‘I wasn’t paying attention’ - Things Aristotle said, part II

Aristotle’s apophthegmata in Diogenes Laertius. Continued from last time.

“When asked what the upshot of philosophy was, he said, ‘the fact that I do without orders what others do because of a fear of the law.’

When asked how students might make progress, he said, ‘when the people urging on the ones who are ahead do not wait for the ones who are behind.’

To the talkative person who’d inundated him with a long story and then asked, ‘has my babbling annoyed you?,’ he said, ‘oh god no, I wasn’t paying attention.’

To the person who accused him of doing a favour for a no-good man – for it is also told in this way – he said, ‘I didn’t do it for a man, but humanity’.

When asked how we should treat our friends, he said, ‘the way we wish they would treat us.’

He said justice is a virtue of soul distributive of something according to worth.

He used to say, ‘the best provision for old age is education.’

In the second book of his Memoirs, Favorinus says that he used to say all over the place, ‘for the one who has friends, there is no friend;’ it’s also in the seventh book of the Ethics.*

These, then, [are the sayings that] have been attributed to him.”

[20 cont.] ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ποτ' αὐτῷ περιγέγονεν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ἔφη, “τὸ ἀνεπιτάκτως ποιεῖν ἅ τινες διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων φόβον ποιοῦσιν.” ἐρωτηθεὶς πῶς ἂν προκόπτοιεν οἱ μαθηταί, ἔφη, “ἐὰν τοὺς προέχοντας διώκοντες τοὺς ὑστεροῦντας μὴ ἀναμένωσι.” πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα ἀδολέσχην, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ πολλὰ κατήντλησε, “μήτι σου κατεφλυάρησα;” “μὰ Δί',” εἶπεν· “οὐ γάρ σοι προσεῖχον.”

[21] πρὸς τὸν αἰτιασάμενον ὡς εἴη μὴ ἀγαθῷ ἔρανον δεδωκώς – φέρεται γὰρ καὶ οὕτως – ”οὐ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ,” φησίν, “ἔδωκα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ.” ἐρωτηθεὶς πῶς ἂν τοῖς φίλοις προσφεροίμεθα, ἔφη, “ὡς ἂν εὐξαίμεθα αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν προσφέρεσθαι.” τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἔφη ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς διανεμητικὴν τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν. κάλλιστον ἐφόδιον τῷ γήρᾳ τὴν παιδείαν ἔλεγε. φησὶ δὲ Φαβωρῖνος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Ἀπομνημονευμάτων ὡς ἑκάστοτε λέγοι, “ᾧ φίλοι οὐδεὶς φίλος”· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑβδόμῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν ἐστι. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναφέρεται.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 5.20-21

*Looks like he means the work we call the Eudemian Ethics. Aristotle does not quite say what is reported in the text of Diogenes (he says ‘many friends’ instead of just ‘friends’), and he doesn’t say it ‘all over the place;’ also, it seems Aristotle, too, was quoting an apophthegm when he wrote it. Here’s the passage (it’s quite beautiful):

“We say we seek and pray for many friends, and at the same time that ‘there is no friend for the one who has many friends.’ Both are right. It is within the realm of possibilities for many people to live together in community and share in each other’s experience. This would be the most choiceworthy thing of all; but it is also the most difficult, and for this reason, it is necessary that the activity of sharing our experiences be kept among only a few people. And so not only is it difficult to make many friends (since you need to get to know one other), but also to enjoy the friends one has.”

καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν ἡμῖν καὶ εὔχεσθαι πολλοὺς φίλους, ἅμα δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐθεὶς φίλος ᾧ πολλοὶ φίλοι, ἄμφω λέγεται ὀρθῶς. ἐνδεχομένου γὰρ πολλοῖς συζῆν ἅμα καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι ὡς πλείστοις αἱρετώτατον: ἐπεὶ δὲ χαλεπώτατον, ἐν ἐλάττοσιν ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς συναισθήσεως εἶναι, ὥστ᾽ οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ πολλοὺς κτήσασθαι (πείρας γὰρ δεῖ), ἀλλὰ καὶ οὖσι χρήσασθαι.

