Two ways to talk about eggs

Two discussions of eggs: one, from Michael of Ephesus, on the egg as a boundary between death and life; another, from Aetius of Amida, on the best way to cook eggs (soft boiled, soaked in wine and fish sauce and cooked on a double-boiler).

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Lemma: “The reason for this is that nature produces the eggs, as it were, before [their] time, because of its own incompleteness…” (Aristotle, Generation of Animals 3.8, 758b19)

"In what follows, he (sc. Aristotle) discusses the reason why insects produce at first a grub which moves itself and is generally speaking an animal; then, once the grub has grown, it turns into an egg, lacking sensation and movement; then it turns into a different animal from the grub. He says that since an insect’s nature, because of its inherent weakness, is in itself unable to nourish and complete the embryo, what it produces is incomplete. And if in addition to generating an incomplete embryo, its nature generated something lacking soul and sensation as well, the embryo would cease to exist. But if this were the case, it is quite likely that the insect-kind would be absent from the world.* So it must be for this reason that nature generates an animal that is able to be nourished from itself, and it feeds on itself until it reaches completion.** Having reached completion, it dies.*** For living and eating are granted to it so that it becomes complete, but once it has reached completion, there is no longer any point for it to eat, and so no point for it to live.**** At this moment it dies, and it is then like an egg surrounded all around by a shell.***** Later, when what is inside of this shell has been completely concocted by the climate as if by a bird and has changed into an animal, it emerges."

758b19 «Τούτου δ’ αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ φύσις ὡσανεὶ πρὸ ὥρας ᾠοτοκεῖ διὰ τὴν ἀτέλειαν τὴν αὐτῆς.»

Τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ τούτων λέγει, τίνος ἕνεκα πρῶτον μὲν σκώληξ γεννᾶται κινούμενος καὶ ὅλως ζῷον ὑπάρχων, εἶτα αὐξηθεὶς ᾠὸν γίνεται ἀναίσθητον καὶ ἀκίνητον, εἶθ’ οὕτω πάλιν ζῷον ἕτερον παρὰ τὸν σκώληκα. λέγει οὖν ὅτι ἡ τῶν ἐντόμων φύσις ἀδυνατοῦσα θρέψαι ἐν αὑτῇ καὶ τελειῶσαι τὸ κύημα διὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀσθένειαν, ἀτελὲς αὐτὸ γεννᾷ· ὥστ’ εἴπερ πρὸς τῷ ἀτελὲς αὐτὸ γεννᾶν καὶ ἄψυχον ἐγέννα καὶ ἀναίσθητον, ἐφθείρετο ἄν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, τάχιον ἂν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς ἐξέλιπε τὸ τῶν ἐντόμων γένος. διά τοι τοῦτο γεννᾷ ζῷον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμενον τρέφεσθαι, καὶ τρέφεται ἕως ἂν τελειωθῇ, τελειωθὲν δὲ θνήσκει· τὸ γὰρ ζῆν καὶ ἐσθίειν δέδοται αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ τέλειον γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ τετελείωται, οὐκέτι χρεία αὐτῷ τοῦ ἐσθίειν, ὥστε οὐδὲ τοῦ ζῆν. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ θνήσκει, καὶ ἔστι τότε οἷον ᾠὸν κύκλῳ περιεχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ κελύφους· εἶθ’ οὕτως τὸ ἐντὸς ὑπάρχον τούτου τοῦ κελύφους ὑπὸ τῆς ὥρας ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ὄρνιθος συμπεφθὲν καὶ εἰς ζῷον μεταβαλὸν ἔξεισιν.

Michael of Ephesus, Commentary on Aristotle's Generation of Animals 3.8, (CAG 14,3 p.153,10-25 Hayduck).

*A reductio: if nature generated embryos without soul, i.e., without life, there wouldn't be any insects in the world; but, there are insects; so, nature does not generate embryos without a soul.

**The idea is either (1) that the grub is able to feed itself, or (2) that it is able to be nourished from the whole of its own body, unlike an egg, in which one part is food (yolk) and one part becomes the animal (white). Cf. GA 2.1, 732a28-32 and Michael’s comments; 3.2, 752a27-28.

***Michael might be thinking of allegories of metempsychosis. I have yet to find whether the psuchê (butterfly) was used as a symbol of resurrection by late Byzantine Christians. Whether or not that's what he has in mind, the idea is not Aristotle’s—he nowhere says that grubs die when they become cocoons, nor does he say, as Michael takes him to, that cocoons are akinêton or without movement; rather, he says they are akinêtisanta or at rest. Elsewhere, Aristotle claims cocoons move when touched, e.g. HA 5.19, 551a19-20. Just how familiar Michael was with the HA is not clear; but Michael is nevertheless right that in the passage he is commenting on, Aristotle emphasizes the lack of motion of chrysalids throughout. And even if allegories of metempsychosis are in the background, Michael is most likely drawing the following inference: if something is alive, it has nutritive (and sensitive) soul; if something has nutritive (and sensitive) soul, then it can (move, sense), eat, and excrete residues; cocoons do none of these things; hence cocoons are not alive. The inference of course would be false: at most it would imply that cocoons are asleep. Michael, however, likely sees that there would be a deeper problem in saying cocoons are alive in this sense of 'sleeping': on the one hand, the soul of the grub and the soul of the completed animal cannot be identical, since the animals have different bodily organs, and souls and the organs they use are correlative; on the other hand, it seems implausible that the grub should have both souls simultaneously. But if it cannot have both souls simultaneously, and it must have a soul, then it must have the souls successively, and so must ‘die’ in some sense. Michael, then, thinks it is better to say that the soul the grub had has perished, while what it left behind is something alive potentially, but actually dead, namely an egg, which comes back to life when warmed by the season. Michael hints that this is what he has in mind by emphasizing that cocoons are like eggs, although he does not explicitly distinguish actual and potential kinds of living. It's telling that another commentator, Philoponus, denies caterpillars perish, and claims they merely change from one form to another (On Physics 8, CAG 16 180,19-20). This suggests people other than Michael were thinking through this problem.

****Michael’s interpretation likely relies on the familiar Arisotelian claim that nature does nothing in vain: it would be in vain for an animal whose purpose is to become an egg to continue to live.

*****A similar point is made by Plutarch, Quaest. Conv. 2.3 (Moralia 636C3-D7)

Eggs the right way, soft boiled and in cups. Detail from a 3rd century mosaic at the Hatay Archaeological Museum in Antakya, Turkey. 

"Eggs of hens and of pheasants are better, while those of geese and ostriches [literally, 'sparrow-camels'] are worse. Best for the body's nourishment are the ones called 'trembling' [i.e., soft-boiled], while runny ones nourish less, but are passed more easily. They soothe the roughness in the throat caused by shouting or an acrid humour, when they are plastered on the affected places and remain there like a poultice; they also cure roughness because their whole substance is not stinging. For the same reason, they heal roughness in the stomach, bowels and bladder. An egg boiled in vinegar, when eaten, dries the discharges in the bowels. And if you mix things suitable for dysentery or a colic disposition with it and then broil it on coals and give it to eat, you will offer no small benefit to your patients. Suitable for these dispositions are the juice of unripe grapes, unripe mulberry plastered on, ashes of snails burnt whole, and grape seeds, myrtle berries and similar things.  Boiled eggs are hard to digest, pass slowly and provide thick nourishment to the body. The ones baked in hot ashes pass even more slowly and produce even thicker humours than them. Fried eggs have the least nutrition in every respect. For when they are cooked they become greasy and produce a thick humor that is bad and full of residues. Better than boiled and baked ones are those called 'curdled': briefly soaked in oil, garum and wine, and boiled on a double-boiler to a medium consistency. Eggs thickened longer become like boiled or baked ones. The same thing should also be done in cases where eggs are poured on a frying pan, taking the frying pan off the fire when the eggs are still soft."

Ὠὰ ἀμείνω τά τε τῶν ἀλεκτορίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν φασιανῶν, φαυλότερα δὲ τὰ τῶν χηνῶν καὶ στρουθοκαμήλων. κάλλιστα μὲν οὖν εἰς τροφὴν τοῦ σώματός ἐστι τὰ τρομητὰ καλούμενα, τὰ δὲ ῥοφητὰ ἧττον μὲν τρέφει, ῥᾷον δὲ ὑποχωρεῖ. τὰς δὲ ἐν τῷ φάρυγγι τραχύτητας διὰ κραυγὴν ἢ χυμοῦ δριμύτητα ἐκλεαίνει, περιπλαττόμενα τοῖς πεπονθόσι τόποις καὶ προσμένοντα ὥσπερ τι κατάπλασμα καὶ τῷ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας ἀδήκτῳ ἐκθεραπεύοντα καὶ τὰς τραχύτητας. τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὰς κατὰ τὸν στόμαχον καὶ γαστέρα καὶ κύστιν ἰᾶται τραχύτητας· ἐν ὄξει δὲ ἑψηθὲν ὠὸν εἰ βρωθείη, ξηραίνει τὰ κατὰ γαστέρα ῥεύματα. καὶ εἰ μίξας δὲ αὐτῷ τι τῶν πρὸς δυσεντερίαν ἢ κοιλιακὴν διάθεσιν ἁρμοττόντων, εἶτα ἐπ' ἀνθράκων ταγηνίσας, δοίης φαγεῖν, οὐ σμικρὰ τοὺς κάμνοντας ὠφελήσεις. ἐπιτήδεια δέ ἐστιν εἰς ταῦτα ὀμφάκιον καὶ ῥοῦς ἐπιπαττόμενος καὶ τέφρα τῶν κοχλιῶν ὅλων καέντων γίγαρτά τε σταφυλῆς καὶ μύρτα καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. τὰ δὲ ἑφθὰ ὠὰ δύσπεπτα καὶ βραδύπορα καὶ τροφὴν παχεῖαν ἀναδίδωσι τῷ σώματι. τούτων δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον βραδυπορώτερά τε καὶ παχυχυμότερα τὰ κατὰ θερμὴν σποδιὰν ὀπτηθέντα. τὰ δὲ ταγηνισθέντα χειρίστην ἔχει τροφὴν εἰς ἅπαντα· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πέττεσθαι κνισσοῦται καὶ παχὺν χυμὸν γεννᾷ καὶ μοχθηρὸν καὶ περιττωματικόν. ἀμείνω δὲ τῶν ἑφθῶν τε καὶ ὀπτῶν ἐστι τὰ καλούμενα πηκτὰ μετ' ἐλαίου καὶ γάρου καὶ οἴνου βραχέος ἀναδευθέντα καὶ ἐπὶ διπλώματος ἑψηθέντα μέχρι μετρίας συστάσεως. τὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλέον παχυνθέντα παραπλήσια τοῖς ἑψηθεῖσι καὶ ὀπτηθεῖσι γίγνεται. τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ χρὴ ποιεῖν κἀπὶ τῶν ἐπιχεομένων ταῖς λοπάσιν ὠῶν, ἔτι ἐγχύλων ὄντων ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς αἴροντας τὴν λοπάδα.

