Pseudo-Galen, what is a soul and what is a body?

“29. According to Plato, soul is a self-moving incorporeal substance. According to the Stoics, however, it is a subtle body moving out of itself according to seminal principles, while according to Aristotle, it is the actuality of a natural instrumental body potentially having life. Alternatively, soul is pneuma distributed through the whole body, through which we live and reason and act by means of the other senses, the body being its servant.*

30. Body is magnitude three times extended, having in itself height, depth and breadth.** Or, it is magnitude composed of three dimensions.”

κθʹ. ψυχή ἐστιν οὐσία ἀσώματος, αὐτοκίνητος κατὰ Πλάτωνα. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς σῶμα λεπτομερὲς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους. κατὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη ἐντελέχεια σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. ἄλλως. ψυχή ἐστι πνεῦμα παρεσπαρμένον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι δι' οὗ ζῶμεν καὶ λογιζόμεθα καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐνεργοῦμεν ὑπηρετοῦντος τοῦ σώματος.

λʹ. σῶμά ἐστι μέγεθος τριχῇ διάστατον ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ μῆκος, βάθος, πλάτος. ἢ μέγεθος ἐκ τριῶν διαστημάτων συνεστηκός.

[Galen], Medical Definitions 29 and 30, 19.355–356 K

*cf. Anonymus Londinensis:

“‘Soul’ is said in three ways: that which pervades the whole body, and the rational part, and further the entrecheia (i.e., ἐντελέχεια, probably).”

ψυχὴ δὲ λέγεται τριχῶς·
[ἥ τε] τῶι ὅλωι σώματι παρεσπαρ-
μ̣ένη καὶ τὸ μόριον τὸ λογιστικὸν
[κ]αὶ ἔτι ἡ ἐντρέχεια. * καὶ τῆς μ(ὲν) ἐντρε-
[χ]είας ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος οὐ χρῄζομεν,
[τ]ῶν δὲ ἄλλων δύο σημαινομένων,
[κα]ὶ μᾶλλον το̣ῦ λο̣γιστ̣ικοῦ.

Anonymus Londinensis I,21-24

**Cf. Apollodorus ap. Diogenes Laertius:

“Body is defined by Apollodorus in his Physics as that which is extended in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. This is also called solid body.”

σῶμα δ’ ἐστίν, ὥς φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ, τὸ τριχῆ διαστατόν, εἰς μῆκος, εἰς πλάτος, εἰς βάθος· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ στερεὸν σῶμα καλεῖται.

Diog. Laert. 7.175

Plato on Providence in Laws X

More on providence: the theodicy from Plato’s Laws. Plato doesn’t say the divine punishes or spites people for failing to be as virtuous as they could be. Instead, he says the cosmic ruler figures out where people with less-than-perfect characters in this life are most likely to succeed in the next one, and makes sure that’s where they end up. Didn’t make it as a good human? No problem—in the next round, maybe you can make it as a good bird or fish. The idea is that the cosmos has been set up so that we’re always given a chance to excel, not just for our own sake, but for the sake of being a part of a process of making everything as good as possible.

“Athenian: This. When the ruler of the cosmos saw that all our actions are ensouled, and that in them there is much virtue and much vice, and that soul and body, once they came into existence, were indestructible—for, had either of them been destroyed, there would never have been a generation of animals—, but they were not eternal like the customary gods, and when he saw by how much the good of the soul is always by nature beneficial, and the evil harmful—when he saw all these things, he determined where, if placed, each individual would make virtue victorious and vice defeated in the universe. And he made it so that, depending on what we are like, we must make our home always in a certain abode and ever in certain places. The causes of becoming the way we are, however, he left to our individual choices. For how we desire and what our soul is like—in just about every case, all of us for the most part come to be the way we are by this.”

ΑΘ. Ὧδε. ἐπειδὴ κατεῖδεν ἡμῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐμψύχους οὔσας τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας καὶ πολλὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν ἐν αὐταῖς οὖσαν, πολλὴν δὲ κακίαν, ἀνώλεθρον δὲ ὂν γενόμενον, ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰώνιον, ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί – γένεσις γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἦν ζῴων ἀπολομένου τούτοιν θατέρου – καὶ τὸ μὲν ὠφελεῖν ἀεὶ πεφυκός, ὅσον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς, διενοήθη, τὸ δὲ κακὸν βλάπτειν· ταῦτα πάντα συνιδών, ἐμηχανήσατο ποῦ κείμενον ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν νικῶσαν ἀρετήν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν, ἐν τῷ παντὶ παρέχοι μάλιστ' ἂν καὶ ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστα. μεμηχάνηται δὴ πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ ποῖόν τι γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ ποίαν ἕδραν δεῖ μεταλαμβάνον οἰκίζεσθαι καὶ τίνας ποτὲ τόπους· τῆς δὲ γενέσεως τοῦ ποίου τινὸς ἀφῆκε ταῖς βουλήσεσιν ἑκάστων ἡμῶν τὰς αἰτίας. ὅπῃ γὰρ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ ὁποῖός τις ὢν τὴν ψυχήν, ταύτῃ σχεδὸν ἑκάστοτε καὶ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται ἅπας ἡμῶν ὡς τὸ πολύ.