Eudemian Ethics 7, 1245b20-25

Earlier in the Eudemian Ethics 7, 1238a9-10, Aristotle says something a bit different. Like the previous passage, he says it’s hard to have lots of friends because it takes time to really cultivate a friendship; but he also adds that he thinks it’s just not possible to feel affection for more than one person at a time. This is a strong claim. In Nicomachean Ethics 8.6, 1158a10-11, it’s even stronger. He says humans by nature can’t love more than one person at a time. Does he really think this? Given the quotation above it’s hard to see how—maybe he’s not too committed to it, maybe I’m missing something.

The Nicomachean Ethics also gives a bit more context to the claim about the time it takes to make a friend:

πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.6, 1158a13-15

There is a difference of opinion among translators about the passage. It’s been moved in opposite directions:

1. “It is not easy for many people to please the same person a great deal at the same time, nor, perhaps, that they be good people.” (Ross takes it this way)

2. “It is not easy for the same person to please many people a great deal at the same time, and perhaps there are not many good people.” (Crisp in the Cambridge translation takes it this way)

The first says something like, “it’s hard to really enjoy lots of people at the same time,” and while I sort of see what this might mean, I admit I don’t totally get it. One thing Ross might be thinking is that Aristotle is making a logical point. It’s like he’s saying, ‘if any one of those people were actually pleasing, there wouldn’t need to be so many of them.’

Or maybe he’s thinking we only have so much attention we can give to everything going on in our lives. If there are too many things going on, at some point we have no more attention to give, so if lots of people are trying to please the same person at the same time, that person won’t be able to be exceptionally pleased by any one of them. And if, to become a true friend, you need to be exceptionally pleasing, then it would be hard for any of those people to become friends (as in the ‘no friend for the one with friends’ saying).

The second says something like, “it’s hard to be all things to all people,” especially since (as he goes on to say), “one needs to become deeply acquainted and develop intimacy” to be a friend, “and this is very difficult.” This puts the emphasis on the fact that, again, time and attention are finite, and the more we divide them, the less we have for any one person.

The reason people take the passage in two ways is in part grammatical. The clause is in indirect speech and the verb ἀρέσκειν can take both a dative and an accusative (i.e., one can be pleasing to X (dative) or simply please X (accusative)). Our sentence has nouns in both cases (πολλούς, as a substantive, ‘many people’; τῷ αὐτῷ, ‘the same person’). So either πολλούς is the subject of ἀρέσκειν and τῷ αὐτῷ is a personal dative (‘that many people are pleasing to the same person is not easy’); or, πολλούς is the object of ἀρέσκειν and τῷ αὐτῷ goes with οὐ ῥᾴδιον (‘it is not easy for the same person to please many people...’).

Passages like this can expose a translator’s intuitions about things seemingly familiar.

"Let him whip me when I'm not around" - Things Aristotle said, part I

Part I of the apophthegmata attributed to Aristotle by Diogenes Laertius.

“These very nice sayings are attributed to him:

When asked what profit is gained by those who tell lies, he said: ‘that whenever they speak the truth, they are not believed.’

Once, he was reproached because he gave charity to a lowly person, so he said, ‘I gave charity to a man, not a way of life.’

He always used to tell his friends and students, whenever and wherever he happened to be lecturing, that ‘as light comes to sight from the air, so it comes to the mind from mathematics.’*

Very often, referring to the Athenians, he said, ‘they discovered wheat and laws: they used the wheat, not so much the laws.’

He used to say, ‘the roots of education are bitter, but the fruit is sweet.’

When asked what gets old quickly, he said, ‘gratitude.’

When asked what is hope, he said, ‘a waking dream.’

When Diogenes offered him a dried fig, he knew if he didn’t take it, Diogenes would have some joke ready to go. So he took it and said, ‘Diogenes ruined the fig as well as the joke.’ Another time he offered them, he took them and, raising them up as if they were children, he said, ‘Great Diogenes!’

He said three things are required for education: nature, study, and practice.