Aetius of Amida, Libri Medicinales, II 134, 201,19-202,14 Olivieri

A Metaphor for Easter

It’s Easter time. A metaphor from Photius on raising the dead.

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epsukhagôgêsen: was hopeful; was encouraged; or, brought back through magic the souls of the dead.

Ἐψυχαγώγησεν: ἐπήλπισε· παρεμυθήσατο· ἢ ψυχὰς διὰ μαγγανείας τῶν τελευτησάντων ἀνήγαγεν.

Photius, Lexicon, 47,14-16

See also the LSJ:

ψυχαγωγέω , (ψυχαγωγός): A. lead departed souls to the nether world, esp. of Hermes. II. evoke or conjure up the dead by sacrifice; hence metaph., lead or attract the souls of the living, win over, persuade, allure.

More on philosophers and magic, and Anaxagoras on teaching philosophy to cattle

"Apollonius, from Tyana, philosopher, son of Apollonius and a citizen-mother of the nobility. When she was pregnant, his mother saw a daimon suddenly appear saying that he himself would be the one she gives birth to, he being Proteus the Egyptian. For this reason, he was assumed to be the son of Proteus. He was in his prime during the time of Claudius, Gaius and Nero, up until Nerva, at which time he died. He kept silence for five years, following Pythagoras. Next he set out for Egypt, then for Babylon to go to the Magi, then to the Arabs, and he collected from all of them countless numbers of their magical incantations. He composed such works as Rites of Initiation or On Sacrifices, Covenant, Oracles, Letters, Life of Pythagoras.

"Philostratus of Lemnos wrote a biography of him fitting for a philosopher. [He says] that Apollonius of Tyana exceeded Sophocles in continence, for the latter used to say "one escapes the raging and wild master, once one has come into old age", but Apollonius, through virtue and continence, did not give way to them even in his youth. About Apollonius, Philostratus says that he was more divine in his approach to wisdom than Pythagoras, since he overcame tyrants and he lived in a time not too ancient and not too modern. People do not yet recognize that he comes from the true philosophy, which he practiced philosophically and soundly. Rather, some people accept one thing about the man, others another. Still others consider him a Magus and attack him as unwise, because he learned from the Magi of Babylon, the Brahmin of India, and the Naked [ones] in Egypt. They poorly understand him. The fact is Empedocles, Pythagoras himself, and Democritus, associated with the Magi and said many demonic things, and yet they were never seduced by the art. And Plato, who went to Egypt and, like a painter when he adds colour to a sketch, infused his own writings with many things derived from the prophets and priests of that place was never thought to practice magic, and he most of all among people is envied for his wisdom.

"Regarding his ability to perceive and foretell many things, one should not attack Apollonius for the things he predicted in his wisdom, since then Socrates will also be attacked for the things he predicted, and Anaxagoras, who, at Olympia, when there was not the least sign it would rain, went into the stadium under a fleece, indicating a prediction of rain. It is wrong for them to attribute to Anaxagoras this foreknowledge that comes from wisdom and deny it to Apollonius. It seems to me, therefore, that one should not pay attention to the ignorance of the many, but describe the man with precision, both with respect to his chronology, when he said or did something, and with respect to the ways of his wisdom, by which he came to be thought daimonic and divine. 

"I have collected reports from the cities that love him, from the temples which, having previously broken their rites, were restored by him, and from the things others wrote to him and he to others. He used to write to kings, sophists, philosophers, Elians, Delphians, Indians, and Egyptians about gods, about customs, and about laws, from whom [we can learn] what he did. The more accurate reports are from Damidos, his pupil.

"This Apollonius of Tyana had a good memory if anyone has. He kept his voice in silence, but gathered many things, and when he was one hundred years old had strength of memory beyond Simonides. He had a hymn to Memory which he would sign, in which he says all things wash away in time, but through memory time itself is ageless and immortal. Concerning Apollonius, look under the entry on 'Timasion' for other predictions. 

"[It is reported] that this Apollonius said the following about Anaxagoras: he said he was from Clazomenae and the things he established were for cattle and camels, and that he would rather teach philosophy to cows than people. Crates from Thebes threw his property into the sea, making it useful for neither cows or men."

Ἀπολλώνιος, Τυανεὺς, φιλόσοφος, υἱὸς Ἀπολλωνίου καὶ μητρὸς πολίτιδος τῶν ἐπιφανῶν, ὃν κύουσα ἡ μήτηρ ἐπιστάντα δαίμονα ἐθεάσατο λέγοντα, ὡς αὐτὸς εἴη ὃν κύει, εἶναι δὲ Πρωτέα τὸν Αἰγύπτιον: ὅθεν ὑπειλῆφθαι αὐτὸν Πρωτέως εἶναι υἱόν. καὶ ἤκμαζε μὲν ἐπὶ Κλαυδίου καὶ Γαί̈ου καὶ Νέρωνος καὶ μέχρι Νέρβα, ἐφ' οὗ καὶ μετήλλαξεν. ἐσιώπησε δὲ κατὰ Πυθαγόραν ε' ἔτη. εἶτα ἀπῆρεν εἰς Αἴγυπτον, ἔπειτα εἰς Βαβυλῶνα πρὸς τοὺς μάγους, κἀκεῖθεν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἄραβας, καὶ συνῆξεν ἐκ πάντων τὰ μυρία καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ θρυλούμενα μαγγανεύματα. συνέταξε δὲ τοσαῦτα: Τελετὰς ἢ περὶ θυσιῶν, Διαθήκην, Χρησμοὺς, Ἐπιστολὰς, Πυθαγόρου βίον.

εἰς τοῦτον ἔγραψε Φιλόστρατος ὁ Λήμνιος τὸν φιλοσόφῳ πρέποντα βίον. ὅτι Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Τυανεὺς ἐς σωφροσύνην ὑπερεβάλλετο τοῦ Σοφοκλέους. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λυττῶντα ἔφη καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγεῖν, ἐλθόντα ἐς γῆρας, ὁ δὲ Ἀπολλώνιος ὑπ' ἀρετῆς καὶ σωφροσύνης οὐδὲ ἐν μειρακίῳ ἡττήθη τούτων. ὅτι Φιλόστρατος λέγει περὶ Ἀπολλωνίου, θειότερον ἢ ὁ Πυθαγόρας τῇ σοφίᾳ προσελθεῖν τυραννίδων τε ὑπεράραντα καὶ γενόμενον κατὰ χρόνους οὔτ' ἀρχαίους οὔτ' αὖ νέους. ὃν οὔπω οἱ ἄνθρωποι γινώσκουσιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἣν φιλοσόφως τε καὶ ὑγιῶς ἐπήσκησεν. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν τὸ, ὁ δὲ τὸ ἐπαινεῖ τἀνδρός: οἱ δὲ, ἐπειδὴ μάγοις Βαβυλωνίων καὶ Ἰνδῶν Βραχμᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Γυμνοῖς συνεγένετο, μάγον ἡγοῦνται αὐτὸν καὶ διαβάλλουσιν ὡς μὴ σοφὸν, κακῶς γινώσκοντες. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε γὰρ καὶ Πυθαγόρας αὐτὸς καὶ Δημόκριτος ὁμιλήσαντες μάγοις καὶ πολλὰ δαιμόνια εἰπόντες οὔπω ὑπήχθησαν τῇ τέχνῃ. Πλάτων δὲ βαδίσας ἐς Αἴγυπτον καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἐκεῖ προφητῶν τε καὶ ἱερέων ἐγκαταμίξας τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ λόγοις καὶ καθάπερ ζωγράφος ἐσκιαγραφημένοις ἐπιβαλὼν χρώματα οὔπω μαγεύειν ἔδοξε, καίτοι πλεῖστα ἀνθρώπων φθονηθεὶς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ.

οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ αἰσθέσθαι πολλὰ καὶ προγνῶναι διαβάλλοι ἂν τὸν Ἀπολλώνιον, ἐφ' οἷς προὔλεγεν, ἐς τὴν σοφίαν ταύτην, ὡς διαβεβλήσεται καὶ Σωκράτης ἐφ' οἷς προὔλεγε, καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας, ὃς Ὀλυμπίασιν, ὁπότε ἥκιστα ὕοι, προελθὼν ὑπὸ κωδίῳ ἐς τὸ στάδιον ἐπὶ προρρήσει ὄμβρου. καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ ὑπὲρ Ἀναξαγόρου προτιθέντες ἀφαιροῦνται τὸν Ἀπολλώνιον τὸ κατὰ σοφίαν προγινώσκειν. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι μὴ περιϊδεῖν τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἄνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἐξακριβῶσαι τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς τε χρόνοις, καθ' οὓς εἶπέ τι ἢ ἔπραξε, τοῖς τε τῆς σοφίας τρόποις, ὑφ' ὧν ἔψαυσε τοῦ δαιμόνιός τε καὶ θεῖος νομισθῆναι.

ξυνείλεκται δέ μοι τὰ μὲν ἐκ πόλεων, ὁπόσαι αὐτοῦ ἤρων, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἱερῶν, ὁπόσα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπανήχθη παραλελυμένα τοὺς θεσμοὺς ἤδη, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ὧν ἕτεροι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἢ αὐτὸς πρὸς ἄλλους ἔγραφεν. ἐπέστελλε δὲ βασιλεῦσι, σοφισταῖς, φιλοσόφοις, Ἠλείοις, Δελφοῖς, Ἰνδοῖς, Αἰγυπτίοις, ὑπὲρ θεῶν, ὑπὲρ ἠθῶν, ὑπὲρ νόμων, παρ' οἷς ὅ τι ἂν πράττοι: τὰ δὲ ἀκριβέστερα παρὰ Δάμιδος ἀκηκοώς.

οὗτος Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Τυανεὺς διαμνημονικός τις ἦν εἴπερ τις ἄλλος, ὃς τὴν μὲν φωνὴν σιωπῇ κατεῖχε, πλεῖστα δὲ ἀνελέγετο, καὶ τὸ μνημονικὸν ἑκατοντούτης γενόμενος ἔρρωτο ὑπὲρ τὸν Σιμωνίδην. καὶ ὕμνος αὐτῷ τίς ἐστιν εἰς μνημοσύνην, ὃν ᾖδεν, ἐν ᾧ πάντα μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου μαραίνεσθαί φησιν, αὐτόν γε μὴν τὸν χρόνον ἀγήρω τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ὑπὸ τῆς μνημοσύνης εἶναι. ζήτει περὶ Ἀπολλωνίου καὶ ἕτερα προγνωστικὰ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ Τιμασίων.

ὅτι Ἀπολλώνιος οὗτος τάδε περὶ Ἀναξαγόρα ἔφη: καὶ γὰρ Κλαζομένιον ὄντα καὶ ἀγέλαις καὶ καμήλοις τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἀναθέντα εἰπεῖν, προβάτοις μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις φιλοσοφῆσαι. ὁ δὲ Θηβαῖος Κράτης κατεπόντωσε τὴν οὐσίαν, οὔτε προβάτοις ποιήσας ἐπιτήδειον, οὔτε ἀνθρώποις.

Suda, s.v. Apollonius of Tyana

*Philostratus' Life of Apollonius of Tyana, which documents his adventures touring the world talking with kings and gymnosophists is online at Livius.org. 
 

A path home, star men, and the origins of astronomy

Astronomy: "the distribution of the stars." The Babylonians were first to discover it through [the teaching of?] Zoroaster. With them was Ostanes. They established that what occurs at birth is caused by celestial movement. The Egyptians and Greeks came after these men, and they trace those who are born back to movement of the stars.

Also, there is the phrase "to judge by the stars": for those who travel a long and solitary path, and by the stars are led back to the place of their homeland.

And the word, "starry": one who comes from the stars.

Magic and astrology originated from the Magouseans, for the Persians are actually called Magog by the locals, and these are the same as the Magouseans.

Ἀστρονομία: ἡ τῶν ἄστρων διανομή. πρῶτοι Βαβυλώνιοι ταύτην ἐφεῦρον διὰ Ζωροάστρου· μεθ' ὧν καὶ Ὀστάνης· οἳ ἐπέστησαν τῇ οὐρανίᾳ κινήσει τὰ περὶ τοὺς τικτομένους συμβαίνειν· ἀφ' ὧν Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ Ἕλληνες ἐδέξαντο καὶ τοὺς γεννωμένους ἀναφέρουσιν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀστέρων κίνησιν.

καὶ Ἄστροις τεκμαίρεσθαι, ἐπὶ τῶν μακρὰν καὶ ἔρημον ὁδὸν πορευομένων καὶ ἄστροις σημειουμένων τὰς θέσεις τῶν πατρίδων.

καὶ Ἀστρῷος, ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἄστρων.

ὅτι μαγεία καὶ ἀστρολογία ἀπὸ Μαγουσαίων ἤρξατο. οἱ γάρ τοι Πέρσαι Μαγὼγ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγχωρίων ὀνομάζονται. καὶ Μαγουσαῖοι, οἱ αὐτοί. 

Suda, s.v. Ἀστρονομία (α-entry 4257)

Aristotle's Lost Book On Magic

Here are all of V. Rose's testimonia of a work attributed to Aristotle called Magic (ὁ Μαγικός λόγος, or τὸ μαγικόν?). The title either refers to the art practised by the Magi (the Zoroastrian priests from Persia), or it refers to the fact that the discussion is a discussion about the Magi. The latter seems more likely, even though the first passage, from Diogenes Laertius, suggests the discussion mentioned all sorts of wisdom cults.

The attribution is disputed. Diogenes Laertius says it is by Aristotle, but doesn't put it in his list of Aristotle's works (it doesn't show up in any other list I've looked at in either Greek or Arabic). The Suda says it is by Antisthenes, and that some people attributed it to Aristotle or someone named Rhodon. It's not clear where the Suda is getting this from.

While we don't know who wrote it, its contents are hinted at by the testimonies gathered in Rose (+ a few others I've put together). Diogenes reports that Aristotle thought magic wasn't sorcery, but philosophy or wisdom. This is confirmed by the Suda. It has something to do with prognostication. Eudoxus, according to Pliny, believed it was useful and very valuable, and so it was not only practical but connected to more valuable objects of study, probably the heavenly bodies. This is especially supported by the etymology of Zoroaster ('star-diviner') reported by Diogenes, and Porphyry's etymology of 'magus' as 'wise in divine matters'. Philo specifies that it was a kind of 'optics' and a very precise branch of natural science. Finally, Philo, Porphyry and the Suda associate it with both wisdom and with kingship. Philo says not only private citizens practice magic, but that Persian kings themselves had to be educated as Magi to become king.

It seems to me as if all these testimonies could be referring to a discussion of wise philosopher kings who are able to predict the future through their understanding of the heavens and the science of nature.

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"Some say the work of philosophy originated with the barbarians. For among the Persians are the Magi, among the Babylonians and Assyrians the Chaldeans, among the Indians the Gymnosophists (lit. naked philosophers), and among the Celts and Gauls, those called 'Druids' and holy people, according to what Aristotle says in the book on Magic and Sotion in the twenty-third book of the Succession of Philosophers."

Τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἔνιοί φασιν ἀπὸ βαρβάρων ἄρξαι. γεγενῆσθαι γὰρ παρὰ μὲν Πέρσαις μάγους, παρὰ δὲ Βαβυλωνίοις ἢ Ἀσσυρίοις Χαλδαίους, καὶ γυμνοσοφιστὰς παρ' Ἰνδοῖς, παρά τε Κελτοῖς καὶ Γαλάταις τοὺς καλουμένους δρυίδας καὶ σεμνοθέους, καθά φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ μαγικῷ καὶ Σωτίων ἐν εἰκοστῷ τρίτῳ τῆς διαδοχῆς.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 1.1

"The Magi were ignorant of sorcerers' magic, says Aristotle in the book on Magic and Dinon in the fifth book of his Histories. He also says 'Zoroaster' when translated literally means 'star-diviner'; Hermodorus says this as well. In the first book of On Philosophy, Aristotle says they (the Magi) are actually older than the Egyptians. And according to them there are two principles, a good daimon and a bad daimon: to the former, the name is Zeus and 'Oromasdes' [i.e., Ahura Mazda], to the other Hades and 'Arimanius' [i.e., Ahriman]. Hermippus says this too in the first book On Magi, so does Eudoxus in the Survey, and Theopompus in the eighth book of the Philippics."

Τὴν δὲ γοητικὴν μαγείαν [sc. οἱ Μάγοι] οὐδ' ἔγνωσαν, φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Μαγικῷ καὶ Δείνων ἐν τῇ πέμπτῃ τῶν Ἱστοριῶν· ὃς καὶ μεθερμηνευόμενόν φησι τὸν Ζωροάστρην ἀστροθύτην εἶναι· φησὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ Ἑρμόδωρος. Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πρεσβυτέρους εἶναι τῶν Αἰγυπτίων· καὶ δύο κατ' αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἀρχάς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν δαίμονα· καὶ τῷ μὲν ὄνομα εἶναι Ζεὺς καὶ Ὠρομάσδης, τῷ δὲ Ἅιδης καὶ Ἀρειμάνιος. φησὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ Ἕρμιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ μάγων καὶ Εὔδοξος ἐν τῇ Περιόδῳ καὶ Θεόπομπος ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ τῶν Φιλιππικῶν.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 1.7-8

"Aristotle says that a certain magus [magician or priest from Persia] came from Syria to Athens and among the other things he predicted about Socrates, was that he will have a violent end."