Plato, Laws 904A6–C4

A Prayer to Isis

Meditation for a friend who saw something else in me, who died last week.

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“Oh holy and eternal comfort of humankind, who ever nurtures mortals with your generosity, you apply a mother’s sweet affection to the misfortunes of the wretched. Not a day or night or even a little moment goes by indifferent to your blessing.

“You protect men on land and sea. Driving away life’s storms, you reach out with your saving hand and you unwind the threads of the Fates, even those that are inextricably twisted. You calm the tempests of Fortune and you restrain the hurtful course of the stars.

“The spirits above honour you, the ones below worship you. You turn the sphere of heaven, you give light to the sun, you govern the universe, and you keep Tartarus at bay. To you, the heavenly bodies reply, the seasons return, the divine power gives praise, and the elements give their devotion.

“At your command, the winds give breath, the clouds nourish, the seeds of the earth sprout forth, and their seedlings grow. At your greatness tremble the birds moving in the sky, the beasts wandering the hills, the serpents hiding in the den, and the monsters that swim in the deep.

“My nature, however, is too feeble to speak your praises, my inheritance too meager to offer you sacrifices. My voice does not have the power to say what I feel about your greatness—nor would a thousand mouths and as many tongues, or even an eternal flow of indefatigable speech.

“I will, therefore, take care to do the only thing a pious but poor person can do: I will hold your divine expression and your most holy will in the secret places of my heart, forever keeping them and remembering.”

‘Tu quidem, sancta et humani generis sospitatrix perpetua, semper fouendis mortalibus munifica, dulcem matris affectionem miserorum casibus tribuis. Nec dies nec quies ulla ac ne momentum quidem tenue tuis transcrrit beneficiis otiosum, quin mari terraque protegas homines et depulsis uitae procellis salutarem porrigas dexteram, qua fatorum etiam inextricabiliter contorta retractas licia, et Fortunae tempestates mitigas, et stellarum noxios meatus cohibes. Te superi colunt, obseruant inferi. Tu rotas orbem, luminas solem, regis mundum, calcas Tartarum. Tibi respondent sidera, redeunt tempora, gaudent numina, seruiunt elementa. Tuo nutu spirant flamina, nutriunt nubila, germinant semina, crescunt germina. Tuam maiestatem perhorrescunt aues caelo meantes, ferae montibus errantes, serpentes solo latentes, beluae ponto natantes. At ego referendis laudibus tuis exilis ingenio et adhibendis sacrificiis tenuis patrimonio; nec mihi uocis ubertas ad dicenda quae de ta maiestate sentio sufficit, nec ora mille linguaeque totidem uel indefessi sermonis aeterna series. Ergo quod solum potest, religiosus quidem sed pauper alioquin, efficere curabo: diuinos tuos uultus numenque sanctissimum intra pectoris mei secreta conditum perpetuo custodiens imaginabor.’

Apuleius, Metamorphoses XI 25

Forever Young

A while ago, I posted a bit of the Pseudo-Lucian’s Long Lives (Macrobii), a funny little book telling the stories of famous people who lived a long life through diet and exercise. Like this one:

“Ariathes, the king of Kappadokia, lived 82 years according to Hieronymos. Maybe he would have lived longer if he hadn’t been captured and crucified during the war against Perdikkas.”

Ἀριαράθης δὲ ὁ Καππαδοκῶν βασιλεὺς δύο μὲν καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα ἔζησεν ἔτη, ὡς Ἱερώνυμος ἱστορεῖ: ἐδυνήθη δὲ ἴσως καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον διαγενέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Περδίκκαν μάχῃ ζωγρηθεὶς ἀνεσκολοπίσθη.

Pseudo-Lucian, Macrobii 13

There seems to have been a whole genre on this topic in antiquity and even into the Renaissance — my sister tells me Ficino’s De vita is essentially advice about how scholars can live a long life …

Here’s another example of the genre, this time from Galen’s On Wasting Away (De marcore):

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Actually, a contemporary philosopher wrote a book showing how it is possible for someone to stay young forever. He published the book when he was forty, but he lived until he was eighty, at which point he was so withered and dry that he himself fit the description in the Hippocratic Prognostics:

“…nose sharp, eyes hollow, temples collapsed, ears cold and drawn in and the ear lobes curled up, and the area around the forehead dry and stretched and wrinkled.” (Hipp. Prog. 2.5, 2.115 Littré)

He was laughed at for trying to teach other people how to stay young when he looked the way he did. And so he put out a second edition of On the Marvellous Eternal Youth (for that’s also what he called it throughout the book), in which he showed that it wasn’t possible for every person to stay forever young, but that one needs to have the right nature and to be given a solid foundation from their earliest upbringing. And he proclaimed that if he were in charge of raising children with a suitable nature right from the start, he would make their bodies immortal.