When he heard that someone was saying bad things about him behind his back, he said, ‘let him whip me when I’m not around.’

He used to say beauty was a better recommendation than any letter. Some people say Diogenes defined it this way, but he said good looks are ‘a gift from god,’ Socrates, ‘a short-lived tyranny,’ Plato, ‘an advantage of nature,’ Theophrastus, ‘a silent deception,’ Theocritus, ‘a penalty made of ivory,’ Carneades, ‘a king without a body-guard.’

When asked how the educated differ from the uneducated, he said, ‘as much as the living from the dead.’

He used to say, ‘education is an adornment in good times and a refuge in bad ones;’ and that children’s teachers are more valuable than those who only gave them birth: for the one gives you a chance to live, the other to live well.

To someone who bragged that he was from a great city, he said, ‘one needn’t look into this, but rather, who is it who is worthy of a great heritage.’

When asked what a friend is, he said, ‘one soul dwelling in two bodies.’

He used to say, ‘there are two kinds of people: those who are as restrained as someone who will live forever, and those who are as excessive as someone who will die tomorrow.’

To the person who was curious why we spend so much time in the company of what is beautiful, he said, ‘that’s a blind man’s question.’”

*or perhaps, “studies”

[17] Ἀναφέρεται δ᾽ εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ ἀποφθέγματα κάλλιστα ταυτί. ἐρωτηθεὶς τί περιγίνεται κέρδος τοῖς ψευδομένοις, "ὅταν," ἔφη, "λέγωσιν ἀληθῆ, μὴ πιστεύεσθαι." ὀνειδιζόμενός ποτε ὅτι πονηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐλεημοσύνην ἔδωκεν, "οὐ τὸν τρόπον," εἶπεν, "ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἠλέησα." συνεχὲς εἰώθει λέγειν πρός τε τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς φοιτῶντας αὐτῷ, ἔνθα ἂν καὶ ὅπου διατρίβων ἔτυχεν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ὅρασις ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος [ἀέρος] λαμβάνει τὸ φῶς, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἀποτεινόμενος τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔφασκεν εὑρηκέναι πυροὺς καὶ νόμους: ἀλλὰ πυροῖς μὲν χρῆσθαι, νόμοις δὲ μή.

[18] Τῆς παιδείας ἔφη τὰς μὲν ῥίζας εἶναι πικράς, τὸν δὲ καρπὸν γλυκύν. ἐρωτηθεὶς τί γηράσκει ταχύ, "χάρις," ἔφη. ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστιν ἐλπίς, "ἐγρηγορότος," εἶπεν, "ἐνύπνιον." Διογένους ἰσχάδ᾽ αὐτῷ διδόντος νοήσας ὅτι, εἰ μὴ λάβοι, χρείαν εἴη μεμελετηκώς, λαβὼν ἔφη Διογένην μετὰ τῆς χρείας καὶ τὴν ἰσχάδα ἀπολωλεκέναι: πάλιν τε διδόντος λαβὼν καὶ μετεωρίσας ὡς τὰ παιδία εἰπών τε "μέγας Διογένης," ἀπέδωκεν αὐτῷ. τριῶν ἔφη δεῖν παιδείᾳ, φύσεως, μαθήσεως, ἀσκήσεως. ἀκούσας ὑπό τινος λοιδορεῖσθαι, "ἀπόντα με," ἔφη, "καὶ μαστιγούτω." τὸ κάλλος παντὸς ἔλεγεν ἐπιστολίου συστατικώτερον.