φησὶ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης μάγον τινὰ ἐλθόντα ἐκ Συρίας εἰς Ἀθήνας τά τε ἄλλα καταγνῶναι τοῦ Σωκράτους καὶ δὴ καὶ βίαιον ἔσεσθαι τὴν τελευτὴν αὐτῷ.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 2.45

"Eudoxus, who wanted it to be known that among the schools of philosophy, magic is the most illustrious and most useful, relates that this 'Zoroaster' lived six thousand years before Plato's death. Aristotle says this too."

Eudoxus qui inter sapientiae sectas clarissimam utilissimamque eam (magicam) intellegi voluit, Zoroastren hunc sex milibus annorum ante Platonis mortem fuisse prodidit. sic et Aristoteles.

Pliny, Natural History, 30.3

"Antisthenes, an Athenian, Socratic philosopher from among the orators, who first was called a Peripatetic, then 'played the dog' (i.e., acted like someone from what would later be called the 'Cynic' school). He was the son of a father with the same name, and his mother came from the people of Thrace. He wrote these ten volumes: first, Magic: it tells about a certain magus, Zoroaster, who discovered wisdom. Some people attribute this to Aristotle, others to Rhodon."

Ἀντισθένης, Ἀθηναῖος, ἀπὸ ῥητόρων φιλόσοφος Σωκρατικός, ὅστις Περιπατητικὸς ἐκλήθη πρῶτον, εἶτα ἐκύνισεν: υἱὸς δὲ ὢν ὁμωνύμου πατρὸς, μητρὸς δὲ τὸ γένος Θρᾴσσης. οὗτος συνέγραψε τόμους δέκα: πρῶτον μαγικόν: ἀφηγεῖται δὲ περὶ Ζωροάστρου τινὸς μάγου, εὑρόντος τὴν σοφίαν: τοῦτο δέ τινες Ἀριστοτέλει, οἱ δὲ Ῥόδωνι ἀνατιθέασιν.

Suda, s.v. Ἀντισθένης

"Execestus, the Phocian tyrant, used to wear two enchanted rings, and he used to determine the appropriate time to act by the sound they made against one another. But, he still died, murdered by treachery despite being warned by the sound, as Aristotle says in the Phocian Constitution."

Ἐξήκεστός τε ὁ Φωκαιέων τύραννος δύο δακτυλίους φορῶν γεγοητευμένους τῷ ψόφῳ τῷ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διῃσθάνετο τοὺς καιροὺς τῶν πράξεων, ἀπέθανεν δὲ ὅμως δολοφονηθεὶς καίτοι προσημήναντος τοῦ ψόφου, ὥς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ Φωκαιέων πολιτείᾳ.

Clement of Alexandria, Stromateus I, chapter 21

"The true art of magic, which is a science of optics by which the works of nature are illuminated with a brighter appearance and is thought to be holy and highly prized, is not only practiced by private citizens, but also by kings and of kings the greatest, and most of all the Persian kings, to the extent that they say no one among them is able to be a successor to the kingship if he does not happen to share in the house of the Magi."

τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ μαγικήν, ὀπτικὴν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν, ᾗ τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα τρανοτέραις φαντασίαις αὐγάζεται, σεμνὴν καὶ περιμάχητον δοκοῦσαν εἶναι, οὐκ ἰδιῶται μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ βασιλέων οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Περσῶν διαπονοῦσιν οὕτως, ὥστ' οὐδένα φασὶν ἐπὶ βασιλείαν δύνασθαι παραπεμφθῆναι παρ' αὐτοῖς, εἰ μὴ πρότερον τοῦ μάγων γένους κεκοινωνηκὼς τυγχάνοι.

Philo of Judaea, On Special Laws, 3.100

"Among the Persians, those who are wise in divine matters and worship it are called 'Magi'. This is just what 'Magus' means in the regional language. This house is considered to be so great and so holy by the Persians, that even Darius, son of Hystaspes, had engraved on his tombstone (among other things) that he was a teacher of magic arts."

παρά γε μὴν τοῖς Πέρσαις οἱ περὶ τὸ θεῖον σοφοὶ καὶ τούτου θεράποντες μάγοι μὲν προσαγορεύονται· τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχώριον διάλεκτον ὁ μάγος· οὕτω δὲ μέγα καὶ σεβάσμιον γένος τοῦτο παρὰ Πέρσαις νενόμισται, ὥστε καὶ Δαρεῖον τὸν Ὑστάσπου ἐπιγράψαι τῷ μνήματι πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅτι καὶ μαγικῶν γένοιτο διδάσκαλος.

Porphyry, On Abstinence from Animal Food, 4.16

"Don't make drugs. Stay away from magic books."

Φάρμακα μὴ τεύχειν, μαγικῶν βίβλων ἀπέχεσθαι.

Pseudo-Phocylides, Sententiae, l.149

Illustration of (a somewhat Christian?) Zoroaster riding the back of a dragon. Zoroaster was associated with the arts of magic and astrology already in antiquity. This illustration is from the Clavis Artis, vol. 1, the Biblioteca dell’Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Roma. On the manuscript and its provenance, see the Italian wiki. Image source here.

Animal Magic

Here are some magical animals from Aelian, Pliny and Pseudo Aristotle. I'm trying to track down animals that use magic, rather than animals (or parts) that are used for magic (like the 'hippomane') or animals that people perform magic on (like snake charmers, etc.). The question I'm interested in is whether anyone in antiquity thought we learned any of the magic arts by observing animals, as they thought we learned many of the more mundane ones. Hyena is the closest thing to an animal magician I've found so far.

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"The salamander is not an animal born from fire, like the animals called 'fire-born'. Still, it is bold and fond of staying close to the flame, and it is eager to defeat it as if it were an adversary."

Ἡ σαλαμάνδρα τὸ ζῷον οὐκ ἔστι μὲν τῶν πυρὸς ἐκγόνων, ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ καλούμενοι πυρίγονοι, θαρρεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ χωρεῖ τῇ φλογὶ ὁμόσε, καὶ ὡς ἀντίπαλόν τινα σπεύδει καταγωνίσασθαι.

Aelian, On the Nature of Animals, 2.31

"They say that in Arabia there is a kind of hyena which, when it first catches sight of some wild animal, or when it steps on a person's shadow,  renders it speechless and fixed in such a way that it cannot move its body. It also does this to dogs."

Ἐν δὲ τῇ Ἀραβίᾳ ὑαινῶν τι γένος φασὶν εἶναι, ὃ ἐπειδὰν προΐδῃ τι θηρίον ἢ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιβῇ ἐπὶ τὴν σκιάν, ἀφωνίαν ἐργάζεται καὶ πῆξιν τοιαύτην ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα. τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κυνῶν.

Pseudo-Aristotle, On Marvellous Things Heard, chapter 145

"If a dog makes contact with the hyena's shadow, it will go silent. And by some magic art, any animal it encircles three times becomes fixed at that spot."

praeterea umbrae eius [sc. hyaenae] contactu canes obmutescere, et quibusdam magicis artibus omne animal, quod ter lustraverit, in vestigio haerere.

Pliny, Natural History, 8.44

"When the moon is full, the hyena will keep the light behind it, and cast its shadow onto dogs. Instantly, they are silenced. Having bewitched them like sorceresses do, it then carries off the silent dogs and makes use of them in whatever way it wants."

ὅταν ᾖ πλήρης ὁ τῆς σελήνης κύκλος, κατόπιν λαμβάνει [sc. ἡ ὕαινα] τὴν αὐγήν, καὶ τὴν αὑτῆς σκιὰν ἐπιβάλλει τοῖς κυσί, καὶ παραχρῆμα αὐτοὺς κατεσίγασε, καὶ καταγοητεύσασα ὡς αἱ φαρμακίδες εἶτα ἀπάγει σιωπῶντας, καὶ κέχρηται ὅ τι καὶ βούλεται τὸ ἐντεῦθεν αὐτοῖς.

Aelian, On the Nature of Animals, 6.14

"Dogs, cows, pigs, goats, snakes and other animals are perceptive of future famine. And they are first to be aware when a plague or earthquake is approaching. They can forsee times of healthy weather and fertile crops. And even though they do not have reason, which is able both to save and to destroy, they do not make mistakes in the matters just mentioned."

Λιμοῦ μέλλοντος ἐπιδημεῖν αἰσθητικῶς ἔχουσι κύνες καὶ βόες καὶ ὗς καὶ αἶγες καὶ ὄφεις καὶ ζῷα ἄλλα, καὶ λοιμοῦ δὲ ἀφιξομένου συνίησι πρώτστα καὶ σεισμοῦ. προγινώσκει δὲ καὶ ὑγίειαν ἀέρων καὶ εὐφορίαν καρπῶν. καὶ λόγου μὲν οὐ μετείληχε τοῦ καὶ σώζειν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν δυναμένου, τῶν γε μὴν προειρημένων οὐ διαμαρτάνει.

Aelian, On the Nature of Animals, 6.16

"By name, it is 'Hunter', by nature, a bird, a member of the Thrush family, black in colour, musical in voice. It has been called hunter and for good reason. For it catches the other birds with its song, the small ones that fly to it when enchanted by its music."