Now, his claim couldn’t be tested, since he would be dead before the kids he was taking care of grew up. And so everyone else thought he was extremely foolish, but not me, since I alone recognized that many reasonable men, tricked by the plausibility of the arguments, hold many other opinions that are inconsistent with what is known through experience.

There is, then, nothing that marvellous about this argument. For the claim that everything born will be thoroughly corrupted is neither a scientific nor a necessary conclusion, but only goes as far as being probable, as I have shown in On Demonstration, even if just about everyone uses this argument when they point out that it is necessary for living things to age, saying that everything born is on the path to its subsequent and necessary destruction.

καί τοί τις τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλοσόφων ἔγραψε βιβλίον, ἐπιδεικνὺς ὅπως ἔνεστιν ἀγήρων τινὰ διαμεῖναι τὸ πάμπαν. ἐξέδωκε μὲν οὖν τὸ βιβλίον ἔτι τεσσαρακοντούτης ὢν, παρέτεινε δὲ μέχρι καὶ τῶν ὀγδοήκοντα ἐτῶν, καὶ ἦν οὕτως ἰσχνός τε καὶ ξηρὸς, ὡς ἁρμόζειν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ προγνωστικοῦ Ἱπποκράτειον ῥῆσιν, ῥὶς ὀξεῖα, ὀφθαλμοὶ κοῖλοι, κρόταφοι ξυμπεπτωκότες, ὦτα ψυχρὰ, καὶ συνεσταλμένα, καὶ οἱ λοβοὶ τῶν ὤτων ἀπεστραμμένοι, καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ μέτωπον ξηρόν τε καὶ περιτεταμένον, καὶ καρφαλέον ἐόν. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἐγελᾶτο τοιοῦτος φαινόμενος, ὅτι ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐπεχείρησε διδάσκειν, ὅπως ἄν τις ἀγήρως διαμείνῃ, δευτέραν ἔκδοσιν ἐποιήσατο περὶ τῆς θαυμαστῆς ἀγηρασίας, οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν καὶ ὠνόμασε διὰ τοῦ συγγράμματος, ἐπιδεικνὺς, ὡς οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἀγήρως δύναται διαμένειν, ἀλλὰ δέοι μὲν εἰς τοῦτο καὶ φύσιν ἔχειν ἐπιτηδείαν, μάλιστα δ' ὧν ἡ πρώτη τροφὴ τοιαῦτα βάλλοιτο θεμέλια, καὶ ἐπηγγείλατο τῶν ἐπιτηδείων εἰς τοῦτο βρεφῶν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτὸς ἐπιστατῶν, ἀθάνατα αὐτῶν ποιήσειν τὰ σώματα. καὶ ἦν ἀνεξέλεγκτον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐπάγγελμα· πρὸ τοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρωθῆναι τοὺς παῖδας, οὓς παρελάμβανεν, ἔμελλεν αὐτὸς τεθνήξεσθαι. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πάντες ἐσχάτην μωρίαν αὐτοῦ κατεγίνωσκον, ἐγὼ δὲ οὒ, [μόνον] εἰδὼς, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα δόγματα τοῖς διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐγνωσμένοις μαχόμενα πολλοὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀπεφήναντο τῇ πιθανότητι τῶν λόγων ἐξαπατηθέντες. οὐκ οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο θαυμαστόν ἐστιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ. τὸ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ γεννητὸν πᾶν φθαρήσεται πάντως οὔτ' ἐπιστημονικὴν οὔτ' ἀναγκαίαν ἔχει τὴν ἀκολουθίαν, ἀλλ' ἄχρι τοῦ πιθανοῦ προϊοῦσαν, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀποδείξεως ἀποδέδεικται, καίτοι γε τούτῳ χρῶνται τῷ λόγῳ σχεδὸν ἅπαντες, ὅσοι τὸ γηράσκειν ἀναγκαῖον ἐπιδεικνύουσι τοῖς ζώοις, ὁδὸν εἶναι φάσκοντες αὐτὸ πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑπομένην φθορὰν τοῖς γεννητοῖς ἅπασιν.

Galen, On Marasmus (De marcore liber | Γαλήνου Περὶ μαρασμοῦ βιβλίον), 7.760–2 Kühn

*On the identity of the contemporary philosopher, Theoharides offers this note in his translation:

Philipp sounds like a cool guy. He’s often named alongside Archigenes and he seems to have written about a state of old age brought about by illness; but, it makes no sense to me to say he’s the philosopher mentioned here.

Galen mentions Philipp all over the place—Theoharides’ note points to six instances in this treatise alone. Why would he refrain from saying his name here? And if Philipp is a doctor, why here would he call him a philosopher? Am I missing something?

The other place this contemporary philosopher shows up is in Galen’s Matters of Health:

“For, it is not possible that what is born be imperishable, even if a contemporary philosopher desperately tried to show this in his incredible treatise, where he teaches the path to immortality.”