[19] οἱ δὲ οὕτω μὲν Διογένην φασὶν ὁρίσασθαι, αὐτὸν δὲ θεοῦ δῶρον εἰπεῖν εὐμορφίαν: Σωκράτην δὲ ὀλιγοχρόνιον τυραννίδα: Πλάτωνα προτέρημα φύσεως: Θεόφραστον σιωπῶσαν ἀπάτην: Θεόκριτον ἐλεφαντίνην ζημίαν: Καρνεάδην ἀδορυφόρητον βασιλείαν. ἐρωτηθεὶς τίνι διαφέρουσιν οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων, "ὅσῳ," εἶπεν, "οἱ ζῶντες τῶν τεθνεώτων." τὴν παιδείαν ἔλεγεν ἐν μὲν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις εἶναι κόσμον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καταφυγήν. τῶν γονέων τοὺς παιδεύσαντας ἐντιμοτέρους εἶναι τῶν μόνον γεννησάντων: τοὺς μὲν γὰρ τὸ ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ τὸ καλῶς ζῆν παρασχέσθαι. πρὸς τὸν καυχώμενον ὡς ἀπὸ μεγάλης πόλεως εἴη, "οὐ τοῦτο," ἔφη, "δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅστις μεγάλης πατρίδος ἄξιός ἐστιν."

[20] ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστι φίλος, ἔφη, "μία ψυχὴ δύο σώμασιν ἐνοικοῦσα." τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔλεγε τοὺς μὲν οὕτω φείδεσθαι ὡς ἀεὶ ζησομένους, τοὺς δὲ οὕτως ἀναλίσκειν ὡς αὐτίκα τεθνηξομένους. πρὸς τὸν πυθόμενον διὰ τί τοῖς καλοῖς πολὺν χρόνον ὁμιλοῦμεν, "τυφλοῦ," ἔφη, "τὸ ἐρώτημα."

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 5.17-20

Aristotle's Lost Book On Magic

Here are all of V. Rose's testimonia of a work attributed to Aristotle called Magic (ὁ Μαγικός λόγος, or τὸ μαγικόν?). The title either refers to the art practised by the Magi (the Zoroastrian priests from Persia), or it refers to the fact that the discussion is a discussion about the Magi. The latter seems more likely, even though the first passage, from Diogenes Laertius, suggests the discussion mentioned all sorts of wisdom cults.

The attribution is disputed. Diogenes Laertius says it is by Aristotle, but doesn't put it in his list of Aristotle's works (it doesn't show up in any other list I've looked at in either Greek or Arabic). The Suda says it is by Antisthenes, and that some people attributed it to Aristotle or someone named Rhodon. It's not clear where the Suda is getting this from.

While we don't know who wrote it, its contents are hinted at by the testimonies gathered in Rose (+ a few others I've put together). Diogenes reports that Aristotle thought magic wasn't sorcery, but philosophy or wisdom. This is confirmed by the Suda. It has something to do with prognostication. Eudoxus, according to Pliny, believed it was useful and very valuable, and so it was not only practical but connected to more valuable objects of study, probably the heavenly bodies. This is especially supported by the etymology of Zoroaster ('star-diviner') reported by Diogenes, and Porphyry's etymology of 'magus' as 'wise in divine matters'. Philo specifies that it was a kind of 'optics' and a very precise branch of natural science. Finally, Philo, Porphyry and the Suda associate it with both wisdom and with kingship. Philo says not only private citizens practice magic, but that Persian kings themselves had to be educated as Magi to become king.

It seems to me as if all these testimonies could be referring to a discussion of wise philosopher kings who are able to predict the future through their understanding of the heavens and the science of nature.

---

"Some say the work of philosophy originated with the barbarians. For among the Persians are the Magi, among the Babylonians and Assyrians the Chaldeans, among the Indians the Gymnosophists (lit. naked philosophers), and among the Celts and Gauls, those called 'Druids' and holy people, according to what Aristotle says in the book on Magic and Sotion in the twenty-third book of the Succession of Philosophers."

Τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἔνιοί φασιν ἀπὸ βαρβάρων ἄρξαι. γεγενῆσθαι γὰρ παρὰ μὲν Πέρσαις μάγους, παρὰ δὲ Βαβυλωνίοις ἢ Ἀσσυρίοις Χαλδαίους, καὶ γυμνοσοφιστὰς παρ' Ἰνδοῖς, παρά τε Κελτοῖς καὶ Γαλάταις τοὺς καλουμένους δρυίδας καὶ σεμνοθέους, καθά φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ μαγικῷ καὶ Σωτίων ἐν εἰκοστῷ τρίτῳ τῆς διαδοχῆς.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 1.1