Ἀγρεὺς τὸ ὄνομα, τὴν φύσιν πτηνός, τὸ γένος κοσσύφων φράτωρ, μέλας τὴν χρόαν, μουσικὸς τὴν γλῶτταν. κέκληται δὲ ἀγρεύς, καὶ δικαίως· τῷ γάρ τοι μέλει τῶν ἄλλων ὀρνέων αἱρεῖ τὰ ἁπαλὰ προσπετόμενα τῇ τῆς εὐμουσίας θέλξει.

Aelian, On the Nature of Animals, 8.24

Postscript:

"I hear that in India, the elephant and the dragon are each other's worst enemies."

Ἐν Ἰνδοῖς, ὡς ἀκούω, ἐλέφας καὶ δράκων ἐστὶν ἔχθιστα.

Aelian, On the Nature of Animals, 6.21

Michael of Ephesus on providence and good behaviour

I'm writing a paper on Michael of Ephesus on providence. I've looked at his views on providence before, but I've started to take it a bit more seriously. Michael uses providence in a few places in his commentaries on Aristotle's biology, and he uses it, as you might expect, as a deus (natura?) ex machina to explain things Aristotle does not (maybe it's more precise to say that he uses providence to complete explanations which Aristotle had left incomplete). On the one hand, I'm interested in in figuring out what Michael thinks providence is - is it a version of the Christian God, or nature, or νοῦς? - but I'm also trying to figure out what his rules are for using it in his commentaries. The way he uses it doesn't seem to be arbitrary (there are times he doesn't use it when he could) and this makes me wonder if he's drawing on an earlier tradition, or following his own philosophical or cultural intuitions. Here is one of these appeals, about why some animals have testes and some do not. NB: I think the fact that Michael refers to providence in this passage should not distract us from what he is actually trying to do, and that is to explain animal mating behaviour in terms of the contribution the behaviour makes to the survival of the species. Also: contrary to what Aristotle and Michael say, fish and snakes do in fact have testes.

Aristotle: "Nature does everything because of necessity of because of the better..."

"If nature does everything either because of necessity or because of the better, then this part [i.e., the testicles] would also exist for one of these reasons. Now, that testicles are not necessary for generation is obvious, since then all animals that generate would have them; but in fact, snakes, birds, and fish do not have testicles, for they are observed when they are mating and they have ducts filled with milt. It remains, then, that they are present for something better. It is a fact that, for most animals, there is just about no other function than [producing] seed and fruit, as is the case for plants. And just as in matters of nutrition animals with straight intestines are more ravenous* in their desire for food, so too those that do not have testicles but only ducts, or which have testicles but have them internally, they are all quicker with respect to the activity of mating. Those animals which need to be more moderate**, just as before the intestines are not straight, also here the ducts have coils so that their desire is not either ravenous or sudden.*** Testicles have been designed for this reason, for they make the movement of the spermatic residue slower."****

εἰ δὴ πᾶν ἡ φύσις ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖ ἢ διὰ τὸ βέλτιον, κἂν τοῦτο τὸ μόριον εἴη διὰ τούτων θάτερον. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν φανερόν· πᾶσι γὰρ ἂν ὑπῆρχε τοῖς γεννῶσι, νῦν δ' οὔθ' οἱ ὄφεις ἔχουσιν ὄρχεις οὔθ' οἱ ἰχθύες· ὠμμένοι γάρ εἰσι συνδυαζόμενοι καὶ πλήρεις ἔχοντες θοροῦ τοὺς πόρους. λείπεται τοίνυν βελτίονός τινος χάριν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων ζῴων ἔργον σχεδὸν οὐθὲν ἄλλο πλὴν ὥσπερ τῶν φυτῶν σπέρμα καὶ καρπός. ὥσπερ δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τὰ εὐθυέντερα λαβρότερα πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τὴν τῆς τροφῆς, οὕτω καὶ τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα ὄρχεις πόρους δὲ μόνον ἢ ἔχοντα μὲν ἐντὸς δ' ἔχοντα, πάντα ταχύτερα πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῶν συνδυασμῶν. ἃ δὲ δεῖ σωφρονέστερα εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ οὐκ εὐθυέντερα, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἕλικας ἔχουσιν οἱ πόροι πρὸς τὸ μὴ λάβρον μηδὲ ταχεῖαν εἶναι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. οἱ δ' ὄρχεις εἰσὶ πρὸς τοῦτο μεμηχανημένοι· τοῦ γὰρ σπερματικοῦ περιττώματος στασιμωτέραν ποιοῦσι τὴν κίνησιν.

Aristotle, Generation of Animals 1.4, 717a12-32 (Peck's Loeb edition here)

* λαβρότερα | 'more ravenous' The word λάβρος can describe violent surges of water and wind, also people and animals. LSJ suggest 'furious' or 'violent', or 'impetuous'; Peck translates it as 'violent'. The sense, however, is clearly that the animals have strong appetites: their intestines are shorter, and without twists and turns to slow down the food and residues, they are never full for long. I like 'ravenous' here: we use it in English (although it is a bit affected) to describe strong appetites + 'ravenous' comes from the archaic ravin ('an act of rapine or robbery'), which is a direct borrowing from French ravine ('impetuosity', violence', 'force'), from which we get ravine, i.e., 'a violent rush of water' and by extension the gorge it travels through. From the Latin rapina, 'to rob', 'plunder', etc. In the Michael passage, I translate it as "(more) impulsive".

** δεῖ σωφρονέστερα | 'need to be more moderate' More of a moral term than λάβρος. Peck translates 'have to be more sober'. But it's the δεῖ that's caused people to pause: why do some animals need to be more moderate in their appetites? Why couldn't all animals be ravenous and impetuous? Aristotle does not tell us why; he just mentions that testicles cause the seminal ducts to double back, 'like stone weights on a loom (a35-6: καθάπερ τὰς λαιὰς προσάπτουσιν αἱ ὑφαίνουσαι τοῖς ἱστοῖς)'.

*** πρὸς τὸ μὴ λάβρον μηδὲ ταχεῖαν εἶναι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν This is a statement of the final cause - testicles cause the ducts to coil in order to steady the animal's desire. The relationship between desire and lack or excess might be in the background: desire for food is an impulse to fill something that has been emptied beyond what is natural; and the desire for sex is an impulse to empty something that has been filled to excess. However, if this were the case, it's not clear to me why slower moving semen would cause an animal to have less desire. Aristotle is vague about the details of the analogy, and Michael will focus mostly on trying to make sense of it.

**** στασιμωτέραν ποιοῦσι τὴν κίνησιν Peck translates 'makes the motion steadier'. στάσιμος is an absence of κίνσις, i.e., movement as flow (e.g. Plato, Sophist 256b6-7; Hippocrates, Nature of Women 1.10). Potter translates it as 'constipated' in his Loeb translation of Nature of Women. The idea again is that the residues don't flow out as quickly as they would if the ducts were straight.

Michael on Aristotle on pudic providence

"What comes to be by nature, comes to be by necessity or the better. "Necessity" means that which is found in every kind, and without which it is not possible for something to come to be. "Better" [means] that which is not like this. Since testicles are not found in every [kind] of male, and generation also occurs without them, they do not exist because of necessity, but because of the better.

Just as, in matters of nutrition, [animals] with straight intestines are more ravenous…

"In what follows he sets out the reasons because of which, among [animals] that have testicles and do not have testicles, (i) some have them, (ii) others do not have them; and of those that have them, (i.b) some have them internally, like birds, but (i.a) others externally. He says, then, that just as "animals with straight intestines" are "more impulsive with respect to desire for food", because the residue comes out more quickly because of their straight intestines, while those that do not have straight intestines are more self-controlled and take less nourishment, "the same applies to (ii) [animals] that do not have testicles but only passages", like fish, "or (i.b) [animals] that have [testicles] but internally",  like birds. Hence, (ii) [animals] that do not have testicles at all are quicker than all other [animals] with respect to the task of mating; (i.b) while [animals] that have [testicles] internally are slower and more self-controlled with respect to this kind of task than those that do not have testicles, but they are more impulsive and faster than (i.a) the ones that have them externally.

"First, we should say why [nature] has designed some [animals] to be naturally self-controlled and has made the testicles of these kinds external, some [naturally] more impulsive and [made their testicles] internal, but others it has utterly neglected and did not assign testicles, and for this reason they are also most impulsive of all. But on this point we should say briefly that [nature] did not neglect them, but that it has regarded them by an even greater magnitude. For since (as he will say going on) they are not able to engage in contact for a long time because they live in water, [nature] has not given [them] testicles in addition to the other things (which he is going to speak about later). For in the case of animals that have testicles, the emission of semen comes about slowly because of the reasons which we will learn. But let this much have been said as an introduction. We must discuss what was mentioned, and then the cause according to which (i.a) firstly, those that have external testicles are especially self-controlled, (i.b) second those [that have] internal [testicles] are even less so, and (ii) most undisciplined of all are those that do not have any [testicles]. And so, we must move on to Aristotle's answer.

"One should note that since nature desires that animals and all other things exist eternally and aims at this, whatever things were not able to be preserved eternally as the same thing numerically, for them [nature] decreed eternity by means of always generating others from others. But since continuous mating causes dissolution of the body* for reasons he will mention in the present book when he talks about what the nature of semen is—since then [continuous mating] imparts weakness, and it is normal for death to follow dissolution in the majority of cases, all those animals that naturally bear few offspring (he will also talk about the reasons for their bearing few young in the present book and in those that follow this one)—all those, then, that naturally bear few offspring have come to be more self-controlled than the others by nature's forethought, so that the animals are not dissolved and destroyed by mating many times each day, and this kind of animal is not suddenly eradicated. Those animals that bear offspring, but [bear] more than those that bear few and a fewer number than those that bear very many, are less moderately self-controlled than those that bear few offspring. For even though they [i.e., the individual animals] should happen to be destroyed from frequent mating, still, because of the fact that they bear more than two or three offspring (it is sometimes possible [for them to bear] even more than seventeen**), such a kind will not be left out of the whole. For this reason, then, [nature] designed these to be less self-controlled. But those that bear altogether many offspring, what necessity is there to regard them? For it is clear that they will not be lacking, since heaps of them are produced. This, then, is the reason that some are more self-controlled, others less, and others not at all."

τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως γινόμενα τὰ μὲν γίνεται διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ βέλτιον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ λέγεται τὸ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ γένει εὑρισκόμενον, καὶ οὗ ἄνευ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι τι, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον. ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ ὄρχεις οὔτε ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ τῶν ἀρρένων εὑρίσκονται γένει, γίνεται δὲ γένεσις καὶ χωρὶς αὐτῶν, οὔκ εἰσι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ βέλτιον.

[35] 717a23 «Ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τροφὴν τὰ εὐθυέντερα λαβρότερα.»

Ἐντεῦθεν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκτίθεται, δι' ἃς τὰ ἔχοντα ὄρχεις καὶ τὰ μὴ [6.1] ἔχοντα τὰ μὲν ἔχει, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔχει, καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ μὲν ἐντὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οἱ ὄρνιθες, τὰ δ' ἐκτός. φησὶν οὖν ὅτι, ὥσπερ «τὰ εὐθυέντερα λαβρότερά» ἐστι «πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τῆς τροφῆς» διὰ τὸ θᾶττον ἐξέρχεσθαι τὸ περίττωμα διὰ τὴν εὐθυεντερίαν, τὰ δὲ μὴ εὐθυέντερα σωφρονέστερα καὶ [5] ὀλιγοτροφώτερα, «οὕτω καὶ τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα ὄρχεις, πόρους δὲ μόνον», ὡς οἱ ἰχθύες, «ἢ ἔχοντα μὲν ἐντὸς δέ» [717a23-25], ὡς οἱ ὄρνιθες· τὰ μὲν οὖν μηδ' ὅλως ἔχοντα ὄρχεις εἰσὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν τοῦ συνδυασμοῦ ταχύτερα πάντων, τὰ δ' ἔχοντα μὲν ἐντὸς δὲ βραδύτερα πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἐργασίαν τῶν μὴ ἐχόντων ὄρχεις καὶ σωφρονέστερα, λαβρότερα δὲ καὶ ταχύτερα τῶν αὐτοὺς [10] ἐχόντων ἐκτός.

ῥητέον δ' οὖν ἡμῖν πρῶτον μέν, τίνος ἕνεκεν τῇ φύσει πεφρόντισται τοῦ τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώφρονα καὶ πεποίηκε τῶν τοιούτων τοὺς ὄρχεις ἐκτός, τὰ δὲ λαβρότερα καὶ ἐντός, τῶν δὲ καὶ παντελῶς κατωλιγώρηκε καὶ οὐκ ἀπέδωκεν ὄρχεις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτό εἰσι καὶ πάντων λαβρότατα. ῥητέον δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο συντόμως ὅτι οὐδὲ τούτων κατωλιγώρησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ [15] μᾶλλον κατὰ πολὺ πεφρόντικεν· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν ὕδατι ὄντα οὐ δύνανται ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐνδιατρίβειν, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς προϊὼν ἐρεῖ, τῇ ἁφῇ, οὐ δέδωκε πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις οἷς μέλλει λέγειν λόγοις περὶ τούτων ὄρχεις· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὄρχεις βραδεῖα δι' ἃς μαθησόμεθα αἰτίας ἡ πρόεσις τοῦ σπέρματος γίνεται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὕτως προλελέχθω· ἡμῖν δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα ῥητέον καὶ ἔτι [20] τὴν αἰτίαν καθ' ἣν συμβαίνει πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα σώφρονα εἶναι τὰ ἐκτὸς ἔχοντα τοὺς ὄρχεις, δευτέρως δὲ καὶ ἧττον τὰ ἐντός, πάντων δὲ ἀκολαστότατα τὰ μηδ' ὅλως τούτους ἔχοντα· καὶ οὕτως τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους ῥῆσιν μετιτέον.

ἰστέον οὖν ὡς ἐπειδὴ ἡ φύσις τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι ζῷα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἐφίεται καὶ τούτου στοχάζεται, ὅσα οὐκ ἠδυνήθη φυλάξαι ἀεὶ τὰ [25] αὐτὰ τῷ ἀριθμῷ, τούτοις ἐπρυτάνευσε τὴν ἀιδιότητα διὰ τοῦ ἀεὶ ἄλλα ἐξ ἄλλων γίνεσθαι. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ συνδυασμὸς ὁ συνεχὴς ἔκλυσιν τοῦ σώματος ἐμποιεῖ δι' ἃς ἐρεῖ αἰτίας ἐν τῷ παρόντι βιβλίῳ, ὅταν περὶ τῆς φύσεως τοῦ σπέρματος λέγῃ τίς ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔκλυσιν ἐμποιεῖ, τῇ ἐκλύσει δὲ φιλεῖ ὡς τὰ πολλὰ παρέπεσθαι θάνατον, ὅσα τῶν ζῴων ὀλιγοτόκα πέφυκεν [30] (ἐρεῖ δὲ καὶ τῆς τούτων ὀλιγοτοκίας τὰς αἰτίας ἐν τῷ παρόντι βιβλίῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς τούτου) ὅσα οὖν πέφυκεν ὀλιγοτόκα, γέγονε σωφρονέστερα τῶν ἄλλων προνοίᾳ φύσεως, ὅπως μὴ πολλάκις τῆς ἡμέρας συνδυαζόμενα ἐκλύηται καὶ φθείρηται καὶ τάχιον ἐκποδὼν γένηται τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος. ὅσα δὲ τίκτει μέν, ἀλλὰ πλείω μὲν τῶν ὀλιγοτόκων, ἐλάττω δὲ κατὰ πολὺ [35] τῶν πάνυ πολλὰ τικτόντων, ἧττόν ἐστι σωφρονέστερα τῶν ὀλιγοτόκων· εἰ γὰρ καὶ συμβαίη αὐτοῖς φθορὰ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις συνδυάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ [7.1] πλείω τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ τριῶν τίκτειν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ καὶ δέκα, οὐκ ἐπιλείψει τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος ἐκ τοῦ παντός. διὰ τοῦτο οὖν ἧττον ἐφρόντισε τοῦ σώφρονα εἶναι ταῦτα. τῶν δὲ πάμπαν πολλὰ τικτόντων τίς ἡ ἀνάγκη τούτων φροντίσαι; δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὐκ ἐπιλείψουσι σωρηδὸν γινό[5]μενα. ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰτία τοῦ τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώφρονα μᾶλλον τὰ δ' ἧττον τὰ δ' οὐδ' ὅλως αὕτη.

Michael of Ephesus, In de generatione animalium commentaria 1.4 (CAG 14.3, 5,35-7,6 Hayduck)

*ἔκλυσιν τοῦ σώματος | dissolution of the body.  The idea is not articulated in Aristotle in quite the way Michael thinks it is, but it's a common belief that too much sex will weaken and destroy the body.

**ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ καὶ δέκα.   This is rather specific.

Soda and onions

Continuing with Aetius of Amida's pharmacy and its parallels: onions.

Philumenus on onions as a cure for bites of all kinds.

"For dog bites or people bites, apply a poultice of fine salt mixed with honey until the bite is filled. Some also add onion and vinegar and then use it."

πρὸς οὖν κυνόδηκτα καὶ ἀνθρωπόδηκτα ἅλας λεῖον σὺν μέλιτι κατάπλασσε, ἄχρις οὗ πλήρη ᾖ. τινὲς δὲ καὶ κρόμμυον προσμίσγουσιν καὶ ὄξους καὶ οὕτως χρῶνται.

Philumenus, On poisonous animals and their remedies [De venenatis animalibus eorumque remediis], 5.6 (10,7-9 Wellman)

Galen on onions.

"The onion belongs to the fourth degree of things that heat. Its substance is composed of rather large particles, which is why it also opens up hemorrhoids when it is applied; when used full strength with vinegar in the sun, it washes away skin lesions; and when rubbed on bald spots, it stimulates the hair faster than alcuonium. If one separates off its juice, whatever remains is a considerably earthy, hot substance, but the juice itself is a watery and airy hot substance. Thus, when it is used as a salve against thick humours, it benefits cataract sufferers and those who are short-sighted. Due to its mixture, the onion generally causes flatulence when eaten, and for this reason, those which are drier in their mixture cause less flatulence."

Κρόμμυον ἐκ τῆς τετάρτης ἐστὶ τάξεως τῶν θερμαινόντων. ἡ δ' οὐσία παχυμερής ἐστιν αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον, ὅθεν καὶ τὰς αἱμοῤῥοΐδας ἀναστομοῖ προστιθέμενον καὶ σὺν ὄξει καταχριόμενον ἐν ἡλίῳ τοὺς ἀλφοὺς ἀποῤῥύπτει καὶ παρατριβόμενον ἀλωπεκίαις θᾶττον ἀλκυονίου παρορμᾷ τὰς τρίχας. εἰ δ' ἀποχωρίσειεν αὐτοῦ τις τὸν χυλὸν, ὅσον μὲν ὑπόλοιπον ἱκανῶς ἐστι γεώδους οὐσίας θερμῆς, αὐτὸς δ' ὁ χυλὸς ὑδατώδους τε καὶ ἀερώδους θερμότητος. οὕτω οὖν καὶ τοὺς ὑποχεομένους καὶ ἀμβλυώττοντας ἐπὶ πάχει χυμῶν ὀνίνησιν ὑπαλειφόμενος. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτου κράσεως ὅλον τὸ κρόμμυον φυσῶδές ἐστιν ἐσθιόμενον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὅσα ξηρότερα τὴν κρᾶσιν ἀφυσότερα.