ἄφθαρτον μὲν γὰρ ποιῆσαι τὸ γεννητὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα τῶν καθ’ ημᾶς τις νῦν ἀνὴρ φιλόσοφος ἐπειρᾶτο δεικνύναι τοῦτο διὰ τοῦ θαυμασίου τούτου συγγράμματος, ἐν ᾧ διδάσκει τὴν ὁδὸν τῆς ἀθανασίας.

Galen, De sanitate tuenda 1.12, 6.63 Kühn

He shows up again at the end of Matters of Health, where Galen calls him (probably not as an insult) a sophist:

“So, if it were really possible to preserve a moist mixture of the body forever, then the argument of the sophist—the one who claimed he would make the person who believed him immortal, which I went over at the beginning—would be true. But since, as we’ve shown, it is not possible for the body to avoid nature’s path to being dried out, it is therefore necessary that we grow old and die, while the one who is the least dried out would be the longest lived.”

ὡς, εἴγε δυνατὸν ἦν ἀεὶ διαφυλάττειν ὑγρὰν τὴν κρᾶσιν τοῦ σώματος, ὁ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ λόγος, ὃν ἐν ἀρχῇ διῆλθον, ἀθάνατον ἐπαγγελλομένου ποιήσειν τὸν αὐτῷ πειθόμενον, ἀληθὴς ἦν. ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τὴν φυσικὴν ὁδὸν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ ξηραίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα φυγεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἐδείχθη, διὰ τοῦτο γηρᾶν ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἐστι καὶ φθείρεσθαι, πολυχρονιώτατος δ’ ἂν ὁ ἥκιστα ξηραινόμενος γένοιτο.

Galen, De sanitate tuenda 6.3, 6.399-400 Kühn

I haven’t found anyone who has noticed Galen contradicts himself in the two works. In De marcore he says there’s no necessity that what is born will die—a good position for a Platonist to hold, or at least for anyone who thinks the cosmos is created but imperishable. PN Singer told me he thinks Galen’s position in De sanitate tuenda may be meant to be restricted to non-celestial matters—that Galen is likely talking about death being necessary in the way he attributes to ‘just about everybody’ in De marcore. Still, he’s not explicit about it and I wonder if Galen put much thought into it. I mean, he’s a doctor, right? How much thought do doctor’s today put into arguments for immortality?

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Galen rants against Chrysippus because he’s a immigrant

As part of a project at the Einstein Centre Chronoi on time and ancient medicine, Peter N. Singer, Orly Lewis and I have been reading through Galen’s writings on the pulse. We came across a passage where Galen goes on a racist rant against the philosopher, Chrysippus. Galen tells us that Chrysippus moved to Athens from the town of Soli in Cilicia (in modern day Turkey), and for that reason, has no business using Attic Greek in novel ways. Galen seems to be alluding to (and rejecting) a hypothetical defence of Chrysippus’ language, one based on a story that must have been making the rounds. The story is an attempt to give the etymology of the word “solecise”. It claims that the citizens of Soli, a town supposedly founded by Solon, the legendary Athenian ruler, originally spoke Attic, but over time, spoke a corrupted dialect. Here is how Diogenes Laertius tells it:

When he (sc. Solon) left that place, he arrived in Cilicia and founded a city, which he called Soli after himself. And he settled a few Athenians there, who over time corrupted the language and were said to “solecise.”

ἐκεῖθέν τε ἀπαλλαγεὶς ἐγένετο ἐν Κιλικίᾳ, καὶ πόλιν συνῴκισεν ἣν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ Σόλους ἐκάλεσεν: ὀλίγους τέ τινας τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγκατῴκισεν, οἳ τῷ χρόνῳ τὴν φωνὴν ἀποξενωθέντες σολοικίζειν ἐλέχθησαν.

Diog. Laert. 1.51

Here is Galen:

For among other things, [the Pneumatist] school also claims that you should betray your state more quickly than you betray your beliefs. But if you keep quiet while they are making decrees and you don’t say anything in opposition, and then allow them to discuss something, they immediately blurt out something contrary to their own decree. This is very much in line with the forefather of their sect, Chrysippus. For he makes decrees about terminology more than Solon set down laws for the Athenians to write on their wooden tablets. He’s the one who first confused these things, and when you ask his successors who follow his decrees, ‘why on earth isn’t he consistent with his own edicts?’, they say, ‘he is speaking loosely.’ ‘Well then, my my fine fellows, is it possible for people to speak loosely without falling into error by doing so?’ ‘It’s possible,’ they say, since what else could they say when they are, as the saying goes, trapped in a well? Well, why on earth don’t they allow other people [to speak loosely]? Or is it only possible for Chrysippus and his followers to do so? By the gods, why? Because, obviously, he was from the race of Atticans, from the line of Kodros and Erechtheus. But if he really was from this race, then he would not have debased, so to speak, the currency of the customary language of their ancestors. And in fact, the worst thing is that Chrysippus wasn’t born in Athens and wasn’t raised there. Instead, he shows up, fresh off the boat from Cilicia, and before he properly learns any Greek, he makes decrees to the Athenians about terminology, like “the jay imitating the siren”—as if I should say a jay, rather than a jackdaw, or a crow, or another more appropriate word to use for someone so shameless.

τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα καὶ ἡ αἵρεσις αὐτῶν θᾶττον πόλιν ἢ δόγμα φησὶ χρῆναι προδιδόναι, ἀλλ' ἐὰν σιωπήσῃς νομοθετούντων καὶ μηδόλως ἀντείπης, εἶτ' ἐπιτρέψῃς περί τινος διαλέγεσθαι, παραχρῆμα ταῖς ἑαυτῶν νομοθεσίαις ἐναντία φθέγγονται. πολὺ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστι παρὰ τῷ προπάππῳ τῆς αἱρέσεως αὐτῶν Χρυσίππῳ. νομοθετεῖ μὲν γὰρ ὀνόματα πλεῖον ἢ Σόλων Ἀθηναίοις ἱστᾷν τοῖς ἄξοσι νομίσματα. συγχεῖ δ' αὐτὸς πρῶτος αὐτά. καὶ εἰ ἔροιο τοὺς διαδόχους αὐτοῦ τῆς νομοθεσίας, τί δή ποτε οὐκ ἐμμένει τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ παραγγέλμασι, καταχρῆται, φασίν. ἔξεστιν οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστοι, καταχρῆσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες; ἔξεστι, φασί. τί γὰρ ἄλλο εἰπεῖν ἔχουσιν, ὅταν ἐν φρέατι, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τοῦ λόγου, συσχεθῶσι; τί δή ποτ' οὖν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἐπιτρέπουσιν; ἢ μόνῳ Χρυσίππῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦτο δρᾷν ἔξεστι; διὰ τί πρὸς τῶν θεῶν; ὅτι δηλαδὴ γηγενὴς Ἀττικὸς ἦν τῶν ἀμφὶ Κόδρον τε καὶ Ἐρεχθέα. ἀλλ' εἰ τῶν τοιούτων ὄντως ἦν, οὐκ ἂν παρεχάραττεν οἷον νόμισμά τι τὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς φωνῆς ἔθος. νυνὶ δὲ τὸ δεινότατον οὔτε γεννηθεὶς Ἀθήνῃσιν οὔτε τραφεὶς, ἀλλὰ χθὲς καὶ πρώτως ἥκων ἐκ Κιλικίας, πρὶν ἀκριβῶς αὐτὸν ἐκμαθεῖν ἡντιναοῦν Ἑλλάδα φωνὴν, Ἀθηναίοις ὑπὲρ ὀνομάτων ἐπιχειρεῖ νομοθετεῖν ἃ κίττα τὰν σειρῆνα μιμουμένα, ἵνα κίτταν εἴπωμεν, μὴ κολοιὸν, μηδὲ κόρακα, μηδ' ἄλλο μηδὲν ὧν οἰκειότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν τὸν οὕτω θρασύν.

Galen, De differentia pulsuum, 2.10 (8.630-8.632 Kühn)

Alternative Medicine (or: Three Conversions)

Plutarch (?) on Cleomenes I

Once, Cleomenes contracted a long illness and he started paying attention to practitioners of purification rites and to seers, having paid no attention to them before. When someone expressed surprise, he said, “Why are you surprised? For I’m not the same man I was then, and, since I’m not the same man, I don’t choose the same things.”

Ἑλκυσθεὶς δὲ νόσῳ μακρᾷ, ἐπεὶ καθαρταῖς καὶ μάντεσι προσεῖχε τὸ πρὶν οὐ προσέχων, θαυμάζοντός τινος, ‘τί θαυμάζεις;’ ἔφη ‘οὐ γάρ εἰμι ὁ αὐτὸς νῦν καὶ τότε· οὐκ ὢν δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς οὐδὲ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκιμάζω.’

Plutarch, Moralia 223E

Theophrastus on Pericles

In his Ethics, Theophrastus mentions an anecdote while going over the problem whether character is bent by fortune and gives up on virtue when moved by the body’s sufferings. He says that when Pericles was sick and one of his friends had come to check in on him, he showed to him an amulet that had been hung around his neck by certain women—that’s how bad a state he was in, that he would give in to that silliness.

ὁ γοῦν Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς διαπορήσας εἰ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τρέπεται τὰ ἤθη καὶ κινούμενα τοῖς τῶν σωμάτων πάθεσιν ἐξίσταται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἱστόρηκεν ὅτι νοσῶν ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπισκοπουμένῳ τινὶ τῶν φίλων δείξειε περίαπτον ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν τῷ τραχήλῳ περιηρτημένον, ὡς σφόδρα κακῶς ἔχων ὁπότε καὶ ταύτην ὑπομένοι τὴν ἀβελτερίαν.