"The Magi were ignorant of sorcerers' magic, says Aristotle in the book on Magic and Dinon in the fifth book of his Histories. He also says 'Zoroaster' when translated literally means 'star-diviner'; Hermodorus says this as well. In the first book of On Philosophy, Aristotle says they (the Magi) are actually older than the Egyptians. And according to them there are two principles, a good daimon and a bad daimon: to the former, the name is Zeus and 'Oromasdes' [i.e., Ahura Mazda], to the other Hades and 'Arimanius' [i.e., Ahriman]. Hermippus says this too in the first book On Magi, so does Eudoxus in the Survey, and Theopompus in the eighth book of the Philippics."

Τὴν δὲ γοητικὴν μαγείαν [sc. οἱ Μάγοι] οὐδ' ἔγνωσαν, φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Μαγικῷ καὶ Δείνων ἐν τῇ πέμπτῃ τῶν Ἱστοριῶν· ὃς καὶ μεθερμηνευόμενόν φησι τὸν Ζωροάστρην ἀστροθύτην εἶναι· φησὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ Ἑρμόδωρος. Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πρεσβυτέρους εἶναι τῶν Αἰγυπτίων· καὶ δύο κατ' αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἀρχάς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν δαίμονα· καὶ τῷ μὲν ὄνομα εἶναι Ζεὺς καὶ Ὠρομάσδης, τῷ δὲ Ἅιδης καὶ Ἀρειμάνιος. φησὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ Ἕρμιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ μάγων καὶ Εὔδοξος ἐν τῇ Περιόδῳ καὶ Θεόπομπος ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ τῶν Φιλιππικῶν.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 1.7-8

"Aristotle says that a certain magus [magician or priest from Persia] came from Syria to Athens and among the other things he predicted about Socrates, was that he will have a violent end."

φησὶ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης μάγον τινὰ ἐλθόντα ἐκ Συρίας εἰς Ἀθήνας τά τε ἄλλα καταγνῶναι τοῦ Σωκράτους καὶ δὴ καὶ βίαιον ἔσεσθαι τὴν τελευτὴν αὐτῷ.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 2.45

"Eudoxus, who wanted it to be known that among the schools of philosophy, magic is the most illustrious and most useful, relates that this 'Zoroaster' lived six thousand years before Plato's death. Aristotle says this too."

Eudoxus qui inter sapientiae sectas clarissimam utilissimamque eam (magicam) intellegi voluit, Zoroastren hunc sex milibus annorum ante Platonis mortem fuisse prodidit. sic et Aristoteles.

Pliny, Natural History, 30.3

"Antisthenes, an Athenian, Socratic philosopher from among the orators, who first was called a Peripatetic, then 'played the dog' (i.e., acted like someone from what would later be called the 'Cynic' school). He was the son of a father with the same name, and his mother came from the people of Thrace. He wrote these ten volumes: first, Magic: it tells about a certain magus, Zoroaster, who discovered wisdom. Some people attribute this to Aristotle, others to Rhodon."

Ἀντισθένης, Ἀθηναῖος, ἀπὸ ῥητόρων φιλόσοφος Σωκρατικός, ὅστις Περιπατητικὸς ἐκλήθη πρῶτον, εἶτα ἐκύνισεν: υἱὸς δὲ ὢν ὁμωνύμου πατρὸς, μητρὸς δὲ τὸ γένος Θρᾴσσης. οὗτος συνέγραψε τόμους δέκα: πρῶτον μαγικόν: ἀφηγεῖται δὲ περὶ Ζωροάστρου τινὸς μάγου, εὑρόντος τὴν σοφίαν: τοῦτο δέ τινες Ἀριστοτέλει, οἱ δὲ Ῥόδωνι ἀνατιθέασιν.

Suda, s.v. Ἀντισθένης

"Execestus, the Phocian tyrant, used to wear two enchanted rings, and he used to determine the appropriate time to act by the sound they made against one another. But, he still died, murdered by treachery despite being warned by the sound, as Aristotle says in the Phocian Constitution."

