', what was said would be true; but it would not be true in the case of the 'dianoetic' soul. Certainly, that the innate heat, to which Hippocrates very often refers bodily functions, is inflamed, not only when it is no longer able to complete its previous activities or nourish us —which is its most important function—but also when it destroys and consumes like fire does, this is clear to us when we look carefully at the text and when we see the colliquesence of the body produced by excessively hot fevers.

Left out of the whole discussion is the third 'soul' or 'capacity' or whatever you might want to call it, which Plato called 'spirited'. It is good to mention this so that nothing is left out of our discussion about the soul. One kind of innate warmth, by which blood is produced, is contained in the liver. But a different, greater warmth has been received by the heart for the production of emotion. For if there is some use for it, as it has been pointed out in On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato, the one warmth needs respiration, the other transpiration. For thus it is customary for doctors to call what occurs through the artery along its whole body a 'double-activity', sending out residues at systole, drawing in outside air at diastole.

τῶν μέντοι γραψάντων ὑπομνήματα τοῦ προκειμένου βιβλίου τινὲς ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίων γίνεται τὸ «φύεταί» φασιν εἰρῆσθαι. γίνεσθαι δ' αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ βελτίονα νομίζουσι τοῖς προνοουμένοις ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ σοφίας, ἀλλ' οὔτε ἰατρικὸς ὁ λόγος οὔθ' ὁμολογῶν τοῖς ἐπιφερομένοις. ὅτι γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς εἴρηται τὸ «φύεται», δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ φάναι· «ἢν δ' ἐκπυρωθῇ, ἅμα τῇ νούσῳ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ <καὶ> τὸ σῶμα φέρβεται». καὶ δόξειε δ' ἂν ἐνδείκνυσθαι τὸ «ἐκπυρωθῇ» ῥῆμα τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν Ἱπποκράτην τὸ ἔμφυτον εἶναι θερμὸν, ὃ καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ἔργων αἰτιᾶται πολλαχόθι.

μέγιστον δ' ἐνταῦθα κινεῖται δόγμα διαπεφωνημένον καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς φιλοσόφοις. ἔνιοι μὲν ἡγοῦνται μίαν οὐσίαν εἶναι ψυχῆς τε καὶ φύσεως, οἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τιθέμενοι τὴν ὕπαρξιν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἰδιότητι. τινὲς δὲ οὐ μίαν, ἀλλ' ἰδίαν ἑκατέρᾳ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναί φασι καὶ οὐ σμικρῷ γ' <εἴδει> τινὶ διαφερούσας, ἀλλ' ὅλῳ τῷ γένει, ὅπου γε καὶ τὴν μὲν τῆς φύσεως φθαρτὴν εἶναι ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄφθαρτον.

Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν οὖν καὶ Πλάτων ὑπὸ μίαν προσηγορίαν ἀμφοτέρας ἄγουσι τὰς δυνάμεις, οὐ μόνον ᾗ λογιζόμεθα καὶ μεμνήμεθα ψυχὴν καλοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς, ᾗ τρέφεταί τε καὶ αὔξεται καὶ διασῴζεται, μέχρι περ ἂν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ξηρανθῇ. τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς δ' ἔθος ἐστὶ φύσιν μὲν ὀνομάζειν, ᾗ τὰ φυτὰ διοικεῖται, ψυχὴν δὲ ᾗ τὰ ζῷα, τὴν οὐσίαν ἀμφοτέρων μὲν τίθενται τὸ σύμφυτον πνεῦμα καὶ διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων οἴονται ποιότητι. ξηρότερον μὲν γὰρ πνεῦμα τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὑγρότερον δὲ τὸ τῆς φύσεως εἶναι, δεῖσθαι δ' ἄμφω πρὸς διαμονὴν οὐ τροφῆς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀέρος.

καὶ ὅσοι γε τοῦ δόγματος τούτου νομίζουσιν ἡγεμόνα τὸν Ἱπποκράτην γεγονέναι, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἑβδομάδων εἴρηται, τὸ «φύεσθαι» λέγουσιν εἰρῆσθαι κατὰ τῆς γινομένης ἐν αὐτοῖς προσθέσεως ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν οὐσιῶν, τῆς τε <τροφῆς καὶ> τοῦ ἀέρος, <ὡς> ἐναργῶς φαίνεται καὶ τὴν ἑκατέρου χρείαν ἐπιστάμεθα (δέδεικται γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀναπνοὴ τὴν συμμετρίαν τῆς ἐμφύτου θερμασίας φυλάττειν, ἡ δὲ τῶν σιτίων προσφορὰ τὸ διαρρέον τῆς σωματικῆς οὐσίας ἀναπληροῦν) καὶ, εἴπερ εἶδός τι τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, προσηκόντως ἂν λέγοιτο «φύεσθαι μέχρι τοῦ θανάτου». 

εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἑτέρα τις αὐτῆς <ἡ> οὐσία, <περὶ ταύτης> τῆς φύσεως, ἣν Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν ὀνομάζει θρεπτικὴν, ἐπιθυμητικὴν δὲ Πλάτων, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ εἰρημένον, οὐκ ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς διανοητικῆς ψυχῆς. ὅτι μέντοι τὸ ἔμφυτον θερμόν, ᾧ μάλιστα ἀναφέρει τὰ σωματικὰ τῶν ἔργων ὁ Ἱπποκράτης, ἐκπυρωθὲν οὐ μόνον οὐκέτι δύναται τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ἐνεργείας ἐπιτελεῖν οὐδὲ τρέφειν ἡμᾶς, ὅπερ ἦν ἔργον αὐτῷ κυριώτατον, ἀλλὰ διαφθείρει τε καὶ τήκει καθάπερ τὸ πῦρ, εὔδηλόν ἐστι τῷ λόγῳ σκοπουμένοις ἡμῖν καὶ τὰς <γινομένας> ὑπὸ τῶν διακαῶν πυρετῶν συντήξεις τοῦ σώματος ἐναργῶς ὁρῶσι.

παραλελειμμένης δὲ κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον λόγον ἅπαντα τῆς τρίτης ψυχῆς ἢ δυνάμεως ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃς ὀνομάζειν αὐτήν, ἣν ὁ Πλάτων ἐκάλει θυμοειδῆ, καὶ περὶ ταύτης ἄμεινόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ μηδὲν ἔτι ὑπολείπεσθαι κατὰ τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς λόγον. θερμασία μέν τις ἔμφυτος ἐν ἥπατι περιέχεται, καθ' ἣν αἷμα γεννᾶται· θερμασία δὲ ἑτέρα πλείων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν εἰς θυμοῦ γένεσιν ἡμῖν δοθεῖσα. καὶ γὰρ <εἰ> χρεία τούτου τίς ἐστιν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τῶν Ἱπποκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος δογμάτων ἐπιδέδεικται, δεῖται μὲν αὕτη ἡ θερμασία τῆς ἀναπνοῆς, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς διαπνοῆς. οὕτω γὰρ ὀνομάζειν ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς ἰατροῖς τὴν διὰ τῶν ἀρτηριῶν γινομένην καθ' ὅλον τὸ σῶμα διττὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐκπεμπουσῶν αἰθαλῶδες περίττωμα κατὰ τὴν συστολὴν, ἑλκουσῶν δὲ τὸν πέριξ ἀέρα κατὰ τὴν διαστολήν.

Galen, Commentary on Hippocrates' Epidemics 6, 5.5 (272,10-274,11 Wenkebach = XVIIB 249-253 Kühn)

(Plato on) Democritus and Aristotle (on Plato) on Art and Nature

“We know how to say many lies like the truth,
And we know how to sing the truth when we want to.”

ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
ἴδμεν δ᾽, εὖτ᾽ ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.

Hesiod, Theogony, 26-7

I

“We are pupils [μαθητὰς] of the animals in the most important things: the spider in spinning and mending, the swallow in building, and the songsters, swan and nightingale, in singing, by way of imitation [κατὰ μίμησιν].”

μαθητὰς ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις γεγονότας ἡμᾶς· ἀράχνης ἐν ὑφαντικῆι καὶ ἀκεστικῆι, χελιδόνος ἐν οἰκοδομίαι, καὶ τῶν λιγυρῶν, κύκνου καὶ ἀηδόνος, ἐν ὠιδῆι κατὰ μίμησιν.

Democritus, DK 68 B154

II

“I'll put it more clearly. They say fire and water and earth and air, all exist by nature and chance [φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ], and none of them by art [τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων]; and the bodies which come next—those, namely, of the earth, sun, moon and stars—have been brought into existence through those [former ones] which are entirely without soul. By chance, they are moved by each other’s forces, through which they crash into each other, somehow fitting together: hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with hard, and all such things that are blended together from necessity through the mixture of opposites by chance. In this way and by those means they have brought into being the whole heaven and all that is in the heaven, and again all animals and plants when all the seasons came to be from these things. [All this], they claim, is not due to reason, or because of some god or some art [οὐ δὲ διὰ νοῦν, φασίν, οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην], but, as I said, by nature and by chance. And art comes from them later, after [everything else]; itself a mortal from mortals, it begets later playthings [παιδιάς τινας] which do not share much in truth [ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας], but are instead images [εἴδωλ’] closely related to [arts] themselves, like [the images] painting makes, and music, and whichever arts are their helpers. Those arts which in fact engender something serious [σπουδαῖον] are whichever ones share their capacity with nature—like medicine, agriculture, and gymnastic.”