Plutarch, Pericles 38.2

Diogenes Laertius on Bion

Bion often used to make rather atheist proclamations in conversation, since he enjoyed this Theodorean habit.* Some time later—so the people in Chalcis relate, since that’s where he died—he fell ill and was persuaded to wear an amulet and to repent his offences against the divine.

πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἀθεώτερον προεφέρετο τοῖς ὁμιλοῦσι, τοῦτο Θεοδώρειον ἀπολαύσας. καὶ ὕστερόν ποτε ἐμπεσὼν εἰς νόσον, ὡς ἔφασκον οἱ ἐν Χαλκίδι — αὐτόθι γὰρ καὶ κατέστρεψε — περίαπτα λαβεῖν ἐπείσθη καὶ μεταγινώσκειν ἐφ’ οἷς ἐπλημμέλησεν εἰς τὸ θεῖον.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 4.54

*Theodorus the Atheist, a Cyrenaic philosopher of the 4th/3rd century.

Why you probably shouldn’t invite Democritus to your dinner party

Dinner parties can be dull, even in ancient Greece. Democritus’ solution was to prank the hosts, eat lots of garlic, and try to sleep with everyone. No wonder he was called the laughing philosopher.

Here is all of his advice, some of it terrible (find the introvert, rub honey on their face, and tell them to lighten up), some not so bad (a cure for garlic breath), some that uses language I wouldn’t have expected (βινεῖν, στύειν, words discussed by sententiae antiquae). It’s almost certainly not by Democritus; still, it says something about how people might have imagined a night like this would go.

The text is included in the collection of Greek Magical Papyri, the edition of which is available online, with German translation, at the University of Heidelberg Library (vol 1) (vol 2). An English translation with notes is available at archive.org.

Democritus’ Party Tricks (paignia)

To make bronzeware look golden: mix unfired (i.e., native) sulfur with chalky earth and wipe it with it.
To make an egg like an apple: after boiling an egg, coat it with a mixture of saffron and wine.
To make it so that the cook can’t light the fire: put a house-leek plant on his stove.
To make it so that those who eat garlic don’t smell: bake some beetroot and eat it.
To make an old woman stop blathering and drinking so much: chop up some pine and toss it in her drink.
To make the painted gladiators fight. Smoke some hare’s head underneath them.
To make cold hors-d'oeuvres burn the person eating them. Soak squill in warm water and give it to him to wash his hands with. Relieve with oil.
To make those who have a hard time mingling more easy going. Give them gum with wine and honey to rub on their face.
To make those who drink a lot not get drunk. Eat baked pork lung.
To make those who have to walk home not get thirsty. Chug an egg beaten in wine.
To be able to fuck a lot. Grind up fifty small pine cones with two ladles of sweet wine and pepper corns and drink it.
To get hard whenever you want. Grind up pepper with honey and rub it on your thing.

Δημοκρίτου παίγνια·
Τὰ χαλκᾶ χρυσᾶ ποιῆσαι φαίνεσθαι· θεῖον ἄπυρον
μετὰ γῆς κρητηρίας μείξας ἔκμασσε.
Ὠὸν ὅμοιον μήλον γενέσθαι· ζέσας τὸ ὠὸν χρεῖε κρόκῳ
μείξας μετ’ οἴνου. Μάγειρον μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν πυρὰν
ἀνάψαι· βοτάνην ἀεί[ζω]ον θὲς αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν ἑστίαν.
Φαγόντα σκόρδον μὴ ὄζειν· [ῥ]ίζας <σ>εύτλου ὀπτήσας φάγε.
Γραῦν μήτε πολλὰ λαλεῖν μήτε πολλὰ πίνειν· πίτυν
κόψας βάλε αὐτῆς εἰς τ[ὸ] κράμμα. Μονομάχας ἐζωγραφη-
μένους μάχεσθαι· ὑποκάτω αὐτῶν κάπνισον λαγοῦ κεφαλήν.
Ψυχρὰ τρώγοντα κατακαίεσθαι· σκίλλαν εἰς ὕδωρ χλιαρὸν
βρέξας δὸς αὐτῷ νίψασ[θ]αι. λύσις ἐλαίῳ. Τοὺς [μεμ]ει-
[γμ]ένους μόγις ε̣[ὖ] ποι[εῖ]ν̣· κόμι μετὰ οἴνου καὶ [μέλιτο]ς
δὸς εἰς τὴν ὄψιν μυρ[ίσα]σθαι. Πολλὰ πίνοντα καὶ μὴ με-
θύειν· χοιραῖον πνεύμονα ὀπτήσας φάγε. Ὁδοιποροῦντα
μὴ διψᾶν· ὠὸν <εἰς> οἶνον ἀνακόψας ῥόφα. Πολλὰ βι[ν]εῖν
δύνασθαι· στροβίλια πεντήκοντα μετὰ δύο κυά[θ]ων
γλυκέος καὶ κόκκους πεπέρεως τρίψας πίε. Στ[ύ]ειν,
ὅτε θέλεις· πέπερι μετὰ μέλιτος τρίψας χρῖέ σου τὸ πρᾶ̣γ̣μ̣α.