Ἐξήκεστός τε ὁ Φωκαιέων τύραννος δύο δακτυλίους φορῶν γεγοητευμένους τῷ ψόφῳ τῷ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διῃσθάνετο τοὺς καιροὺς τῶν πράξεων, ἀπέθανεν δὲ ὅμως δολοφονηθεὶς καίτοι προσημήναντος τοῦ ψόφου, ὥς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ Φωκαιέων πολιτείᾳ.

Clement of Alexandria, Stromateus I, chapter 21

"The true art of magic, which is a science of optics by which the works of nature are illuminated with a brighter appearance and is thought to be holy and highly prized, is not only practiced by private citizens, but also by kings and of kings the greatest, and most of all the Persian kings, to the extent that they say no one among them is able to be a successor to the kingship if he does not happen to share in the house of the Magi."

τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ μαγικήν, ὀπτικὴν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν, ᾗ τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα τρανοτέραις φαντασίαις αὐγάζεται, σεμνὴν καὶ περιμάχητον δοκοῦσαν εἶναι, οὐκ ἰδιῶται μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ βασιλέων οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Περσῶν διαπονοῦσιν οὕτως, ὥστ' οὐδένα φασὶν ἐπὶ βασιλείαν δύνασθαι παραπεμφθῆναι παρ' αὐτοῖς, εἰ μὴ πρότερον τοῦ μάγων γένους κεκοινωνηκὼς τυγχάνοι.

Philo of Judaea, On Special Laws, 3.100

"Among the Persians, those who are wise in divine matters and worship it are called 'Magi'. This is just what 'Magus' means in the regional language. This house is considered to be so great and so holy by the Persians, that even Darius, son of Hystaspes, had engraved on his tombstone (among other things) that he was a teacher of magic arts."

παρά γε μὴν τοῖς Πέρσαις οἱ περὶ τὸ θεῖον σοφοὶ καὶ τούτου θεράποντες μάγοι μὲν προσαγορεύονται· τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχώριον διάλεκτον ὁ μάγος· οὕτω δὲ μέγα καὶ σεβάσμιον γένος τοῦτο παρὰ Πέρσαις νενόμισται, ὥστε καὶ Δαρεῖον τὸν Ὑστάσπου ἐπιγράψαι τῷ μνήματι πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅτι καὶ μαγικῶν γένοιτο διδάσκαλος.

Porphyry, On Abstinence from Animal Food, 4.16

"Don't make drugs. Stay away from magic books."

Φάρμακα μὴ τεύχειν, μαγικῶν βίβλων ἀπέχεσθαι.

Pseudo-Phocylides, Sententiae, l.149

Illustration of (a somewhat Christian?) Zoroaster riding the back of a dragon. Zoroaster was associated with the arts of magic and astrology already in antiquity. This illustration is from the Clavis Artis, vol. 1, the Biblioteca dell’Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Roma. On the manuscript and its provenance, see the Italian wiki. Image source here.

Soda and onions

Continuing with Aetius of Amida's pharmacy and its parallels: onions.

Philumenus on onions as a cure for bites of all kinds.

"For dog bites or people bites, apply a poultice of fine salt mixed with honey until the bite is filled. Some also add onion and vinegar and then use it."

πρὸς οὖν κυνόδηκτα καὶ ἀνθρωπόδηκτα ἅλας λεῖον σὺν μέλιτι κατάπλασσε, ἄχρις οὗ πλήρη ᾖ. τινὲς δὲ καὶ κρόμμυον προσμίσγουσιν καὶ ὄξους καὶ οὕτως χρῶνται.

Philumenus, On poisonous animals and their remedies [De venenatis animalibus eorumque remediis], 5.6 (10,7-9 Wellman)

Galen on onions.

"The onion belongs to the fourth degree of things that heat. Its substance is composed of rather large particles, which is why it also opens up hemorrhoids when it is applied; when used full strength with vinegar in the sun, it washes away skin lesions; and when rubbed on bald spots, it stimulates the hair faster than alcuonium. If one separates off its juice, whatever remains is a considerably earthy, hot substance, but the juice itself is a watery and airy hot substance. Thus, when it is used as a salve against thick humours, it benefits cataract sufferers and those who are short-sighted. Due to its mixture, the onion generally causes flatulence when eaten, and for this reason, those which are drier in their mixture cause less flatulence."