Ὧδ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασίν, τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων, καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα, γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἄστρων τε πέρι, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων· τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ᾗ συμπέπτωκεν ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως, θερμὰ ψυχροῖς ἢ ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρὰ καὶ μαλακὰ πρὸς σκληρά, καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη, ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτως γεγεννηκέναι τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα κατ' οὐρανόν, καὶ ζῷα αὖ καὶ φυτὰ σύμπαντα, ὡρῶν πασῶν ἐκ τούτων γενομένων, οὐ δὲ διὰ νοῦν, φασίν, οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην ἀλλά, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ. τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, αὐτὴν θνητὴν ἐκ θνητῶν ὕστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδιάς τινας, ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλὰ εἴδωλ' ἄττα συγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν, οἷ' ἡ γραφικὴ γεννᾷ καὶ μουσικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις εἰσὶν συνέριθοι τέχναι· αἳ δέ τι καὶ σπουδαῖον ἄρα γεννῶσι τῶν τεχνῶν, εἶναι ταύτας ὁπόσαι τῇ φύσει ἐκοίνωσαν τὴν αὑτῶν δύναμιν, οἷον αὖ ἰατρικὴ καὶ γεωργικὴ καὶ γυμναστική.

Plato, Laws X 889B1-D6

III

“Of things that come to be, some come to be from some kind of thought and art [ἀπό τινος διανοίας καὶ τέχνης], for example a house or a ship (for one cause of each of these is a kind of art and thought), while others come to be from no art at all, but from nature [διὰ φύσιν]. For the cause of animals and plants is nature and all such things come to be in accordance with nature. But then some things come to be from chance [διὰ τύχην] as well, for we say most things that come to be neither from art nor from nature nor of necessity come to be from chance. So then, nothing of what comes to be from chance comes to be for the sake of anything, nor do they have any end; however, in what comes to be from art there exists both the end and the for the sake of which (for one who possesses the art always will give you a reason [λόγον] because of which and for the sake of which he wrote), and this [because it] is better than what comes to be because of it. I mean the things of which art is a cause naturally in itself and not accidentally. For we should assume medicine is properly [a cause] of health rather than disease, while housebuilding is [a cause] of the house and not of its demolition. Therefore, everything that comes to be in accordance with art comes to be for the sake of something and this end is its best; yet, what is from chance does not come to be for the sake of something, for even should something good occur from chance, nevertheless surely it is not good in accordance with chance and insofar as it is from chance; instead what comes to be in accordance with it is always indeterminate. What is in accordance with nature [τὸ κατά γε φύσιν], however, comes to be for the sake of something and is always composed for the sake of a better thing than that [which comes to be] from art. For it is not the case that nature imitates art, but art nature [μιμεῖται γὰρ οὐ τὴν τέχνην ἡ φύσις ἀλλ' αὐτὴ τὴν φύσιν], and it exists to help and compensate for nature’s deficiencies.”

Τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ μὲν ἀπό τινος διανοίας καὶ τέχνης γίγνεται, οἷον οἰκία καὶ πλοῖον (ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ τούτων αἰτία τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ διάνοια), τὰ δὲ διὰ τέχνης μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς, ἀλλὰ διὰ φύσιν· ζῴων γὰρ καὶ φυτῶν αἰτία φύσις, καὶ κατὰ φύσιν γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διὰ τύχην ἔνια γίγνεται τῶν πραγμάτων· ὅσα γὰρ μήτε διὰ τέχνην μήτε διὰ φύσιν μήτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται, τὰ πολλὰ τούτων διὰ τύχην γίγνεσθαί φαμεν. Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνομένων οὐδὲν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, οὐδ' ἔστι τι τέλος αὐτοῖς· τοῖς δ' ἀπὸ τέχνης γιγνομένοις ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα (ἀεὶ γὰρ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων ἀποδώσει σοι λόγον δι' ὃν ἔγραψε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα), καὶ τοῦτο [ὅτι] βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ διὰ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. λέγω δ' ὅσων καθ' αὑτὴν ἡ τέχνη πέφυκεν αἰτία καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὑγιείας μὲν γὰρ ἰατρικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ νόσου κυρίως ἂν θείημεν, οἰκοδομικὴν δ' οἰκίας, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ καταβάλλειν. πᾶν ἄρα ἕνεκά του γίγνεται τὸ κατὰ τέχνην, καὶ τοῦτο τέλος αὐτῆς τὸ βέλτιστον, τὸ μέντοι διὰ τύχην οὐ γίγνεται ἕνεκά του· συμβαίη μὲν γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ἀγαθόν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλά γε κατὰ τὴν τύχην καὶ καθόσον ἀπὸ τύχης οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ἀόριστον δ' ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνόμενόν ἐστι κατ' αὐτήν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ κατά γε φύσιν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, καὶ βελτίονος ἕνεκεν ἀεὶ συνίσταται ἢ καθάπερ τὸ διὰ τέχνης· μιμεῖται γὰρ οὐ τὴν τέχνην ἡ φύσις ἀλλ' αὐτὴ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῷ βοηθεῖν καὶ τὰ παραλειπόμενα τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν.

Aristotle, Protrepticus 9, 49.3-50.2