Galen, On the mixtures and capacities of simple drugs, 7.58 (XII 48-49 Kühn)

Oribasius' concise summary.

"Onion belongs to the fourth rank of things that heat. Its substance is composed of thick particles."

Κρόμμυον ἐκ τῆς τετάρτης ἐστὶ τάξεως τῶν θερμαινόντων· ἡ δὲ οὐσία παχυμερής ἐστιν.

Oribasius, Collectiones medicae, 15.1.10.79 (260,26-28 Raeder)

Aetius' entry based on Galen.

"Onion belongs to the fourth degree of things that heat. Its substance is composed of very large particles, whence it also opens up hemorrhoids when it is applied; when used full strength with vinegar in the sun, it washes away skin lesions; and when rubbed on bald spots, it stimulates the hair faster than alcuonium. When eaten, it heats the body with its acridity and thins thick and sticky humours in it. It fills the abdomen with air because its substance is composed of very thick particles."

Κρόμυον ἐκ τῆς τετάρτης ἐστὶ τάξεως τῶν θερμαινόντων· ἡ δὲ οὐσία αὐτοῦ παχυμερὴς μᾶλλον, ὅθεν καὶ τὰς αἱμορροίδας ἀναστομοῖ προστιθέμενον καὶ σὺν ὄξει καταχριόμενον ἐν ἡλίῳ τοὺς ἀλφοὺς ἀπορρύπτει καὶ παρατριβόμενον ἀλωπεκίαις θᾶττον ἀλκυονίου παρορμᾷ τὰς τρίχας. ἐσθιόμενον δὲ θερμαίνει μὲν τὸ σῶμα τῇ δριμύτητι καὶ λεπτύνει τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ παχεῖς καὶ γλίσχρους χυμούς· ἐμπνευματοῖ δὲ τὴν γαστέρα διὰ τὸ παχυμερὲς τῆς οὐσίας.

Aetius of Amida, Libri medicinales, I 232 (97,14-20 Olivieri)

Cf. Dioscorides, De materia medica, 2.151 (p.155 in Beck), which mentions many of the other uses of onions as well, adding to what is said above that it's useful for blisters on the feet (when it is mixed with chicken fat, hardness of hearing, sore throats, and stuffy noses, but that it causes headaches. He leaves out the part about people bites. Oddly, none of these passages mention the fact that onions make your cry, a fact that Aristotle's school was rather interested in:

(pseudo-)Aristotle on why onions cause tears, while garlic does not.

"Why is it that only onions cause the eyes to sting so excessively? People even say it got its name because of this, since [κρόμμυον] makes the pupil close [τὴν κόρην συμμύειν]. Marjoram doesn't, nor do other things which are acrid. Thus, watercress [lit. "up the nose"], because it is hotter, causes more drying than the colliquescence that it produces, since it produces tears in those who eat it; it does not, however, [produce tears] when it is brought close by, because it does not give off any thin vapour, for it is too dry and hot. Marjoram and similar hot things are dry and mild, but what is going to produce tears needs to be stinging, moist and sticky. For this reason, olive oil produces tears, although its stinging is weak. For because of its stickiness and fineness, it produces pain when it penetrates [the flesh], and produces liquefaction because of the pain. The onion has a similar capacity, hence the moisture and vapour from it is hot, fine and sticky. Thus, when it is brought close by, because of the kind of vapour that it is and because it carries with it a fine moisture, it produces tears; when it is eaten, the exhalation passes through […there is a lacuna here…]. Garlic is hot and acrid and has moisture, but it is not sticky, so it does not produce tears.

Διὰ τί τὸ κρόμμυον μόνον οὕτως περιττῶς δάκνει τὼ ὀφθαλμώ (διὸ καὶ τοὔνομά φασι τοῦτ' ἔχειν αὐτό, ὡς τὴν κόρην ποιεῖν συμμύειν), ἡ δὲ ὀρίγανος οὔ, οὐδ' ἄλλα δριμέα ὄντα; καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀνάρρινον μᾶλλον δάκνον οὐ ποιεῖ ὁμοίως δακρύειν προσφερόμενον, τὸ δὲ προσφερόμενον καὶ κατατρωγόμενον. ἢ ὅτι διαφοραὶ πολλαὶ ἀκολουθοῦσιν ἑκάστοις τῶν δριμέων, ἃ ποιεῖ τὴν ἰδίαν ἑκάστου δύναμιν; τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀνάρρινον διὰ τὸ θερμότερον εἶναι ξηραντικώτερόν ἐστι τῆς γινομένης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συντήξεως, ἐπεὶ ποιεῖ γε δάκρυον ἐσθίοντι· προσφερόμενον δὲ οὔ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπατμίζει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ λεπτόν τι· ξηρότερον γάρ ἐστι καὶ θερμότερον. ἡ δὲ ὀρίγανος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα θερμὰ ξηρά ἐστιν ἠρέμα. δεῖ δὲ τὸ μέλλον δάκρυον ποιήσειν δηκτικὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν εἶναι καὶ γλίσχρον. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον ποιεῖ δακρύειν, ἀσθενῆ ἔχον δῆξιν· διὰ γλισχρότητα γὰρ καὶ λεπτότητα παραδῦνον ποιεῖ τὸν πόνον, καὶ τὴν σύντηξιν διὰ τὸν πόνον. τὸ δὲ κρόμμυον τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὴν ἀτμίδα αὐτοῦ θερμὴν καὶ λεπτὴν καὶ γλίσχραν εἶναι. ὥστε προσφερόμενον μέν, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀτμίδα τοιαύτην εἶναι καὶ συναφιέναι ὑγρότητα λεπτήν, ποιεῖ δακρύειν, ἐσθιομένου δὲ ἡ ἀναθυμίασις διιοῦσα ... τὸ δὲ σκόροδον θερμὸν μὲν καὶ δριμύ ἐστι καὶ ὑγρότητα ἔχει, ἀλλ' οὐ γλίσχρον· διὸ οὐ ποιεῖ δακρύειν.

Pseudo-Aristotle, Problemata, 21.22, 925a27-925b12

Alexis on knowing frivolous things.

"You don’t know what you're talking about. Run over and have a conversation with Plato and become enlightened about soda and onions."

λέγεις περὶ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα· συγγενοῦ τρέχων
Πλάτωνι καὶ γνώσῃ λίτρον καὶ κρόμμυον.

Alexis, Ancylion ap. Diogenes Laertius, Vita philosophorum, 3.37

"When the soul is inflamed", part II

... Galen discusses the opinions of Aristotle, Plato and the Stoics on the relationship between nature, soul, vital breath and innate heat. Some physicians, perhaps the Pneumatists, were interested in finding the Stoic view already articulated by Hippocrates, particularly in a work called On Sevens, and in Epidemics 6, which is being discussed here. I've added paragraph breaks to make the text easier to read. This is a continuation from part i...

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In fact, some of those who wrote commentaries on the book under discussion say the word 'born' was written in the sense of 'becomes better'. They suppose it [sc. the soul] becomes better over time for those who are concerned about science and wisdom. This discussion, however, is neither medical nor is it consistent with what comes next, for it is clear from the following quotation that 'produced' is said about the substance of [the soul]: "when it is inflamed together with disease, the soul also consumes the body." The word 'inflamed' would seem to indicate Hippocrates thinks the substance of the soul is the innate heat, which he uses as a cause of natural activities in many other places.

On this point, there is also a great difference of opinion among philosophers. Some believe the substance of the soul and of nature are identical, some of these ones positing its existence in pneuma, others in a specific quality of the body. Certain people think it is not one substance, but claim each of them is distinct and differ not just in a small way in species, but wholly in kind. In this case, they think that the substance of nature is perishable, while that of the soul is imperishable.

Now, Aristotle and Plato introduce both capacities using one word, not only calling that by which we think and remember 'soul', but also the capacity in plants by which they are nourished, increased and preserved until they dry out over time. For the Stoics, on the other hand, it is customary to refer 'nature' to that by which plants are governed, 'soul' that by which animals are. They posit that the substance of both is the co-natural pneuma, and they think these differ from each other by quality: the pneuma of the soul is drier, that of nature more moist, but both require not only food in order to persist, but also air.

Whoever thinks the person who introduced this opinion is Hippocrates, according to what was mentioned in On Sevens, say the word 'born' is mentioned concerning the production in them of additional stuff from both substances, of food and air, since it is clearly observable and we know the usefulness of each of them. For it has been proven that respiration preserves the balance of the innate heat, while ingestion of food replenishes the flowing-out of bodily substance. Moreover, if the soul is a kind of form of the body, it would be appropriate to say that 'it is born until death.'  

Now, if there is some other substance, then concerning the one called 'nature', which Aristotle calls 'threptic', Plato 'epithumetic', what was said would be true; but it would not be true in the case of the 'dianoetic' soul. Certainly, that the innate heat, to which Hippocrates very often refers bodily functions, is inflamed, not only when it is no longer able to complete its previous activities or nourish us —which is its most important function—but also when it destroys and consumes like fire does, this is clear to us when we look carefully at the text and when we see the colliquesence of the body produced by excessively hot fevers.