Κρόμμυον ἐκ τῆς τετάρτης ἐστὶ τάξεως τῶν θερμαινόντων. ἡ δ' οὐσία παχυμερής ἐστιν αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον, ὅθεν καὶ τὰς αἱμοῤῥοΐδας ἀναστομοῖ προστιθέμενον καὶ σὺν ὄξει καταχριόμενον ἐν ἡλίῳ τοὺς ἀλφοὺς ἀποῤῥύπτει καὶ παρατριβόμενον ἀλωπεκίαις θᾶττον ἀλκυονίου παρορμᾷ τὰς τρίχας. εἰ δ' ἀποχωρίσειεν αὐτοῦ τις τὸν χυλὸν, ὅσον μὲν ὑπόλοιπον ἱκανῶς ἐστι γεώδους οὐσίας θερμῆς, αὐτὸς δ' ὁ χυλὸς ὑδατώδους τε καὶ ἀερώδους θερμότητος. οὕτω οὖν καὶ τοὺς ὑποχεομένους καὶ ἀμβλυώττοντας ἐπὶ πάχει χυμῶν ὀνίνησιν ὑπαλειφόμενος. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτου κράσεως ὅλον τὸ κρόμμυον φυσῶδές ἐστιν ἐσθιόμενον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὅσα ξηρότερα τὴν κρᾶσιν ἀφυσότερα.

Galen, On the mixtures and capacities of simple drugs, 7.58 (XII 48-49 Kühn)

Oribasius' concise summary.

"Onion belongs to the fourth rank of things that heat. Its substance is composed of thick particles."

Κρόμμυον ἐκ τῆς τετάρτης ἐστὶ τάξεως τῶν θερμαινόντων· ἡ δὲ οὐσία παχυμερής ἐστιν.

Oribasius, Collectiones medicae, 15.1.10.79 (260,26-28 Raeder)

Aetius' entry based on Galen.

"Onion belongs to the fourth degree of things that heat. Its substance is composed of very large particles, whence it also opens up hemorrhoids when it is applied; when used full strength with vinegar in the sun, it washes away skin lesions; and when rubbed on bald spots, it stimulates the hair faster than alcuonium. When eaten, it heats the body with its acridity and thins thick and sticky humours in it. It fills the abdomen with air because its substance is composed of very thick particles."

Κρόμυον ἐκ τῆς τετάρτης ἐστὶ τάξεως τῶν θερμαινόντων· ἡ δὲ οὐσία αὐτοῦ παχυμερὴς μᾶλλον, ὅθεν καὶ τὰς αἱμορροίδας ἀναστομοῖ προστιθέμενον καὶ σὺν ὄξει καταχριόμενον ἐν ἡλίῳ τοὺς ἀλφοὺς ἀπορρύπτει καὶ παρατριβόμενον ἀλωπεκίαις θᾶττον ἀλκυονίου παρορμᾷ τὰς τρίχας. ἐσθιόμενον δὲ θερμαίνει μὲν τὸ σῶμα τῇ δριμύτητι καὶ λεπτύνει τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ παχεῖς καὶ γλίσχρους χυμούς· ἐμπνευματοῖ δὲ τὴν γαστέρα διὰ τὸ παχυμερὲς τῆς οὐσίας.

Aetius of Amida, Libri medicinales, I 232 (97,14-20 Olivieri)

Cf. Dioscorides, De materia medica, 2.151 (p.155 in Beck), which mentions many of the other uses of onions as well, adding to what is said above that it's useful for blisters on the feet (when it is mixed with chicken fat, hardness of hearing, sore throats, and stuffy noses, but that it causes headaches. He leaves out the part about people bites. Oddly, none of these passages mention the fact that onions make your cry, a fact that Aristotle's school was rather interested in:

(pseudo-)Aristotle on why onions cause tears, while garlic does not.