Papyri Graecae Magicae VII 168-186

‘Who slept among the heroes of Sardinia’ — Aristotle on time and memory

“But surely, we recognize time whenever, marking by the before and after, we marked a change. And that’s when we say time has passed: when we have grasped in the change a perception of the before and after. We mark them by grasping that one thing is different from another, and a certain interval is different from them. For when we consider the extremes to be different, and the soul says that there are two nows—the one before, the other after—then this we also assert to be time. For what is marked by the now is thought to be time. Let us assume this.”

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν χρόνον γε γνωρίζομεν ὅταν ὁρίσωμεν τὴν κίνησιν, τῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ὁρίζοντες· καὶ τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἴσθησιν λάβωμεν. ὁρίζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτά, καὶ μεταξύ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ ἄκρα τοῦ μέσου νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δ' ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τοῦτό φαμεν εἶναι χρόνον· τὸ γὰρ ὁριζόμενον τῷ νῦν χρόνος εἶναι δοκεῖ· καὶ ὑποκείσθω.

Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219a22-30

“Memory is neither a perception nor a conception; instead, it is a state or affection of a certain one of them, when time has passed. There is no memory of the now in the now, as we said; rather, perception is of the present, hope of the future, memory of the past. For this reason, all memory follows time. Thus, only those animals which perceive time can remember, and with that by which they perceive.”

ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὔτε αἴσθησις οὔτε ὑπόληψις, ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὸς ἕξις ἢ πάθος, ὅταν γένηται χρόνος. τοῦ δὲ νῦν ἐν τῷ νῦν οὐκ ἔστι μνήμη, καθάπερ εἴρηται [καὶ πρότερον], ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος αἴσθησις, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γενομένου μνήμη· διὸ μετὰ χρόνου πᾶσα μνήμη. ὥσθ' ὅσα χρόνου αἰσθάνεται, ταῦτα μόνα τῶν ζῴων μνημονεύει, καὶ τούτῳ ᾧ αἰσθάνεται.*

Aristotle, On Memory 1, 449b24-30

*note: Aristotle thinks time is something that happens to us, that affects us, like color or taste or touch.

“Neither (is there time) without change: for when we ourselves do not change our state of mind, or when we have not noticed ourselves changing, then time does not seem to us to have passed—just like it does not for those whom the stories tell slept among the Heroes in Sardinia: when they wake up,* they connect the earlier now with the later now and make them one, cutting out the interval. So, just as if the now were not different but one and the same, there would not be time, so, too, when we do not notice a difference, it does not seem that there has been an interval of time.”

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ γε μεταβολῆς· ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτοὶ μεταβάλλωμεν τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ λάθωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, οὐ δοκεῖ ἡμῖν γεγονέναι χρόνος, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐν Σαρδοῖ μυθολογουμένοις καθεύδειν παρὰ τοῖς ἥρωσιν, ὅταν ἐγερθῶσι· συνάπτουσι γὰρ τῷ πρότερον νῦν τὸ ὕστερον νῦν καὶ ἓν ποιοῦσιν, ἐξαιροῦντες διὰ τὴν ἀναισθησίαν τὸ μεταξύ.* ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ μὴ ἦν ἕτερον τὸ νῦν ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν, οὐκ ἂν ἦν χρόνος, οὕτως καὶ ἐπεὶ λανθάνει ἕτερον ὄν, οὐ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ μεταξὺ χρόνος.

Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 218b21-29

*Two versions of the story are told by Ross in his commentary (and what follows is roughly a quotation from him, p. 597). Philoponus says sick people went to the heroes of Sardinia for treatment, slept for five days, which they didn’t remember when they woke up. Simplicius says that nine children born to Heracles died in Sardinia, did not decay, and looked like men asleep. Rohde (Rhein Mus. 35 (1880), pp. 157-163) points out the story’s affinities to legends which represent Alexander the Great, Nero, Charlemagne, Arthur, and Barbarossa as sleeping in the earth until they awake and come to revisit their people.

Aristotle and Solon on acting our natural age

“For the end containing the time of each animal, beyond which there is no time in accordance with nature, has been called the age of each them.”

ὸ γὰρ τέλος τὸ περιέχον τὸν τῆς ἑκάστου ζωῆς χρόνον, οὗ μηθὲν ἔξω κατὰ φύσιν, αἰὼν ἑκάστου κέκληται.

Aristotle, De caelo 1.9, 279a23-30

“At seven years, a child, when he is still young and immature, loses the first set of teeth he has grown. When the god grants him another seven years, the child shows signs of coming puberty. At the third, as the body grows, the chin grows a beard, while the blush of the skin begins to change. At the fourth seven-year period, everyone is at their best in strength, and by it men make a trial of the excellence they have. At the fifth, it is time for a man to be reminded of marriage and to seek for a generation of children to come after him. At the sixth, a man’s mind is training in all things, and likewise he no longer wishes to do foolish things. At the seventh seven-year period, he is best in mind and speech, and at the eighth as well—in all, fourteen years. At the ninth, he is still powerful, but his speech and wisdom are softer in extent of excellence than they were. But if someone, having completed the measure, gets to the tenth (i.e., 70 years), he would not receive the fate of death at the wrong season.”