Left out of the whole discussion is the third 'soul' or 'capacity' or whatever you might want to call it, which Plato called 'spirited'. It is good to mention this so that nothing is left out of our discussion about the soul. One kind of innate warmth, by which blood is produced, is contained in the liver. But a different, greater warmth has been received by the heart for the production of emotion. For if there is some use for it, as it has been pointed out in On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato, the one warmth needs respiration, the other transpiration. For thus it is customary for doctors to call what occurs through the artery along its whole body a 'double-activity', sending out residues at systole, drawing in outside air at diastole.

τῶν μέντοι γραψάντων ὑπομνήματα τοῦ προκειμένου βιβλίου τινὲς ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίων γίνεται τὸ «φύεταί» φασιν εἰρῆσθαι. γίνεσθαι δ' αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ βελτίονα νομίζουσι τοῖς προνοουμένοις ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ σοφίας, ἀλλ' οὔτε ἰατρικὸς ὁ λόγος οὔθ' ὁμολογῶν τοῖς ἐπιφερομένοις. ὅτι γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς εἴρηται τὸ «φύεται», δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ φάναι· «ἢν δ' ἐκπυρωθῇ, ἅμα τῇ νούσῳ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ <καὶ> τὸ σῶμα φέρβεται». καὶ δόξειε δ' ἂν ἐνδείκνυσθαι τὸ «ἐκπυρωθῇ» ῥῆμα τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν Ἱπποκράτην τὸ ἔμφυτον εἶναι θερμὸν, ὃ καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ἔργων αἰτιᾶται πολλαχόθι.

μέγιστον δ' ἐνταῦθα κινεῖται δόγμα διαπεφωνημένον καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς φιλοσόφοις. ἔνιοι μὲν ἡγοῦνται μίαν οὐσίαν εἶναι ψυχῆς τε καὶ φύσεως, οἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τιθέμενοι τὴν ὕπαρξιν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἰδιότητι. τινὲς δὲ οὐ μίαν, ἀλλ' ἰδίαν ἑκατέρᾳ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναί φασι καὶ οὐ σμικρῷ γ' <εἴδει> τινὶ διαφερούσας, ἀλλ' ὅλῳ τῷ γένει, ὅπου γε καὶ τὴν μὲν τῆς φύσεως φθαρτὴν εἶναι ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄφθαρτον.

Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν οὖν καὶ Πλάτων ὑπὸ μίαν προσηγορίαν ἀμφοτέρας ἄγουσι τὰς δυνάμεις, οὐ μόνον ᾗ λογιζόμεθα καὶ μεμνήμεθα ψυχὴν καλοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς, ᾗ τρέφεταί τε καὶ αὔξεται καὶ διασῴζεται, μέχρι περ ἂν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ξηρανθῇ. τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς δ' ἔθος ἐστὶ φύσιν μὲν ὀνομάζειν, ᾗ τὰ φυτὰ διοικεῖται, ψυχὴν δὲ ᾗ τὰ ζῷα, τὴν οὐσίαν ἀμφοτέρων μὲν τίθενται τὸ σύμφυτον πνεῦμα καὶ διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων οἴονται ποιότητι. ξηρότερον μὲν γὰρ πνεῦμα τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὑγρότερον δὲ τὸ τῆς φύσεως εἶναι, δεῖσθαι δ' ἄμφω πρὸς διαμονὴν οὐ τροφῆς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀέρος.

καὶ ὅσοι γε τοῦ δόγματος τούτου νομίζουσιν ἡγεμόνα τὸν Ἱπποκράτην γεγονέναι, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἑβδομάδων εἴρηται, τὸ «φύεσθαι» λέγουσιν εἰρῆσθαι κατὰ τῆς γινομένης ἐν αὐτοῖς προσθέσεως ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν οὐσιῶν, τῆς τε <τροφῆς καὶ> τοῦ ἀέρος, <ὡς> ἐναργῶς φαίνεται καὶ τὴν ἑκατέρου χρείαν ἐπιστάμεθα (δέδεικται γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀναπνοὴ τὴν συμμετρίαν τῆς ἐμφύτου θερμασίας φυλάττειν, ἡ δὲ τῶν σιτίων προσφορὰ τὸ διαρρέον τῆς σωματικῆς οὐσίας ἀναπληροῦν) καὶ, εἴπερ εἶδός τι τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, προσηκόντως ἂν λέγοιτο «φύεσθαι μέχρι τοῦ θανάτου». 

εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἑτέρα τις αὐτῆς <ἡ> οὐσία, <περὶ ταύτης> τῆς φύσεως, ἣν Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν ὀνομάζει θρεπτικὴν, ἐπιθυμητικὴν δὲ Πλάτων, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ εἰρημένον, οὐκ ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς διανοητικῆς ψυχῆς. ὅτι μέντοι τὸ ἔμφυτον θερμόν, ᾧ μάλιστα ἀναφέρει τὰ σωματικὰ τῶν ἔργων ὁ Ἱπποκράτης, ἐκπυρωθὲν οὐ μόνον οὐκέτι δύναται τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ἐνεργείας ἐπιτελεῖν οὐδὲ τρέφειν ἡμᾶς, ὅπερ ἦν ἔργον αὐτῷ κυριώτατον, ἀλλὰ διαφθείρει τε καὶ τήκει καθάπερ τὸ πῦρ, εὔδηλόν ἐστι τῷ λόγῳ σκοπουμένοις ἡμῖν καὶ τὰς <γινομένας> ὑπὸ τῶν διακαῶν πυρετῶν συντήξεις τοῦ σώματος ἐναργῶς ὁρῶσι.

παραλελειμμένης δὲ κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον λόγον ἅπαντα τῆς τρίτης ψυχῆς ἢ δυνάμεως ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃς ὀνομάζειν αὐτήν, ἣν ὁ Πλάτων ἐκάλει θυμοειδῆ, καὶ περὶ ταύτης ἄμεινόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ μηδὲν ἔτι ὑπολείπεσθαι κατὰ τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς λόγον. θερμασία μέν τις ἔμφυτος ἐν ἥπατι περιέχεται, καθ' ἣν αἷμα γεννᾶται· θερμασία δὲ ἑτέρα πλείων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν εἰς θυμοῦ γένεσιν ἡμῖν δοθεῖσα. καὶ γὰρ <εἰ> χρεία τούτου τίς ἐστιν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τῶν Ἱπποκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος δογμάτων ἐπιδέδεικται, δεῖται μὲν αὕτη ἡ θερμασία τῆς ἀναπνοῆς, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς διαπνοῆς. οὕτω γὰρ ὀνομάζειν ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς ἰατροῖς τὴν διὰ τῶν ἀρτηριῶν γινομένην καθ' ὅλον τὸ σῶμα διττὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐκπεμπουσῶν αἰθαλῶδες περίττωμα κατὰ τὴν συστολὴν, ἑλκουσῶν δὲ τὸν πέριξ ἀέρα κατὰ τὴν διαστολήν.

Galen, Commentary on Hippocrates' Epidemics 6, 5.5 (272,10-274,11 Wenkebach = XVIIB 249-253 Kühn)

More from Michael of Ephesus on dreams

Michael is again talking about his dreams.  Here, he comments on a passage from On prophesying by dreams. Aristotle says in this passage that dreams are more vivid when they involve things we are anxious or thinking about. Michael disagrees--dreams about our anxieties (or even our recent conscious thoughts) are not the only ones that can be extremely vivid. We can have dreams about things that are not on our minds, as well, that feel just as bright and real. As an example, he mentions a dream he had about a colleague who died when he was young, and whom he (curiously) distinguishes from his current, more famous, colleague and collaborator on ‘the discourses’. The names of both have been lost to time.

"And in fact [we have vivid dreams] even if something else should appear to us, [something] which we are not [currently] thinking about. Like the time I saw my colleague in a dream—not my famous [colleague], who is alive and working with me on the discourses (τοὺς λόγους), but another one who, because of the quick approach of death, wrote down only a few works in philosophy—anyway, I saw the one who died long ago in a dream; he was discussing things with me which I had not thought about during that whole month, or even the month before, [but which I] had thought about a lot in earlier times. For both my questions to him and his answers to me were about the soul."

καὶ γὰρ κἂν ἄλλο τι ἡμῖν φαίνηται, οὗπερ οὐ φροντίζομεν· ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ ἰδόντι τὸν ἐμὸν ἑταῖρον, οὐχὶ τὸν κλεινόν μοι τουτονί, ὅστις ἔτι μοι ζῶν συμπονεῖ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ἄλλον ὀλίγους ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ πόνους καταβεβληκότα διὰ τὴν τοῦ θανάτου σύντομον προσέλευσιν, ἐγὼ γοῦν ἐκεῖνον πάλαι θανόντα εἶδον καθ' ὕπνον διαλεγόμενόν μοι, περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ κατ' ἐκεῖνον ὅλον τὸν μῆνα καὶ ἔτι τὸν πρὸ ἐκείνου οὐκ ἐφρόντισα, πρότερον πολλὰ φροντίσας· ἦσαν γὰρ περὶ ψυχῆς αἱ ἐμαί τε πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἐρωτήσεις κἀκείνου πρός με αἱ ἀποκρίσεις.

Michael of Ephesus, In parva naturalia commentaria, CAG 22.1, 85,3-11 Wendland