"Why is it that only onions cause the eyes to sting so excessively? People even say it got its name because of this, since [κρόμμυον] makes the pupil close [τὴν κόρην συμμύειν]. Marjoram doesn't, nor do other things which are acrid. Thus, watercress [lit. "up the nose"], because it is hotter, causes more drying than the colliquescence that it produces, since it produces tears in those who eat it; it does not, however, [produce tears] when it is brought close by, because it does not give off any thin vapour, for it is too dry and hot. Marjoram and similar hot things are dry and mild, but what is going to produce tears needs to be stinging, moist and sticky. For this reason, olive oil produces tears, although its stinging is weak. For because of its stickiness and fineness, it produces pain when it penetrates [the flesh], and produces liquefaction because of the pain. The onion has a similar capacity, hence the moisture and vapour from it is hot, fine and sticky. Thus, when it is brought close by, because of the kind of vapour that it is and because it carries with it a fine moisture, it produces tears; when it is eaten, the exhalation passes through […there is a lacuna here…]. Garlic is hot and acrid and has moisture, but it is not sticky, so it does not produce tears.

Διὰ τί τὸ κρόμμυον μόνον οὕτως περιττῶς δάκνει τὼ ὀφθαλμώ (διὸ καὶ τοὔνομά φασι τοῦτ' ἔχειν αὐτό, ὡς τὴν κόρην ποιεῖν συμμύειν), ἡ δὲ ὀρίγανος οὔ, οὐδ' ἄλλα δριμέα ὄντα; καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀνάρρινον μᾶλλον δάκνον οὐ ποιεῖ ὁμοίως δακρύειν προσφερόμενον, τὸ δὲ προσφερόμενον καὶ κατατρωγόμενον. ἢ ὅτι διαφοραὶ πολλαὶ ἀκολουθοῦσιν ἑκάστοις τῶν δριμέων, ἃ ποιεῖ τὴν ἰδίαν ἑκάστου δύναμιν; τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀνάρρινον διὰ τὸ θερμότερον εἶναι ξηραντικώτερόν ἐστι τῆς γινομένης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συντήξεως, ἐπεὶ ποιεῖ γε δάκρυον ἐσθίοντι· προσφερόμενον δὲ οὔ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπατμίζει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ λεπτόν τι· ξηρότερον γάρ ἐστι καὶ θερμότερον. ἡ δὲ ὀρίγανος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα θερμὰ ξηρά ἐστιν ἠρέμα. δεῖ δὲ τὸ μέλλον δάκρυον ποιήσειν δηκτικὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν εἶναι καὶ γλίσχρον. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον ποιεῖ δακρύειν, ἀσθενῆ ἔχον δῆξιν· διὰ γλισχρότητα γὰρ καὶ λεπτότητα παραδῦνον ποιεῖ τὸν πόνον, καὶ τὴν σύντηξιν διὰ τὸν πόνον. τὸ δὲ κρόμμυον τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὴν ἀτμίδα αὐτοῦ θερμὴν καὶ λεπτὴν καὶ γλίσχραν εἶναι. ὥστε προσφερόμενον μέν, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀτμίδα τοιαύτην εἶναι καὶ συναφιέναι ὑγρότητα λεπτήν, ποιεῖ δακρύειν, ἐσθιομένου δὲ ἡ ἀναθυμίασις διιοῦσα ... τὸ δὲ σκόροδον θερμὸν μὲν καὶ δριμύ ἐστι καὶ ὑγρότητα ἔχει, ἀλλ' οὐ γλίσχρον· διὸ οὐ ποιεῖ δακρύειν.

Pseudo-Aristotle, Problemata, 21.22, 925a27-925b12

Alexis on knowing frivolous things.

"You don’t know what you're talking about. Run over and have a conversation with Plato and become enlightened about soda and onions."

λέγεις περὶ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα· συγγενοῦ τρέχων
Πλάτωνι καὶ γνώσῃ λίτρον καὶ κρόμμυον.

Alexis, Ancylion ap. Diogenes Laertius, Vita philosophorum, 3.37