παῖς μὲν ἄνηβος ἐὼν ἔτι νήπιος ἕρκος ὀδόντων φύσας ἐκβάλλει πρῶτον ἐν ἕπτ' ἔτεσιν. τοὺς δ' ἑτέρους ὅτε δὴ τελέσηι θεὸς ἕπτ' ἐνιαυτούς, ἥβης †δὲ φάνει† σήματα γεινομένης. τῆι τριτάτηι δὲ γένειον ἀεξομένων ἔτι γυίων λαχνοῦται, χροιῆς ἄνθος ἀμειβομένης. τῆι δὲ τετάρτηι πᾶς τις ἐν ἑβδομάδι μέγ' ἄριστος ἰσχύν, ἧι τ' ἄνδρες πείρατ' ἔχουσ' ἀρετῆς. πέμπτηι δ' ὥριον ἄνδρα γάμου μεμνημένον εἶναι καὶ παίδων ζητεῖν εἰσοπίσω γενεήν. τῆι δ' ἕκτηι περὶ πάντα καταρτύεται νόος ἀνδρός, οὐδ' ἔρδειν ἔθ' ὁμῶς ἔργ' ἀπάλαμνα θέλει. ἑπτὰ δὲ νοῦν καὶ γλῶσσαν ἐν ἑβδομάσιν μέγ' ἄριστος ὀκτώ τ'· ἀμφοτέρων τέσσαρα καὶ δέκ' ἔτη. τῆι δ' ἐνάτηι ἔτι μὲν δύναται, μαλακώτερα δ' αὐτοῦ πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετὴν γλῶσσά τε καὶ σοφίη. τὴν δεκάτην δ' εἴ τις τελέσας κατὰ μέτρον ἵκοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἄωρος ἐὼν μοῖραν ἔχοι θανάτου.

Solon, fragment 27 West

Spontaneous Generation: Galen and Alexander against the Platonists on why the world soul doesn’t make mosquitos

Stranger: Take animals and all mortal things, and even plants, those which grow from seeds on the earth or those which grow from roots, and those bodies without soul which form in the earth, both the ones that can be melted and the ones that can’t. Surely we are not going to say anything other than divine craftsmanship makes them come to be after previously not being? Or do we consult the saying and opinion of the masses that…

Theaetetus: That what?

Stranger: That nature produces them from some spontaneous cause and without an engendering thought, rather than with reason and divine knowledge that comes from a god?

Ξένος: ζῷα δὴ πάντα θνητά, καὶ δὴ καὶ φυτὰ ὅσα τ᾽ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ῥιζῶν φύεται, καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ συνίσταται σώματα τηκτὰ καὶ ἄτηκτα, μῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι—

Θεαίτητος: ποίῳ τῳ;

Ξένος: τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾶν ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης, ἢ μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης; [265δ]

Plato, Sophist 265 C-D

“When one of my Platonists teachers told me that the soul-that-is-extended-through-the-whole-cosmos formed the (human) embryo, I thought that the technical skill and power is worthy of it; but, I could not abide thinking that the world-soul formed scorpions, poisonous spiders, flies, conopses, vipers, grubs, worms and ascarides. I take it this kind of opinion comes near impiety. ”

εἰπόντος δέ τινος τῶν διδασκάλων μοι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν, τὴν δι' ὅλου κόσμου ψυχὴν ἐκτεταμένην διαπλάττειν τὰ κυούμενα, τὴν μὲν τέχνην καὶ δύναμιν ἀξίαν ἐκείνης ἐνόμισα, σκορπίους δὲ καὶ φαλάγγια, καὶ μυῖαν καὶ κώνωπας, ἐχίδνας τε καὶ σκώληκας, ἕλμινθάς τε καὶ ἀσκαρίδας ὑπ' ἐκείνης διαπλάττεσθαι νομίζειν οὐχ ὑπέμεινα, πλησίον ἀσεβείας ἥκειν ὑπολαβὼν τὴν τοιαύτην δόξαν.

Galen, On the Formation of the Foetus, 4.700—701 K

“Again, it is possible to discover the existence of a regular order even among evil things and things that come to be contrary to nature, like abscesses, wounds, inflammations, and periodic illnesses. But also the generation of some living things is in fact orderly, without being relative to an Idea, like the generation of grubs, gnats, and grubs.”

ἔτι τὸ εὔτακτον ἔστιν εὑρεῖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς καὶ παρὰ φύσιν γιγνομένοις, οἷον ἀποστήματα, τραύματα, φλεγμοναί, νόσων περίοδοι. ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῴων τινῶν γενέσεις τεταγμέναι μέν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς ἰδέαν, οἷον σκωλήκων, ἐμπίδων, τερηδόνων.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle’s Metaphysics Α, 103,35-104-19 Hayduck